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Abstract
In today’s networked society, security protocols are widely used by the majority of
people. From web browsing and instant messaging to cash machines, we are all, directly
or indirectly, using protocols in order to ensure that certain security properties, such as
integrity or confidentiality, hold. However, a significant number of real world attacks on
the implementation of security protocols are against the surrounding components, such
as the users, and not directly against the protocol itself. In a protocol specification, the
human actions are usually included in the design assumptions, without being explicitly
described in the protocol flow. When implemented, these assumptions are then replaced
by dynamic user-interactions. It is often the case that these assumptions do not hold
in practice. If this happens, the implementation can fail to deliver the security goals
that the protocol has been designed to provide.
Security ceremonies, introduced by Ellison, can be described as an extension of se-
curity protocols which includes whatever was originally left out-of-band. In a ceremony
the node types may include devices and humans, and the communication channels may
vary, including not only the traditional network channels, but also human commu-
nication (e.g. speech) and human-device communication (e.g. user-interfaces). The
increased coverage that ceremonies allow means that assumptions, which previously
provided relatively static input to protocol design, are now a more explicit part of
the model. This allows a more detailed analysis of their influence on the ceremony’s
security goals.
In this thesis, we provide a thorough review of security ceremonies and what we can
achieve through including them in the design and analysis of a security implementation.
First, we propose a taxonomy of human-protocol interaction weaknesses. This is impor-
tant because the human elements of a ceremony are very hard to model. We outline a
taxonomy of the most common human-interaction difficulties that can potentially result
in successful attacks against protocol implementations. We then map these weaknesses
onto a set of design recommendations aimed at minimising those weaknesses. Such
a taxonomy and recommendations are important when modelling the user interaction
in a ceremony to prevent an unrealistic expectation of the user’s actions. Next, we
describe a framework for designing and analysing security ceremonies. We provide a
description of the agent types, communication channels, events and an adaptive threat
model, designed to accurately reflect real world scenarios. We then analyse existing
ceremonies using our framework and present the results. Finally, we discuss how all of
our findings are related and could be used and developed further.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Security Protocols in the Real World . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.1 Security Protocols in the Real World
Security is very important to today’s network based communications. Cryptogra-
phy, a very active research area, is an essential component for secure communica-
tions. However, cryptography alone is not enough. Security protocols, which define
sequences of operations and rules among agents, must be correctly defined and im-
plemented to make a communication secure. By secure, we mean achieving relevant
Figure 1.1: Desire Path1
security properties within a given con-
text. Security properties are quite var-
ied, normally being integrity, confiden-
tiality and authentication, but not lim-
ited to only those services. We all, di-
rectly or indirectly, use security protocols
on a daily basis. Web browsing, instant
messaging, payments using credit cards,
cash machines, and many other services
that are part of our daily routine rely on
security protocols to ensure that certain
security properties, hold.
1image by Alan Stanton - http://flic.kr/p/bNU5cF
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1.1. Security Protocols in the Real World
Security protocols (also called cryptographic protocols) are widely researched, and
methods for verifying whether protocols achieve their claimed security goals are well
developed and mature [69, 16]. However, a significant number of real world attacks on
the implementation of security protocols are against the surrounding components, such
as the users, and not directly against the protocol itself. In a protocol specification, the
human actions are usually included in the design assumptions, without being explicitly
described in the protocol flow. When implemented, these assumptions are then replaced
by dynamic user-interactions. It is often the case that these assumptions do not hold
in practice. If this happens, the implementation can fail to deliver the security goals
that the protocol has been designed to provide.
A good ‘real-world’ example of such misalignment between design and practice,
which all of us are likely to see very often, is the desire path. Desire paths are those
unpaved paths created over time by human and animal footsteps. As we can see in
Figure 1.1, they show that the designed path is not aligned with the users’ desired
path. Therefore, even though there is a paved sidewalk in place, which is likely to be
more comfortable, safe, etc., humans tend to use the path where they can easily achieve
their goals.
Figure 1.2: Another Desire Path 2
Such misalignments may happen for
several reasons and under different con-
ditions and scenarios, as we will see in
this thesis. In security protocols, these
misalignments also happen, usually when
protocols’ assumptions are implemented.
As we might expect, predicting human
behaviour is a very complex and difficult
task. However, leaving human interaction
out-of-bounds may increase the chances
of incorrect expectations about the user
behaviour, and therefore introduce secu-
rity flaws in practice. As we can see in
Figure 1.2, security mechanisms designed to prevent certain actions may be simply
ignored or misused by humans when put into practice and easier alternatives are avail-
able.
The idea of extending security protocols to include whatever was originally left
out-of-bounds was introduced by Ellison [47]. One of the main additions in ceremonies
is that now, human interaction is more explicit in the design and specification. In a
2image by Will S. - http://flic.kr/p/6o7HAZ
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1.2. Contributions
ceremony, the node types include (but are not limited to) devices and humans, and the
communication channels may vary, including not only the traditional network channels,
but also human communication (e.g. speech) and human-device communication (e.g.
user-interfaces). The increased coverage that ceremonies allow means that assumptions,
which previously provided relatively static input to protocol design, are now a more
explicit part of the model. This allows a more detailed analysis of their influence on
the ceremony’s security goals.
In this thesis we demonstrate that by extending protocol analysis to ceremony
analysis, we can potentially find and solve security flaws that were previously not
detectable.
1.2 Contributions
The high-level contribution of this thesis is to reduce the gap between security and
human-computer interaction by tackling the problem using security ceremonies. We
provide a thorough review of security ceremonies and what we can achieve by including
them in the design and analysis of a security implementation. The thesis is structured
to sequentially represent all the steps we performed in order to reach a point where
we can design and analyse security ceremonies. We used a multidisciplinary approach
where we make use of concepts and ideas from different areas such as computer science,
social sciences, psychology, web design and HCI design, to be able to develop a com-
prehensive model for the design and analysis of security ceremonies. We begin with a
taxonomy of human-protocol interaction weaknesses. Such a taxonomy highlights the
most common human-interaction difficulties that can potentially result in successful
attacks against protocol implementations. Then, we map these weaknesses onto a set
of design recommendations aimed at minimising their impacts. The development of a
taxonomy and recommendations are important when modelling the user interaction in
a ceremony. By considering them, we are able to minimise an unrealistic expectation
of the user’s actions.
After developing the taxonomy and creating a set of recommendations, the natural
next step was to move to the design and analysis of security ceremonies. Then we
developed a framework for designing and analysing security ceremonies. We provide
a description of agent types, communication channels, events and an adaptive threat
model, designed to accurately reflect real world scenarios. With this framework, we can
start modelling security ceremonies and analyse the outcomes. We then analyse existing
ceremonies, such as Bluetooth’s legacy pairing ceremony and Simple Secure Pairing,
as well as the WhatsApp messenger registration ceremony, using our framework and
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1.3. Thesis Outline
present the results. Finally, we discuss how all of our findings are related and could be
used and developed further.
Part of the contents of this thesis presents revised and updated versions of the
following papers:
1. J. E. Martina and M. C. Carlos. Why should we analyse security ceremonies?
First CryptoForma workshop, May 2010.
2. M. C. Carlos and G. Price. Understanding the weaknesses of human-protocol
interaction. In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, FC’12, pages 13–26, Berlin, Heidelberg, Mar.
2012. Springer-Verlag.
3. M. C. Carlos, J. E. Martina, G. Price, and R. F. Custodio. A proposed framework
for analysing security ceremonies. In P. Samarati, W. Lou, and J. Zhou, editors,
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Security and Cryptography,
SECRYPT 12, pages 440–445. SciTePress, July 2012.
4. M. C. Carlos, J. Martina, G. Price, and R. F. Custodio. An updated threat model
for security ceremonies. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on
Applied Computing, SAC ’13, pages 1836–1843, New York, NY, USA, Mar. 2013.
ACM.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The structure of the thesis represents the sequence of steps we performed in order to
reach the point where we could design and analyse security ceremonies and discuss the
results achieved.
We start, in Chapter 2, by introducing the description of the basic concepts that
are used throughout the thesis, as well as fixing the notation used in this work. We also
provide a general description of the main protocols, which are extended to ceremonies
throughout the thesis, that are relevant for the following chapters.
In Chapter 3 we present our proposed taxonomy of the most common characteris-
tics and behavioural patterns involved in human-protocol interaction. In addition to
the taxonomy, we propose a set of design recommendations aimed at minimising the
security inherent problems in the human-protocol interaction.
The contents of this chapter are the starting point of our research. The study we
conducted led us to better understand why some protocols fail when implemented, and
15
1.3. Thesis Outline
provided grounds that allowed us to analyse and discuss mechanisms to address some
of the existing problems.
In Chapter 4 we present a framework that allows us to design and analyse security
ceremonies. We present new agent types, communication channels, events and an
adaptive threat model designed to accurately reflect real world scenarios.
Then, in Chapter 5, making use of the taxonomy and the framework we proposed,
we modelled and analysed ceremonies based on existing and well known protocols.
We analyse each scenario by discussing the ceremonies and their possible variations.
For each setting, we propose a realistic threat model, informally analyse the possible
outcomes and prove the properties of the ceremonies discussed by using an automatic
cryptographic protocol verifier (ProVerif). We then discuss the results of the analysis
performed and highlight the gains obtained by analysing ceremonies.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we conclude the thesis by providing final remarks and dis-
cussing our achievements followed by a discussion of how our ideas could be used and
developed further.
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In this chapter we introduce the basic concepts that will be used throughout this
thesis, as well as the notation which has been used in this work. We describe of
the main ceremonies we analyse in this thesis and are relevant to the following
chapters.
2.1 Security Ceremonies
We all, directly or indirectly, use security protocols nowadays. From web browsing to
cash machines, we all rely on the implementation of protocols to provide assurance that
certain security properties, such as integrity or confidentiality, hold in practice. Proto-
cols have been thoroughly analysed since Needham and Schroeder [71] first introduced
the idea and several methods and tools have been developed in order to prove protocols’
goals. Therefore, we can say that protocol design and analysis is a well established and
mature research field.
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Nevertheless, during the last decade, the awareness that information security is
much more than just a technical issue has been consolidated [15]. Recent research
[57, 41, 76, 56, 64] shows that even the most widely analysed and deployed protocols
can exhibit security flaws when put into practice. This usually happens when a user
of an implemented protocol acts in an unexpected, although plausible, way. This
reinforces the claim made by Bella and Coles-Kemp that accomplishing a security goal
in practice requires heterogeneous and combined efforts from computer scientists, social
scientists, experimental psychologists, cognitive scientists, and web and HCI designers
[15].
The technical side of a protocol focuses on the computer level, and therefore, pro-
tocols tend to focus on interaction between computers. However, protocols are usually
built to facilitate or accomplish a human task and thus we should design and verify
such protocols by also focusing on human interaction. The idea of ceremonies was
introduced in 20031 [46], and elaborated upon further in 2007 [47], extends the concept
of a security protocols by including humans as nodes in the network. Ellison states
that a ceremony is like a network protocol, but some of its nodes may be human and
the network links are not limited to traditional communications channels.
In general terms, a ceremony is an extension of a protocol, where the nodes types
include devices and humans, and the communication channels may vary, including not
only the traditional network channels, but also human communication (e.g. speech)
and human-device communication (e.g. user-interfaces). Figure 2.1 gives a general
overview of the association between ceremony and protocol.
Figure 2.1: Protocol and Ceremony association
Such a detailed level of description introduces interesting characteristics to cere-
mony descriptions. A protocol leaves some components (e.g. human-device interaction)
1Ellison mentions in that document that the term “ceremony” for such a purpose was defined by
Jessie Walker.
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as ‘out-of-bounds’ and does not define nor clarify how they should work in practice,
leaving them as assumptions. When the assumptions are unrealistic, it becomes ex-
tremely difficult to translate the protocol assumption into an implementation that still
provides the expected security properties. That is one of the main reasons why we
still have practical attacks on well stablished protocols. A ceremony, due to its more
detailed description, inherently contain more fine-grained assumptions when compared
to protocols. When designing a ceremony, the user interaction (e.g. messages that the
user inputs or receives) needs to be explicitly described.
The inclusion of humans into the specification introduces a considerable complexity
into the analysis. Humans are a more error prone and unpredictable node. The non-
deterministic behaviour of humans is hard to model and analyse. The state machine of
a human, their knowledge, skills, strategies and limitations are very complex structures
to deal with. We obviously cannot model a human node that matches an exact human
being but we can learn some common characteristics empirically (as we see in Chapter
3) and use them in order to develop a more robust ceremony.
In this thesis, we consider that a ceremony has two possible node types: humans
and devices. Human nodes represent human beings that are part of the ceremony, and
devices could be a device of any type, such as a computer, smart phone, etc. We also
consider that a ceremony has three possible communication channels to represent the
human-human, human-device, and device-device communication (we will discuss node
types and communication channels in more details in Chapter 4).
2.2 Ceremonies versus Protocols
Both security ceremonies and security protocols can be defined as a sequence of inter-
actions among agents to achieve a certain security goal, such as entity authentication,
key distribution, confidentiality and anonymity. The difference between ceremonies
and protocols is that, as we can see in Figure 2.1, ceremonies are a superset of se-
curity protocols. As a result, we can say that all security protocols are ceremonies.
However, ceremonies based on the same protocol, due to the extended coverage and
context added to its description, are different from each other. In other words, and as
described by Radke et al., a ceremony is a (set of) protocol(s) in its context of use [80].
As we have mentioned earlier, ceremonies can potentially include everything that
has been left as assumptions in a protocol, such as additional node types, communica-
tion channels, internal assumptions and operations which were previously considered
out-of-bounds. As examples of these out-of-bounds operations we have user interaction
via human-device interface, human knowledge and capabilities, and key provisioning.
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A protocol runs among two or more nodes and each node has its own state, its
set of possible messages and a state machine. The communication channel (network)
between the nodes can be analysed against very powerful attackers that might control
the whole channel. Ceremonies, as opposed to protocols, do not necessarily require a
(classic) network. We may have additional channels to represent human-human and
human-device communication. To analyse and verify security protocols there are several
techniques and methods, and all of this analytical power is available to ceremonies
[47]. We just need to adapt the threat model to each new channel and verify them
accordingly. As we will discuss in Chapter 4, the threats to the new channels can be
different to the classic network channel that is used for protocols. Additionally, we may
have ceremonies that do not make use of a network channel at all. A ceremony that
covers only communication between devices and humans, or only between humans, is
an example of a ceremony which does not include traditional communication protocols.
Another relevant difference between ceremonies and protocols is the level of details
included in the assumptions. While in a protocol specification we define assumptions to
represent out-of-bounds operations, ceremonies turn assumptions into realistic design
parameters. The inclusion of the human nodes, and their interaction with the ceremony,
enriches the detail and coverage of the analysis. In security protocols we include several
assumptions for operations that are considered out-of-scope, such as human-device
interaction, human-human interaction, key provisioning, human knowledge, etc.; in
security ceremonies we explicitly include such interactions. By including a human node,
we have to define and use additional communication channels such as user-interfaces,
for human-device interaction, and a human channel, to represent speech, gestures, etc.,
for human-human interaction. Nevertheless, security ceremonies still require the use
of certain assumptions. For example, some initial knowledge regarding the human
agent, but the assumptions tend to be more precisely described, fine grained and more
realistic.
It is important to emphasize that the gains from designing and analysing security
ceremonies are directly linked to the quality and accuracy with which we describe the
additional components of a ceremony when compared to protocols. In protocols, it
is relatively simple to predict the agents’ behaviour and expect a deterministic set of
possible outcomes. The communication channel is usually a network channel and it
follows the same rules regarding the threat model it is subject to. In ceremonies, we
have to deal with the challenge of adding human nodes into the specification. This
brings additional communication channels, such as the human-device channel and the
device-device channel and the human agent type in addition to the already existing
device (or computer) type. All of these new additions have their own possible set of
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threats, nuances and complexity, making ceremony design and analysis a challenging
process.
2.3 Notation
In this section, we describe the basic notation that we will adopt in this thesis. The
notation we chose for describing security protocols and ceremonies is very similar to
the notation that is commonly used for describing protocols.
2.3.1 Ceremony and Protocol Notation
The notation we use for protocol description consists of describing each step of the
protocols in a line identified by a sequential number. Each step is divided into three
main blocks: the first block is composed by a step number followed by a dot (“.”); the
second block contains the name of the sender on the left side, an arrow that indicates
the flow of the message in the center (usually from left to right), followed by the name
of the receiver and a delimiter, indicated by a colon (“:”), that represents the end of the
second block; the third block contains the message. The components in the message are
delimited by a comma (“,”) and may be grouped using braces “{” and “}” to indicate
the use of a cryptographic function over the grouped message components. Figure 2.2
shows an example of the notation we use.
1. A −→ B : A,Na
2. B −→ A : {B,Nb,Na}Kab
Figure 2.2: Example of protocol notation
This protocol consists of two steps, where in the first agent A sends to agent B a
two component message composed of his identity A concatenated with a nonce Na.
The second describes a message from agent B to the agent A. In this message we have
the concatenation of B’s identity, a nonce Nb and the nonce Na, encrypted with a key
Kab. In other words, B sends a encrypted message to A, using the key Kab, containing
its identity, Nb and Na.
The notation for ceremonies is very similar to the one used in protocols. The
difference exists because of the different communication channels (which may be subject
to different threat models), hence the need to differentiate over which channel the
message is being sent. To do that, we add a label below the arrows (in the second
block) to specify the name of the channel. Figure 2.3 shows an example of the notation
being used.
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1. B −−→
DD
A : B,Nb
2. A −−→
HD
U : B
Figure 2.3: Example of ceremony notation
Similar to the protocol described earlier, this ceremony consists of two steps, where
in the first agent B sends to agent A, via the network channel identified by DD, a two
component message composed of his identity B concatenated with a nonce Nb. The
names used to differentiate the channels and that we will adopt throughout this thesis
will be defined in Chapter 4. The second step describes a message from agent A to the
agent U via the HD channel. In this message we have B’s identity being sent.
2.3.2 Logical Notation
This thesis also contains a few logical expressions, hence in Table 2.1 we present the
logical symbols we used, followed by how they are read in English.
Symbol Logical Context Reads as
∧ conjunction “and”
∨ disjunction “or”
∪ union “the union of”
¬ negation “not”
= equality “is equal to”
∈ set membership “is in”
/∈ negation of set membership “is not in”
Table 2.1: Logical Notation
2.4 Protocols Studied
In this section, we describe the protocols we will discuss and analyse in this thesis. The
focus of the description at this moment is only at the protocol level. In Chapter 5 we
then model ceremonies based on these protocols and analyse these ceremonies in more
detail.
2.4.1 Bluetooth Pairing
Bluetooth is a short-range communication system intended to replace the cables con-
necting portable and/or fixed electronic devices [21]. The establishment of such com-
munication has a momentary nature, created for data exchange between the devices.
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Bluetooth has been designed with robustness, low power consumption, and low cost in
mind.
Bluetooth devices work under two modes of operation, namely, discoverable and
non-discoverable. When operating in the discoverable mode, the device responds to in-
quiries made by other (unknown) devices. On the other hand, when in non-discoverable
mode, a device only responds to enquiries from devices with whom it has previously
set up communication.
When two devices are communicating for the first time, they do not have a common
link key. Therefore, such a key shall be created. To create a new key, a procedure called
“pairing” is used. Pairing allows devices to mutually authenticate themselves and
create a shared symmetric key, which will provide the basis for all security transactions
between those devices. There are two procedures for pairing. The first is currently
known as the Legacy Pairing Protocol and the second is the Secure Simple Pairing.
The legacy pairing protocol, in use from Bluetooth’s version 1.0 to 2.0+EDR (En-
hanced Data Rate), generally makes use of a user input to establish the connection.
User(s) of both devices in the pairing are asked to type a PIN code into each device
which is used as part of the connection establishment. For devices with limited input
capabilities (e.g. headsets), a fixed PIN number is used (e.g. 0000), whereas for ad-
vanced devices, such as mobile phones or computers, a numeric or alpha-numeric PIN
may be used.
For recent versions of Bluetooth, a different pairing mechanism is defined. This
new pairing procedure is called Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) and is available from ver-
sion 2.1+EDR and above. SSP was designed to solve several problems found in earlier
versions of the pairing protocol. First, it simplifies the pairing process from the user’s
perspective, offering different pairing options and requiring fewer and simpler interac-
tions. In addition to the usability improvements, it adds increased protection against
passive (eavesdropping) and active (man-in-the-middle) attacks. This additional pro-
tection solves flaws found in earlier versions that allowed attackers to perform oﬄine
attacks and deploy man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks [24, 25, 57, 92, 34].
2.4.1.1 Legacy Pairing Protocol
The legacy pairing protocol, which is the pairing mechanism used from Bluetooth
version 1.0 to 2.0+EDR aims to allow devices to create a shared symmetric key called
Kinit, authenticate one device to the other (mutually in most cases), and generate a
link key, which is a key that will provide the basis for all security transactions between
these pairing devices.
The pairing process includes several steps. First, a personal identification number
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(PIN) must be set for the both pairing Bluetooth devices. The way that the PIN can
be set varies. It can be variable, and therefore be defined via user input (if the devices
support such a feature) or it can be fixed (in devices with limited input capabilities,
such as headsets). Entering a PIN in to both devices is recommended according to the
specification and should be used whenever possible [23]. The PIN must be the same
for both devices involved in the pairing process. For most applications, the PIN is a
short string of numbers, consisting usually of four digits, but it can be up to 16 octets.
In addition to sharing the same PIN , each device has its own (unique) Bluetooth device
address.
The protocol is composed of 8 messages that can be divided in three different parts.
The initial assumption is that both agents involved initiate the protocol run with the
same initial knowledge, which is composed by PIN and each others bluetooth addresses
(BD ADDRA and BD ADDRB).
In Figure 2.4 we present the first part of the protocol, which we call initialisation
phase. The main goal of this phase is to allow both peers to generate the initialisation
key Kinit. To do that, both peers, which already share a common PIN and know
each others bluetooth device addresses (BD ADDRA and BD ADDRB), initiate a
communication by A sending a 128-bit random number IN RAND to agent B, which
replies with an ACCEPTED message. With these values, both sides can now calculate
Kinit by using the algorithm e22, which is based on the SAFER+ cipher
2 [67]. The
inputs for this function are BD ADDR, PIN and IN RAND. In order to define which
Bluetooth address should be used (BD ADDRA or BD ADDRB), the following rule
is applied: if one device has a fixed PIN the BD ADDR of the other device should be
used. If both devices have a variable PIN the BD ADDR of the device that received
IN RAND (B in our example) should be used.
Device A Device B
Generate IN RAND
IN RAND
ACCEPTED
Calculate: Kinit =
e22(BD ADDRB , P IN, IN RAND)
Calculate: Kinit =
e22(BD ADDRB , P IN, IN RAND)
Figure 2.4: Sequence diagram for the legacy mode pairing - part 1 (Initialisation)
2The algorithms e21 and e1 used in this protocol are also based on the SAFER+ cipher.
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After calculating Kinit, the next part is the authentication phase (Figure 2.5). The
goal is to mutually authenticate the devices using a challenge-response mechanism.
First, to authenticate B, A generates a 128-bit random number AU RANDA and sends
it to B. On the other side, B calculates the authentication response SRES1 using the
e1 algorithm with Kinit, BD ADDRB and AU RANDA as inputs
3 and sends it to
A. Then A is able to verify if SRES1 sent by B matches the value expected by A. If
it does, the protocol continues and the other side and B repeats a similar process to
authenticate A.
Device A Device B
Generate AU RANDA
AU RANDA
Calculate: SRES1 =
e1(Kinit, BD ADDRB , AU RANDA)
SRES1
Verify if: SRES1 =
e1(Kinit, BD ADDRB , AU RANDA)
Generate AU RANDB
AU RANDB
Calculate: SRES2 =
e1(Kinit, BDADDRA, AU RANDB)
SRES2
Verify if: SRES2 =
e1(Kinit, BDADDRA, AU RANDB)
Figure 2.5: Sequence diagram for the legacy mode pairing - part 2 (authentication)
Finally, the last part is calculating the link key KAB, as we show in Figure 2.6.
To generate this key, A generates a 128-bit random number LK RANDA, xors it
with Kinit and sends the resulting value (E LK RANDA) to B. The other peer, B,
obtains LK RANDA by xoring E LK RANDA with his Kinit generated in part 1, and
repeats the same process as A. It generates a 128-bit random number LK RANDB,
xors it with Kinit and sends the resulting value (E LK RANDB) to A, who obtains
3Note that if the link key generation part is run before the authentication, Kinit shall be replaced
by KAB as input for the e1 function.
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LK RANDB by using Kinit. Since both devices know Kinit, each device now holds
both random numbers LK RANDA and LK RANDB. At this point, both parties
have the information they need to calculate KAB by using the e21 algorithm twice and
xoring the results.
Device A Device B
Generate LK RANDA
Calculate: E LK RANDA =
LK RANDA ⊕ Kinit
E LK RANDA
Obtains LK RANDA =
E LK RANDA ⊕Kinit
Generate LK RANDB
Calculate: E LK RANDB =
LK RANDB ⊕ Kinit
E LK RANDB
Obtains LK RANDB =
E LK RANDB ⊕Kinit
Calculate: KAB =
(e21(LK RANDA, BD ADDRA) ⊕
e21(LK RANDB , BD ADDRB))
Calculate: KAB =
(e21(LK RANDA, BD ADDRA) ⊕
e21(LK RANDB , BD ADDRB))
Figure 2.6: Sequence diagram for the legacy mode pairing - part 3 (Link key calculation)
As we can see, the protocol relies on the PIN . It is clear that if an attacker is
capable of obtaining the PIN value, then the protocol properties of confidentiality
and authentication are violated. Confidentiality is violated because, by knowing the
value of PIN , the attacker will have all the required information to calculate Kinit.
Authentication is also violated because an attacker can successfully impersonate a
device by knowing Kinit and the device’s Bluetooth address. Additionally, the PIN
is a low entropy input (usually 4-digit long) susceptible to oﬄine attacks, as discussed
and presented in related papers [57, 92, 34].
For clarity and simplification, Figure 2.7 presents the full protocol using protocol
notation.
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1. A −→ B : IN RAND
2. B −→ A : ACCEPTED
3. A −→ B : AU RANDA
4. B −→ A : SRES1 = e1(Kinit, BD ADDRB, AU RANDA)
5. B −→ A : AU RANDB
6. A −→ B : SRES2 = e1(Kinit, BD ADDRA, AU RANDB)
7. A −→ B : E LK RANDA = LK RANDA ⊕Kinit
8. B −→ A : E LK RANDB = LK RANDB ⊕Kinit
Figure 2.7: Protocol description for Bluetooth legacy mode pairing
2.4.1.2 Simple Secure Pairing
Bluetooth’s new pairing procedure, called “secure simple pairing” (SSP), was presented
in version 2.1+EDR and, at the time of writing, it is still the current pairing mechanism
in use. SSP was designed to mitigate several problems found in the legacy pairing
protocol. The two main focuses of this protocol are on improving usability by offering
different pairing options and simplifying user interactions, and on mitigating security
problems against passive and active attacks.
SSP presents four distinct association modes designed to cover most device types.
The just works (JW) mode is designed for devices with limited display and input
capabilities, possibly without them. In this mode, the associating devices exchange
public keys, nonces and a commitment value but nothing is displayed for the user,
except in some implementations where the user might be asked whether to accept
the connection or not. The numeric comparison (NC) association mode, which
is our main focus in this thesis, makes use of the same protocol as the just works
mode. The difference between them is that the numeric comparison mode is designed
for devices capable of displaying digits (a 6-digit number) and accepting user inputs
(“yes” or “no”). Due to the additional capability of the device, the protocol includes
an additional authentication step, which is performed by the user. Both devices display
a number (based on the nonces and public keys shared between the devices) and the
users have to check whether the numbers shown are the same for both devices. If they
are equal, the pairing is successful. The third association mode is the out of band
(OOB) and it is designed for scenarios where an out of band mechanism is used for
discovering devices as well as exchanging the cryptographic information required for
the pairing process. For example, when using two devices that support Near Field
Communication (NFC), the user(s) would touch the two devices together to perform
the pairing. The last mode is the passkey entry (PE), which is designed for situations
where the pairing devices have different input and display capabilities. For example,
where one device has only input capabilities, such as a keyboard, and the other has
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only displaying capabilities, for example, a screen [24].
The SSP protocol is divided into five phases, and phases one, three, four and five
are the same for all modes/protocols. Phase two, which focuses on achieving mutual
authentication between the devices, is unique for each association mode. Our focus in
this thesis is on the SSP protocol under the numeric comparison mode. Therefore, we
will concentrate on phases one and two of the SSP protocol using the NC mode and
assume that all following phases are correct.
Phase one, called Public Key Exchange, is presented in a protocol description in
Figure 2.8. Prior to the beginning of this phase, each device generates its own Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key pair. Note that this key pair is required to be
generated only once per device and could be generated at any point prior to the pairing
or during the first pairing of the device.
1. A −→ B : PKA
2. B −→ A : PKB
Figure 2.8: Protocol description the SSP - phase one
As shown in the sequence diagram presented in Figure 2.9, in order to start the
pairing process, the initiating device, sends its public key PKA to the receiving de-
vice. The responding device then replies by sending its own public key PKB. At this
point, both devices have the necessary information to calculate DHKey, using a P192
function that computes a FIPS approved P-192 elliptic curve, which will be used to
generate the link key later in the protocol.
Device A Device B
PKA
PKB
Calculate:
DHKey = P192(SKA, PKB)
Calculate:
DHKey = P192(SKB , PKA)
Figure 2.9: Sequence diagram for the SSP - phase one
Phase two starts as soon as phase one is concluded. In NC mode, considering
that Na and Nb are nonces and the function f1 is a function to generate the 128-bit
commitment value Cb, the protocol in phase two is presented in Figure 2.10.
As we can see in the protocol description, there are only 3 steps in phase two in the
NC mode. However, there are important steps which are not explicitly described. Fig-
ure 2.11 presents a detailed sequence diagram of phase two. After exchanging nonces
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1. B −→ A : Cb = f1(PKB, PKA, Nb, 0)
2. A −→ B : Na
3. B −→ A : Nb
Figure 2.10: Protocol description for the SSP - phase two
with B, A verifies if the value of Cb sent by B matches the value A calculates. Addi-
tionally, there are two confirmation values that must be calculated by the devices A and
B. The confirmation values are Va and Vb which are generated via a known function g
using the values PKA, PKB, Na, Nb, that were shared between the devices during the
previous protocol messages, as parameters. Va and Vb are values that will be shown
on devices A and B’s displays respectively. Finally, the users of these two devices will
then compare whether Va and Vb are equal and confirm by (usually) pressing a button
on the device. Without this user verification of Va and Vb, the authentication goal does
not hold for this protocol, making it vulnerable to MITM attacks for example.
Device A Device B
Generate: Na Generate: Nb
Calculate :
Cb = f1(PKB , PKA, Nb, 0)
Cb
Na
Nb
Verify if:
Cb = f1(PKB , PKA, Nb, 0)
Calculates:
Va = g(PKA, PKB , Na, Nb)
Calculates:
Vb = g(PKA, PKB , Na, Nb)
Figure 2.11: Sequence diagram for the SSP - phase two
In the following phase, called Authentication Phase 2, a new message exchange is
used to confirm that both devices have successfully completed all the steps until this
moment. A new confirmation value is computed by using the previously exchanged
values and this value is exchanged between the devices. Both devices then check if
the exchanged values match with the expected value. If these checks fails, it means
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that the pairing has not been confirmed. Phase four involves the link key calculation.
There is no message exchange between peers at this point. Finally, in Phase five, the
encryption keys are calculated.
Although major attacks against the protocol have not yet been found, therefore we
could consider that the SSP protocol is secure, we still find attacks based on a forced
change from a strong association mode to a weaker one [51], or a user’s misinterpretation
of concurrent pairing sessions [34]. Both attacks focus on possible real-world uses (and
on specific association modes) of the protocol rather than its specification. That is,
they focus on the Bluetooth SSP ceremony rather than the SSP protocol.
As we can see, there is more involved in this protocol than a classic protocol analysis
covers. There is human verification and interaction with the devices and humans
communicating with each other. This makes the SSP protocol (and even the legacy
mode) an excellent case study for ceremonies.
2.4.2 WhatsApp Messenger Registration
WhatsApp Messenger is a messaging application for mobile devices that allow users
to exchange text, images, audio and video messages. It is available for several mobile
operating systems such as Android, iOS, Blackberry, Windows and Symbian. It is an
extremely popular and fast growing messaging service. According to statistics published
by their account on Twitter, in August 2012 the number of messages sent and received
via WhatsApp in a day was around ten billion [108]. In June 2013, this number went
to twenty seven billion [109] per day, with a database of 300 million of active users [75].
The registration and the communication protocols used by WhatsApp are propri-
etary. Despite not being available as a public protocol, there are several attacks that
exploit the message exchange during the registration process between the application
(client) and the server based on reverse engineering the registration and communication
protocols.
2.4.2.1 Registration Protocol
WhatsApp user registration uses the user’s mobile phone number as basis for identifi-
cation. The basic registration scenario begins with the user choosing his country and
entering his phone number in to the application. Here we note the first curious part of
the process. Rather than detecting the phone number, the application asks the user to
insert the number. After some investigation, we found that Apple’s iOS SDK does not
allow applications to access the device’s phone number. Android SDK, on the other
hand, grants access to the phone number, but this feature is not currently in use by
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WhatsApp. There are some potential benefits by asking the user to input the phone
number. Firstly, by keeping the user registration process homogenous across different
operating systems, it improves usability and user experience. Secondly, it allows the
user to register his account using a device which does not have a phone number (e.g.
tablet) as long as the user has access to mobile phone capable of receiving SMS during
the registration process.
For obvious reasons, asking the user to insert a phone number comes with a security
risk. If a user inserts someone else’s phone number, he could hijack or create a user
account for a number he does not own. To prevent such a problem from happening,
an SMS verification mechanism is implemented. After receiving the user input phone
number, the application then sends the information entered to the registration server.
In response, the server returns an acknowledgement. Additionally, when receiving the
request, the server sends an SMS message containing a PIN code to the phone number
that requested the registration. The SMS is sent via an alternative channel (separate
from the network channel used during the rest of the process) and it is used to verify the
possession of the phone number by the device making the request. The PIN received
via SMS is then entered by the user in to the application, which is then sent to the
server and the registration is confirmed by binding the phone number to the device.
Figure 2.12 gives an overview of the registration process. Note that alternatively, in
case the SMS verification fails, a method based on an automated phone call to the user
is used. The process is the same, the user receives an automated phone call to the
number he entered and the recording spells the PIN code that the user has to insert
in to the application.
Device A Server S
Phone Number
Confirmation
PIN (V ia SMS)
PIN
Registration Confirmation
Figure 2.12: Sequence diagram for the general WhatsApp registration protocol
Although the general registration process presented in Figure 2.12 seems to rep-
resent the expected protocol specification, we found that the real implementation, at
least for earlier versions of the protocol, had some variations and presented serious
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security flaws.
The first relevant difference is that in earlier versions, the PIN was generated by
the application and sent to the server along with the phone number through a HTTPS
connection [91, 105]. An important issue to note is that the phone number and PIN
sent to the server are not used for registration at this point. These values are only
used to allow the server to send an SMS. This SMS is sent to the phone number
received and contains the PIN code informed [61]. All the information received at
this point is simply discarded after the SMS is sent. This introduces a security flaw
where an attacker could simply intercept the HTTPS request sent from the device to
the server and read the PIN that was supposed to be delivered via SMS. Despite the
fact the communication is SSL-protected, the attacker would only have to intercept the
connection between his own device and the server. This can easily be performed using
a proxy server and tools such as SSLSniff [65]. By doing that, the attacker can insert
any phone number he wants and easily obtain the PIN generated by the application
to successfully perform the registration. The attacker could even prevent the request
from being sent to the server (this is not necessary for the attack to succeed, but it is
useful to prevent the user from receiving an unexpected SMS). According to some tests
we performed using Whats-API [102], which allows us to send and receive requests to
the server and manipulate the parameters, this flaw seems to be solved now and the
PIN is generated on the server side.
As an attempt to fix the problem, the following versions changed the registration
and removed the verification of the PIN from the application. Instead of just contact-
ing the server to ask for an SMS to be sent, the application sends a request including
the device’s phone number and the server responds with a confirmation message. How-
ever, rather than just acknowledging that the message has been received, the response
message includes the verification PIN code [105]. The most probable reason for that
is because the SMS message with the PIN code is not always sent from the server to
the device. There are two variations for sending the SMS. The first, called self, is de-
signed for Android devices and the device sends an SMS to its own number to confirm
the ownership of the number. The application then keeps monitoring incoming SMS
messages waiting for the SMS containing the PIN and, when it is received, it auto-
matically reads the number and completes the registration. The second, called sms, is
the method where the SMS is sent by the server in order to verify the ownership of the
phone.
However, both self and sms methods were still vulnerable to attacks. Since the
PIN can be discovered prior to the reception of the SMS, an attacker could use a
simple variation of the attack presented above, and sniff the SSL connection between
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his own device and the server to get the PIN . Then, for the self method he could
simply spoof an SMS sent from his own device, using the PIN he captured and complete
the registration. For the sms method, it would be even simpler, we could just enter
the PIN in to the application and complete the registration.
The latest version of Whatsapp changed the registration process. It is now similar
to that we present in Figure 2.12. According to some tests we performed using Whats-
API [102], the PIN is no longer displayed when the registration is performed using the
sms method. However, the PIN , which is now a longer code, is still returned when
the self method is requested. Although we could not test whether the attack described
above would work in this new version, we believe that the attack is still possible, since
the attacker would still have access to the PIN in advance when requesting the self
method.
In Chapter 5, we will discuss more details of some of the scenarios above from a
ceremony point of view.
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In this chapter we propose a taxonomy of the most common characteristics
and behavioural patterns involved in human-protocol interaction. Along with
the taxonomy, we present a set of design recommendations to minimise the
problems inherent in the human-protocol interaction. This was the starting
point of our research, which led us to understand why some protocols fail in
practice and how we can address some of the existing problems. The content
of this chapter is a revised and updated version of the paper “Understanding
the weaknesses of human-protocol interaction” by the author and Geraint Price
published in the proceedings of the 16th international conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security [33].
3.1 Introduction
The volume of data that flows through modern networks is immense. People use
many different applications and tools to store, process and manipulate this data on
a daily basis. Among this intensive data flow lies sensitive information. To ensure
that this sensitive information is adequately protected, different security mechanisms
and protocols have been developed to provide security services such as confidentiality,
integrity and authenticity.
There is a wide range of protocols, each one with its own goals and characteristics.
To check whether those protocols are correct or not, that is, they provide the properties
they claim, verification techniques have been developed. However, there are situations
where even some of the most secure and robust protocols are vulnerable to attacks when
implemented. A significant number of these attacks are against the non-cryptographic
components, such as the human-protocol interaction.
In protocol design and analysis, the human interaction is usually part of the as-
sumptions and not specifically included in the description (e.g. an assumption that
a user is able to verify a digital certificate, or will generate strong passwords). How-
ever, user behaviour is often unpredictable, making the assumptions not precise enough
[47, 66]. Despite that unpredictable nature, there are some common design errors and
weak assumptions that can be avoided if taken into account.
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We conducted a thorough study of the existing work, among different areas, to
identify and understand the most common characteristics and behavioural patterns
involved in the human-protocol interaction. Based on the results of this study, we
propose a unified set of often overlooked human-protocol interaction components that
merges the findings from different research areas into a harmonised taxonomy. In
particular, we focus on human characteristics that are usually overlooked during the
protocol design process.
Based on the proposed taxonomy, we then discuss ways in which we can factor
in these weaknesses and minimise their impacts. Our analysis is based partly on re-
lated research findings, but is also based on our own proposals which evolved from our
taxonomy of weaknesses. Ultimately, this allows us to present a set of design recom-
mendations to address the problems inherent in human-protocol interaction. What is
interesting is that this set is not simply a linear evolution of the taxonomy of weak-
nesses. What we can see is that a second independent layer of structure emerges when
we separately consider the categorisation of solutions to the problems we collate and
identify in the taxonomy of weaknesses.
3.2 Overview
Human computer interaction is a topic which spans several different areas, including
computer science, sociology and psychology. A large portion of research in this subject
is related to design and usability of security systems. Each of these research areas inde-
pendently address different layers of systems security. Figure 3.1 gives us an overview
of the layers involved. The specification layer (I), represents the protocol specification;
the application layer (II) contains the implementation of the specified protocol in an
application; the interface (III) brings a point of interaction between the application
and user layers; finally, the user layer (IV) represents a user of the application.
Figure 3.1: Human-protocol interaction layers
Software engineering is focused on the application’s design and implementation
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(application layer); humancomputer interaction (HCI) focuses on the interface and
usability aspects (interface and user layers); computer security design focuses on the
design and implementation level (specification and application). Most of the existing
research within these areas focuses on a specific layer rather than the whole set. This
creates a gap, particularly between the specification and application layers where the
human-protocol interaction involved has received little attention. The human interac-
tion within a ceremony context, which we focus on this work, crosses all the layers,
such as specification, application, interface and user.
Within the scope of human-protocol interaction we consider any type of action
performed by a user that might impact on the security properties of a system. Since
the interaction is usually made via a software interface, we have to consider usability
issues. Additionally, we need to look at the implementation and specification levels. In
a protocol specification, the human-protocol interaction is usually part of the design
assumptions, that is, static components where actions are assumed to happen without
being explicitly included in the specification. When implemented, these static choices
are then replaced by dynamic user-interactions. It is often the case where the assump-
tions are inaccurate, as a result, it is very unlikely that an implementation can provide
the expected security properties. Our work focuses on detecting patterns of problems
that occur during the human-protocol interaction and highlight human characteristics
that are often overlooked during protocol design and implementation. We explore the
findings of research within these layers to construct a broader point of view.
As mentioned above, different research fields address security issues in different
ways. However, we were able to observe overlaps in the way those issues are dealt with.
These overlaps occur due to the use of different terminologies and distinct research
goals. For example, there have been studies of phishing attacks [56, 76, 111, 40, 39];
users’ susceptibility to attacks [44, 87]; factors exploited to allow an attack to be
successful [99, 41, 48, 88] amongst others. The findings from these experiments are
a very good source of analysis and comprehension of users’ weaknesses. Among this
wealth of studies, we found that similar findings are labelled in different ways. We also
found that some findings, applied to a specific context, can be extended to different
contexts. Each of these existing areas of research independently contributed to the
construction of the set of human-protocol interaction weaknesses and recommendations
we propose.
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3.3 Frequently Overlooked Components of
Human-Protocol Interaction
The interaction between computers is relatively easy to define and the results are,
in general, predictable. However, defining or predicting human characteristics or be-
havioural patterns is a challenging task. It requires a more subtle approach, commonly
based on empirical results [66]. Despite this complicating factor, we can create a generic
(but not perfect) human-protocol interaction model by using empirical and statistical
information to improve the human-protocol interaction process.
Therefore, it is necessary to study and analyse the most common characteristics and
behavioural patterns regarding human-protocol interaction. As we will see throughout
this Section, there is a significant amount of research which maps human character-
istics (or principles, weaknesses, etc.). This existing body of work offers important
and relevant insights that constitute the basis of the set of overlooked components of
human-protocol interaction we discuss during this section. By analysing existing work
and detecting the common components among them, we define our list of five main
overlooked components of human-protocol interaction: user knowledge, authentication
capabilities, decision making influencing factors, bounded attention, and inherent char-
acteristics.
The taxonomy we present here is necessarily incomplete, simply because new tech-
nologies, new attacking tactics and new human-computer interaction methods may
arise. Nevertheless, this taxonomy reflects the current situation for overlooked compo-
nents of human-protocol interaction.
3.3.1 User Knowledge
We define knowledge as familiarity, awareness, experience or understanding of a certain
subject. Within the human-protocol interaction context, users’ knowledge certainly is
an important factor to be considered. We have seen several situations where this factor
(or the lack of it) is exploited by attackers. In general, most users do not have extensive
knowledge of how computers, operating systems and software work. Furthermore,
even users who are familiar with computing do not necessarily have knowledge about
computer security, cryptography or security protocols. Therefore, a secure human-
protocol interaction should carefully consider users’ knowledge.
Phishing attacks provide a very interesting case study from which we can evaluate
human-protocol interaction. The main reason is that, in many cases, the user has to
interact with the implementation of the SSL/TLS protocol [42]. Dhamija et al. [41]
developed a usability study to understand how phishing attacks work. In their research,
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a set of hypotheses was developed and tested. Within this set, they identified that,
indeed, users are not familiar with computer systems, security, security indicators and
risks (such as web frauds). Similar findings are presented by Wu et al. [111], Downs et
al. [44], Sasse et al. [87] and Jakobsson [56], among several others.
The obvious approach to minimise problems related to untrained users is training
them. It does, indeed, improve some aspects of user practices, such as strong password
generation [101] and not revealing private information in phishing websites [60]. How-
ever, there are also side effects, such as a greater likelihood of writing down passwords
due to human memory limitations (related to the component we describe in Section
3.3.5) [101] and falling for spoofs of security indicators [44] because of human limited
authentication capabilities (see Section 3.3.2).
When an attacker is able to perceive a weakness in the victim’s level of knowledge,
it is relatively easy to manipulate and exploit it to successfully attack a protocol. In
phishing attacks, for example, the attacker exploits the victim’s lack of knowledge
of computer systems (e.g. inability to recognise URLs and redirections [111, 41]),
security risks (e.g. many users do not know that websites can be cloned [41]) and lack
of knowledge in computer security (e.g. when they erroneously decide to trust a website
solely on the fact that they see the picture of a padlock [56]).
In summary, we can list the knowledge-related issues that are most commonly
exploited by attackers:
Lack of knowledge of computing – Despite the fact of being computer users, many
people do not (and probably should not be required to) have a proper under-
standing of how operating systems, networks and protocols work [41, 44, 111].
Techniques and attack methods such as web site redirections, URL masking, mal-
ware and others are often used by attackers to exploit this fact. Systems often
have security failures because they are too difficult to be used. Even educated
and careful users sometimes cannot understand security-relevant user interfaces
[94].
Lack of knowledge of security – Most users do not have knowledge and under-
standing about digital certificates, encryption mechanisms and most of security
technologies [41, 111, 56, 44]. In a test that required users to detect phishing
websites, 95% of users did not know the meaning of the browser warning about
an untrusted server certificate [41]. Additionally, users often do not know how
to identify a spoofed website or email, and do not understand the meaning of
security indicators [111].
Lack of knowledge of security threats – Many users do not know they can be
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attacked or attacks such as spoofing websites are even possible [41, 111]. Fur-
thermore, even those with a better understanding of the risks, are not usually
familiar with many techniques used by attackers.
Inaccurate mental models – There are many indicators that people are likely to
construct their own concepts about computing and security. Jakobsson [56] ob-
served that people judge relevance of content before checking for indicators of
authenticity. We have also seen situations where users create their own (and fre-
quently inaccurate) concepts about how the authentication process works [4], and
about the likelihood and impacts of attacks (“They could not do much damage
anyway” [87]).
Human-protocol interaction cannot rely on users’ computing/security knowledge
and awareness. A secure human-protocol interaction must consider users knowledge
and, preferably not require higher training levels. Taking into account the level of
knowledge and understanding relevant to the target users is very important to avoid
security flaws due to an overlooked target audience. Also, the more generic the audi-
ence, the lower level of understanding should be required. It is a design flaw to assume
that the users are knowledgeable in something they are not. Thus, when designing a
human-protocol interaction, giving tasks to users where they might have insufficient
knowledge to perform that task should always be avoided.
3.3.2 Authentication Capabilities
An authentication performed by a user is a task where the user verifies that the authen-
ticating party is whom it is expected to be. People frequently make use of visual cues
as an important authentication tool. However, there are studies [98, 99, 41, 111, 56]
that show that this visual authentication mechanism is weak and unreliable in some
cases. Stajano and Wilson [98, 99] performed several experiments as attempts to detect
common exploited patterns in scam scenarios. The limited authentication capabilities
inherent in populations of users was often an important (if not the most important)
factor to the success of their attacks. Their study demonstrated that people are usu-
ally very good at recognising people they already know, however they are not good at
authenticating strangers (someone they do not know) or objects. The more visually
equivalent to the original a spoofed element is, the more likely it is to be accepted as
authentic.
Other research [41, 111, 56] achieved similar outcomes, corroborating Stajano’s
results. Many additional techniques were used to deceive users, such as fake email
messages, spoofed websites and untrusted certificates. In most cases users were fooled,
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and consequently attacked, because they failed to authenticate objects. Therefore,
human authentication should be avoided for authenticating strangers or objects (either
real or digital).
In a human-protocol interaction scenario, the attacker may exploit the user’s lim-
ited authentication capabilities to make the victim believe the messages haven been
exchanged with a trusted party. Once the user authenticates the attacking party as
valid (by accepting the attacker’s digital certificate, or simply ignoring security indica-
tors), the attacker is extremely close to achieve their objectives.
In general, we found four different users’ authentication skills that are well known
by attackers, but not always correctly addressed by designers:
Users are good at authenticating people they know – In general, users are very
good and efficient at authenticating people they know [98]. Indeed, facial recog-
nition for computer systems still faces several challenges, while the human visual
system works very well at recognising other people. Even when not in person,
humans can accurately recognise familiar faces displayed in computer displays or
photos (even in low-resolution images) [93, 52].
Users are not good at authenticating objects – Users usually have problems au-
thenticating objects [98, 39, 111]. Objects are easy to spoof, with it often being
possible for an attacker to produce exact copies of objects. When facing a spoofed
object, it is very likely that the spoofed copy will be perceived by the user as orig-
inal. A fake card reader machine given to a user in a restaurant, for example, is
likely to be unnoticed by the user who will type his PIN in to the machine.
Users are not good at authenticating strangers – People are not usually good
at recognising unfamiliar people or people they do not know [93]. Bruce et al.,
for example, demonstrated that humans perform poorly when matching different
photographs of an unfamiliar person [27]. Additionally, people are not good at
establishing whether someone belongs to a designated class (e.g. confirm whether
a person dressed as a police officer belongs indeed to a police squad) [98]. When
authenticating strangers, users have to make use of other authenticating factors,
such as documents or references given by someone else (e.g. physical attributes).
This shifts the authentication type to an object-based authentication, which, as
we have seen, is not precise enough to be used in security protocols. In addition
to that, other factors, such as social conditioning and time pressure (discussed in
Section 3.3.3) may be used to weaken user’s authentication capacity even further.
Users are not good at authenticating digital objects – In the same way as real
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objects, digital objects, such as websites, software and email are not easily au-
thenticated by users. Also, the use of deceptive texts (exploiting similar drawing
patterns of some characters to avoid users from detecting relevant information)
and masking information (using images or windows on top of legitimate text or
other elements) are successfully used by attackers [41]. By creating visually iden-
tical (or very similar) copies of the original source, attackers can fool users into
believing they are contacting the entity they trust. Finally, personalised content
increases the chance of a spoofed virtual object being accepted as real [44, 56].
Directly or indirectly, most scams and/or attacks exploit the false acceptance of
spoofed content by users and almost all scams are forms of deception [99]. Asking a
user to authenticate an object (e.g. an online banking website) by checking its elements
(e.g. digital certificates, padlocks, etc.) does not represent a proper translation from
the authentication design goal to its implementation. In fact, it is very likely that
the authentication task, despite technically feasible, will not be performed properly,
introducing a security breach.
3.3.3 Decision Making Influencing Factors
There are different factors that need to be taken into account when considering users’
decision making capability and its influencing factors. These aspects include personal
and environmental issues. Despite the differences, the core concept behind this com-
ponent is that users can be influenced to make different (and potentially damaging)
decisions to those they would usually make. Thus, when designing human-protocol in-
teraction, security engineers must be aware of which factors may influence the user’s de-
cisions and check whether this decision under influence can introduce security breaches
or not.
The most common influencing factors are:
Social conditioning – When people receive commands from strangers, they are un-
likely to follow that command without questioning the request. However, when
the command comes from a recognised authority (or someone mimicking an au-
thority), people are very likely to obey such a command. This happens because
people are trained to accept commands from certain people, such as police officers,
their bosses, etc., without further rationalisation [99, 87, 79]. An attacker can
make use of social conditioning to force people to behave in a predictable manner
and use it to deploy a successful attack. Nevertheless, before using social com-
pliance, an attacker needs to make the victims believe they are receiving orders
from an authority figure. The manipulation of decision making is often exploited
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in conjunction with another component we discussed previously: users’ authen-
tication capabilities. Therefore, an authentication failure is often a pre-requisite
for exploiting social conditioning.
User’s principles – Victims’ principles such as guilt, dishonesty, need and/or greed,
when exploited by an attacker, are powerful ingredients to increase the effective-
ness of an attack. People’s needs and desires make them vulnerable because the
attacker can use them to force the victim to behave in a predictable manner. Once
attackers know what the victim wants, they can easily manipulate the victim’s
behaviour [99, 79]. One classical example of an attack exploiting this principle is
the 419 scam (or Nigerian fraud) where a significant amount of money is offered
to the victim, but before receiving the money, they are persuaded to advance a
certain sum of money in the hope of receiving a significantly larger gain after-
wards. In this attack, victims’ greed, need and also dishonesty are manipulated
(not necessarily all of them), making the victims more vulnerable than they usu-
ally are. Another example is related to guilt. An attacker could manipulate the
victim’s feelings by approaching the target and pretending that they desperately
need some help. In such a scenario, it is very hard to refuse the request, oth-
erwise the victim will feel guilty for not helping someone who desperately needs
help [79]. These violations (deviations from safe operating practices, procedures,
standards, or rules) are different from user errors (discussed in Section 3.3.5).
Errors arise from informational problems (inattention, lack of knowledge), while
violations are motivational, the actions - despite being unsafe - are intended [82].
Time constraints – The main idea behind this factor is to push the victim into mak-
ing a decision without sufficient time to rationalise the decision. Consequently,
the actions taken by the victim tend to be more predictable and easier to ma-
nipulate [99]. In attacks that exploit time constraints, the victims believe they
must act quickly, otherwise they might lose the opportunity. Also, the decision
strategies used under time pressure are typically based on affective and intuitive
heuristics, rather than on a reasoned examination of all the possible options [48].
Shared risk – This aspect can be easily seen in real-world situations where someone
is worried about taking a certain action but accepts the risk because there are
many others sharing the same risk [99]. An attacker can exploit this by including
other people (other attackers) faking that they accept the risk. When the victims
see other people accepting the risk, they tend to accept the risk, allowing the
attacker to be successful. In online reputation services, we can see an example
where shared risk can be used. The attacker can create fake profiles and insert
43
3.3. Frequently Overlooked Components of Human-Protocol Interaction
as many reviews as he wants to improve the ‘reliability’ of the service or product
offered. Additionally, offering additional ‘verification’ options (such as a customer
service number or chat in a website) also creates trust. Subjects stated that they
would not call the number to verify the authenticity, but “someone else would”
[56, 79].
Fear – Many techniques such as scareware are effectively used by attackers to scare
people and make them fall into attacks. Warnings presenting scary messages that
your computer is infected, or that you might be attacked by a hacker, etc., makes
users act without proper rationalisation to solve the problem (e.g. Mac defender
malware1). Fear changes the decision strategies of the users, making them more
likely to behave in a predictable manner. Another type of fear exploited by an
attacker is the fear of getting into trouble. For example, the fear of receiving
a negative reaction from their superiors because a routine security check was
applied (even though it should be applied) to an important user and that person
(boss, or an important visitor) felt offended [79]. This second type is related to
social conditioning since, in addition to the fear of having problems with their
bosses, the victim is dealing with an important person or authority.
Users’ decision making factors involve many different factors that should be carefully
analysed. Even trained users might have their decision strategies manipulated under
certain circumstances. People will make errors and will eventually make wrong deci-
sions. To prevent an attacker from exploiting this, it is important to identify potential
situations where this component might be exploited and make the system insensitive
to them. Alternative methods to avoid unreasonable decisions by users should be con-
sidered. These possibilities may include extra security checks, additional verifications,
or a reduction in the impact that the user interaction has on the security properties of
the protocol.
3.3.4 Bounded Attention
Users focus on their main task, and consequently, most of their attention is bound to
the activity of performing that task. According to Stajano [99], people tend to forget
the task of protecting themselves when it is not their main activity at a given moment.
Security protocols are frequently used as part of a computational system or software.
Consequently, from the users’ perspective the protocol used and the security aspects
of the protocol are a secondary concern. As a result, they may not notice security
indicators and warnings.
1http://support.apple.com/kb/ht4650
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The users’ bounded attention can potentially be exploited in the case of lack of
attention to security indicators, or even in the lack of attention to the absence of
security indicators [41]. Wu [111] conducted an experiment to check the efficiency of
security toolbars when trying to prevent phishing attacks. About 45% of users who
were spoofed said that the reason was they were focused on finishing their main task
(i.e. dealing with email requests). Some of the spoofed users explicitly mentioned that
reason, and even having noticed the security warnings, they decided to take some risks
to complete their task.
Users have a tendency to notice only what they are interested in and ignore the
fact those security mechanisms were created to protect them from attacks [99, 41]. For
example, in the SSL/TLS protocol implementation in web browsers, when an untrusted
server certificate is sent to the client’s browser, the user is asked whether to trust
the certificate presented or not. In this case, users’ bounded attention principle can
be successfully exploited because users tend to dismiss the security warning of the
untrusted server certificate presented by the server. In this case, the security decision
is presented in a context were the focus is on accessing a website. Consequently, a
warning informing users that an untrusted certificate had been presented and asking
whether to continue or not is very likely to be quickly dismissed since it is stopping
the users from completing their main tasks. In other research, Herley [53] argues
that users rejection of warnings and security messages is entirely understandable and
rational from a economical point of view. He states that it is necessary to prioritize
the important security messages and remove the others that do not do much to address
security threats. By doing that, it is possible to improve the cost-benefit tradeoff that
currently exists regarding security advice.
If a warning is required to be presented to a user, this should implemented using an
active interruption. Egelman et al. [45] conducted an investigation into the effectiveness
of passive and active warnings. Active interruptions, that is, indicators that stop users
from performing their tasks and only allow them to proceed after certain steps are
executed, were far more efficient than passive warnings. The trade-off between usability
and security must also be considered. An excessive number of interruptions may train
users to dismiss all security warnings without proper rationalisation.
We found four main factors which can potentially weaken the security aspects of
human-protocol interaction:
Lack of attention to security – The user’s focus is not on the security aspects of the
system, and consequently, the security checks tend to be executed less carefully.
Using the SSL/TLS protocol as example, users who are aware of the security
indicators of an SSL connection in the web browser, despite the fact that they
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understand the need to look for security indicators, may simply look for the image
of a padlock on the webpage. We have seen examples of attacks that exploit such
a factor [41, 44, 64, 63]. In this case, the users were fooled by a spoofed icon
appearing in the body of the web page rather than in the browser’s chrome. This
is closely related to the user knowledge, users that are knowledgeable of security
may still fall for such attack if they are not aware of the security threats (e.g.
spoofing a security indicator).
Lack of attention to the absence of security – Another factor is the lack of at-
tention to the absence of security indicators. In the same way that security checks
and indicators are not the users’ main focus, they are likely to be ignored [41].
Attacks such as SSLStripping, presented by Marlinspike, exploit the fact that
most requests to HTTPS websites are performed via links or redirections (HTTP
response status code 302) [64, 63]. With that, an attacker could just switch url
links and/or location that contains https to http. The indicators in the web
browser (usually a padlock) are not shown to the user in this case. However,
the lack of such indicators are very likely to go unnoticed. Even some additional
tricks exploiting users’ knowledge can be employed to make the attack even more
efficient (e.g. sending a image of a padlock as a favicon, which mimics a security
indicator in the address bar). Additionally, in some cases, users might not even
know that security is a relevant part of the interaction [107].
Security in a secondary workflow – Users are more likely to finish their main task
rather than stop it due to a security warning. Therefore, security should not
be part of a secondary workflow. Security checks that occur outside of the main
task, interrupt the user’s focus, and are more likely to be dismissed without much
consideration. Usually, users’ primary goal when using a computer is not security
per se, but communicating with friends, using online services, etc. Users will try
to finish their main tasks if they believe they are more important than the security
tasks, even if there are potential risks [111, 35].
Conditioning – An excessive number security interruptions ends up training users to
dismiss warnings, pop-up boxes and any other security interruption in a insecure
way because this is the only (or the simplest) way to finish their tasks. Some at-
tacks successfully exploit this factor because it is known that people will have this
behaviour even when they know they should not [6]. We have several examples
of an excessive number of warnings. Older versions of the web browser Internet
Explorer, for example, used to warn users for every change in the security con-
text, even when successfully changing from an insecure to a secure context. This
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excessive number of warnings can make users become less inclined to take them
seriously in the future [73, 35].
Security tasks are more effective when they are included in the main workflow.
Simply warning users by stating that something is wrong is not sufficient: they need to
be provided with a safe alternative to achieve their goals [111]. Additionally, security
activities should be designed to disrupt user’s workflow as little as possible to minimise
the impact of these additional tasks on the user’s motivation to perform the security
activity [35]. Finally, bounded attention may also be affected by user’s knowledge. For
example, a user may not know what security cues they should look for or whether the
operation being performed is insecure or not.
3.3.5 Inherent Limitations
Human skills are vast and vary significantly. It includes proficiency or ability that is
acquired or developed through training or experience. Overlooked inherent character-
istics encompasses situations where human skills might not be sufficient to perform
an activity or task as intended. It also includes particularities of human behaviour.
We cannot expect that humans behave in a similar manner to a computer, nor be-
lieve they share similar skills. By equating these two different components during the
human-protocol interaction, a series of security threats may arise.
A usable and secure design must consider human abilities and check what people
can, and more importantly, what they cannot do well [40]. We cannot expect people
to store large amounts of data, as well as we cannot assume they will ‘erase’ data from
their memories once that information is not needed anymore [87]. In the same way,
we cannot expect a human-protocol interaction to be performed in the same way, or
under the same timing constraint on every run. Thus, skill limitations should always
be considered within the scope of human-protocol interaction. There are several skills
we should consider when designing secure systems:
Memory limitations – Sasse et al. listed the most important issues related to hu-
man memory (focusing on password memorability) [87]. From her list, we must
highlight that human capacity for working memory is limited and decays over
time, meaning that they may may not be able to recall information when needed
or not recall it accurately. Items used often (such as passwords you use on a
daily basis) are easier to remember than those that are rarely used. Addition-
ally, people cannot ‘forget on demand’, so even undesired items will remain in
memory even when they are no longer needed. Finally, Sasse et al. highlight
meaningful items (e.g. words) are easier to recall than non-meaningful ones (e.g.
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randomly generated passwords). Other research corroborates Sasse’s list, showing
that users cannot remember large and random keys or recall dozens of different
passwords [35, 112]. Dhamija and Perrig [38] also pinpoint that precise recall
is not a strong point of human cognition. They state that the main weakness
of knowledge-based authentication is that it relies on precise recall of the secret
information. An authentication process does not allow variations on the secret,
therefore, it fails even if the user makes a small mistake when entering the secret
(e.g. password).
Lapses, Slips and Mistakes – Lapses, slips and mistakes are very common human
error types. A lapse happens when the plan to achieve a certain goal is correct
but an error happens when a required action is forgotten [82, 35] (e.g. a required
step in a sequence of actions is skipped). A slip, in the same way as a lapse,
occurs when the plan is correct, but in this case, an action is performed incorrectly
[82, 35]. For example, when a user wants to type “password”, but instead of typing
the correct word, a slip happens and the word “passwprd” is typed because the
wrong key was accidentally pressed. A mistake, on the other hand, occur when
the plan to achieve a certain goal is inadequate, that is, even if the the actions
performed go as planned, it will not achieve the desired goal [82, 35] (e.g. a user
checking if he/she trusts a website by looking for a picture of a padlock in its
contents).
Problem solving limitations – Some problems can be easily solved by some users
but the same problem can be a complex task for others. This limitation can
be influenced by many of the previously presented weaknesses, such as lack of
knowledge or bounded attention. Even in the case of the user being capable of
understanding the task received, knowing how and when it should be applied, a
failure may still happen if the user does not have the capability to perform the
appropriate actions [35].
Task termination – A user may decide to terminate the interaction. When users
finish their main task, they might leave the subsidiary tasks incomplete. For
example, a user accessing a webmail, after reading the messages, may leave the
computer without logging out. This is acceptable on private computers, but it is
a security risk in public environments. In a similar manner, users may terminate
the interaction if they assume there is no alternative to proceed due to a fault or
an unexpected system state [84].
Non-deterministic behaviour – As opposed to the previous limitations, this issue
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is not related to a limited set of capabilities, in fact it is the opposite situation.
According to Ruksenas [84], in any situation, any one of several cognitively plau-
sible behaviours might be taken. It cannot be assumed that any specific plausible
behaviour will be the one that a person will follow where there are alternatives.
We cannot expect that users have skills or abilities they do not have. Human-
protocol interaction should be designed taking the user’s inherent characteristics into
account and checking whether the task given to the user is feasible or not. Even edu-
cated users may fail when performing a security task if their capabilities (e.g. physical
skills) are not properly considered [35]. For example, despite understanding the im-
portance of creating strong passwords, a policy that requires a password length of 10
or more random characters is not feasible for most users due to memory limitations.
Also, limitations on the number of password length and attempts (e.g. a maximum 3
attempts before blocking the account), despite being important to prevent password
guessing attacks, might overload the user’s memory and reduce compliance with secu-
rity rules.
3.4 Minimising the Weaknesses in the Interaction
After merging several research findings into a harmonised and limited set of often
overlooked human-protocol interaction components, a set of design recommendations
to minimise the impact of these components is an obvious next step. Despite the wide
range of users’ characteristics and behavioural patterns, we were able to propose a
taxonomy of frequently overlooked characteristics of human-protocol interaction, and
from these characteristics, we can develop a set of design recommendations.
To construct a set of recommendations on how to reduce the effectiveness of attacks
exploiting these human-protocol interaction weaknesses, we initially attempted to make
a one-to-one association between a weakness and a corresponding recommendation
where, for each weakness, we proposed a recommendation. We independently analysed
each component of the taxonomy presented in Section 3.3, and by making use of our
findings and results from related work we drew a recommendation aiming at minimising
the impact of that specific component on the security of the human-protocol interaction.
What we found was that some factors, even those belonging to the same taxon-
omy item, have to be treated in different ways. However, the opposite situation was
also found, when factors from different taxonomy items could be handled in a similar
manner.
The correspondence between the taxonomy of human-protocol interaction weak-
nesses that we proposed and the design recommendations is not linear. There is a
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separate layer of abstraction that makes the associations between our taxonomy to the
set design recommendations. In this section, we discuss how we tackled each weakness
and its subdivisions and we highlight their associations to the design recommendations
we will outline in Section 3.5.
3.4.1 User Knowledge
To perform a task correctly, users need to have a certain level of understanding of the
key components that make up the task. If they do not have sufficient understanding, one
or more sub-tasks are likely to fail. Within the context of human-protocol interaction,
there are some fields of knowledge which are pre-requisites in most cases, such as
computing and security. When the user’s understanding of computing and security
is weak, other problems may also arise, such as the lack of knowledge about security
threats, and also, the construction (by users) of inaccurate concepts.
To minimise problems related to the lack of knowledge in computing human-
protocol interaction should not require tasks that require advanced knowledge about
computing, such as configuration or filesystem management tasks. The same idea
should be applied to the lack of knowledge of security problem. Users should not
have to understand how encryption works, how to verify a digital signature, or how a
certificate chain is built. We should only rely on security tasks which are feasible for
ordinary users.
On the other hand, to address the issues related to the lack of knowledge of
security threats and inaccurate mental models, it is necessary to make use of
methods to prevent users from making incorrect decisions. We cannot expect users to
be aware of potential threats, or that they understand the risks of making incorrect
decisions. Additionally it is dangerous to assume that users will have an accurate idea
of the protocol’s workflow (e.g. authentication processes).
Training users, although recommended and effective if used correctly [101, 60, 112,
4], is mostly feasible in smaller environments, such as companies and other institutions.
A protocol designed to be used by the general public within different environments
should not rely on training users.
As we can see in Figure 3.2, there are three main types of approaches to min-
imise problems related to users’ knowledge. The first is keeping realistic and low user
knowledge requirements (as we will discuss in Section 3.5.1). The second is making
use of methods to prevent users from performing unsafe actions, which we will discuss
in Section 3.5.5. Finally, there is training, which we will not focus on in our design
recommendations, since we will assume that we should not design protocols that rely
on training users.
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User Knowledge
Low knowledge
requirements
Protect against
unsafe actions
Training
Figure 3.2: Minimising user knowledge issues
3.4.2 Authentication Capabilities
In the previous section, we highlighted that users have limited authentication capabil-
ities. That is, they can easily make mistakes when asked to authenticate objects (real
or virtual) and unknown people. Attackers make use of several techniques to fool users
by using spoofed objects, such as identities, text, documents, and by doing that they
are able to deploy their attacks.
It is necessary to understand and acknowledge that users are not good at au-
thenticating objects (real and digital) or strangers. Consequently, objects and
text, which are easy to spoof, should not be used as a component in a authentica-
tion process. By reducing the relevance of objects and text as authentication factors,
masking information would become less effective for attackers. However, when an au-
thentication performed by a user is a required component in the protocol workflow, this
task should be designed to be feasible by ordinary users, that is, the user can perform
the task accurately.
As we can see in Figure 3.3, there are two main types of approaches to tackle the
limitations of users’ authentication skills. First, we need to recognise the limitations of
users’ authentication skills and should not rely on such skills when designing protocols
(as we will discuss further in Section 3.5.2). Second, we need to respect user faculties
and provide them with feasible tasks, such as authenticating people they know or
images they are familiar with (presented in Section 3.5.1).
Authentication
Capabilities
Do not rely on user
authentication capabilities
Respect user faculties
Figure 3.3: Minimising authentication capabilities issues
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3.4.3 Decision Making Influencing Factors
When a user has to make a decision during the interaction with the protocol, it is
important to identify whether this decision might be affected when the user is under
external influencing factors. In the Section 3.3.3, we listed social conditioning, user’s
principles, time constraints, shared risk and fear as the most relevant factors of influ-
ence during human-protocol interaction. Each one of them should be considered as a
potential threat to the interaction’s security.
Users influenced by social conditioning, by the manipulation of their principles,
sharing risk with others or afraid of some kind of threat, change their perception of
risk making their decision strategies different (and often less careful). Attackers exploit
these factors by manipulating users’ perception of risk, weakening the reliability of their
decisions. When time is a limiting factor of an activity, users once again change their
decision strategy making them more vulnerable. Additionally, when security is not the
main activity, the decisions under timing constraints tend to be performed even more
carelessly.
All five factors are exploited by attackers to change users’ decision strategies. How-
ever, we found that for some factors, such as timing constraints, bounded attention is
another determining factor that should be dealt with. To avoid that, security features
should always be part of the main task. Furthermore, users’ limited authentication
capabilities are also often used by attackers when exploiting all of the five factors. A
spoofed authority or entity that inspires some level of trust is often a pre-requisite
for the attacker to be able to successfully deploy an attack based on decision making
influencing factors.
As we can see in Figure 3.4, by considering that users’ decision strategies are likely
to change under different situations (as we will discuss in more detail in Section 3.5.4),
making use of methods to prevent users from performing unsafe actions (which will
be discussed in Section 3.5.5) and bringing security into the main workflow (discussed
in Section 3.5.3), we can minimise the effects of decision making influencing factors
on protocols. Since users’ limited authentication capabilities are closely related to the
decision making factor, we represented the approaches to tackle this factor by using
dotted rectangles and arrows in the Figure 3.4.
3.4.4 Bounded Attention
Users are focused on their main activity, leaving secondary tasks in low priority. There-
fore, protocols’ implementation might present weaknesses during the users’ interaction
due to the lack of attention to the security features, lack of perception of absence
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Figure 3.4: Minimising decision making influencing factors issues
of security, the fact of security is treated as a secondary task in the workflow, and
conditioning.
To minimise the problems related to the lack of attention to security, it is
necessary to make use of mechanisms to change the priority of the security activities
within the users’ main task. An effective way to deploy it is by bringing security
activities into the users’ main task [111]. In this way, we can bring the users’ focus to
the security aspects of the activity. This solution might also minimise the problems
related to lack of perception to absence of security, since users will be more likely
to detect the lack of a feature that was part of their main task. Changing the relevance
of security activities in the main task also changes users’ perception of the relevance of
security. Since security is in the main workflow, security will not be a secondary
activity anymore. Ultimately, by differentiating warnings and avoiding unnecessary
security messages, we can minimise the effects of conditioning users to ignore security
interruptions.
As we present in Figure 3.5, to minimise the impacts of user’s bounded attention,
we need to focus on integrating security into the main workflow. Including security
actions as part of the users’ main workflow rather than just notifying and warning in a
secondary flow is a good way to approach the problem (we will discuss the integration
of the security concerns into the main workflow in more details in Section 3.5.3).
3.4.5 Inherent Limitations
Inherent limitations, such as memory, lapse, slips, mistakes and problem solving
skills are often underrated. In the same way that we have discussed the users’ lack of
knowledge, we cannot give users a task that they are not capable of performing, whether
by physical or cognitive limitations. We cannot overload humans’ memory by requiring
users to ‘store’ large amounts of data, especially when it is random. Users might also
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Bounded
Attention
Integrate security into
the main workflow
Figure 3.5: Minimising bounded attention issues
make mistakes due to motor issues (press the wrong key by accident). Additionally, if
a problem is given to users to solve, we should also consider humans’ problem solving
limitations. All these issues should be considered before being added as part of the
protocol design or implementation, and if this type of task is relevant to the protocol’s
scope, it should be feasible to general users.
Thus, tasks given to users should be feasible considering humans’ limitations. There
are other factors that influence the human limitation weakness, such as human’s
unpredictable behavior and task termination. Protocol implementations cannot
assume that a task given to user will be completely performed (a user can potentially
leave a task incomplete) or that a user will always make the correct decision (user
decision is non-deterministic). In these situations it is necessary to use mechanisms to
prevent incorrect decisions from being made.
As we can see in Figure 3.6, there are two main types of approaches to minimise
problems due the inherent human limitations. First, we need to respect user faculties
and provide them with feasible tasks (which we discuss in more details in Section 3.5.1).
Second, it is necessary to make use of methods to prevent users from performing unsafe
actions (that we will discuss in Section 3.5.5)
Inherent
Limitations
Respect user faculties Protect against
unsafe actions
Figure 3.6: Minimising inherent limitations issues
3.5 Design Recommendations
By analysing the human-protocol interaction weaknesses we presented in Section 3.3
and by exploring related research findings, we were able to discuss ways to tackle these
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weaknesses and minimise their impacts. The associations among the weaknesses and so-
lutions to minimise their impact were a key factor that allowed us to identify the design
recommendations we discuss in this section. By proposing a set of design recommen-
dations, we introduce guidelines to help designers overcome the problems presented in
Section 3.3. In the following we describe each of our five design recommendations.
3.5.1 Respect User Faculties
Humans have different levels of knowledge and skills in a wide range of areas. Some
people have stronger abilities in subjects such as logic or mathematics, others are better
dealing with human sciences and so on. Some protocols might be expected to be used
only by specialists and consequently could require a higher level of skill or knowledge.
However, there are other protocols that are designed for general purpose use and,
consequently, used by people that have different levels of skill and areas of expertise.
In both cases, protocols should be designed and implemented keeping in mind the level
of knowledge and skills of the people who will interact with it. In this recommendation
we are merging two approaches we described in Section 3.4 that are related to human
skills and knowledge: “low knowledge requirements” and “respect user faculties”.
The SSL/TLS protocol implementation in web browsers, for example, is designed
to be used by a wide range of people. In this protocol, which we will use as example
throughout this Chapter, advanced knowledge about security technologies should not
be required. During the protocol handshake, there is an assumption that the server
certificate is previously known and trusted. However, there are situations where the cer-
tificate is unknown, untrusted, or does not match some requirement (e.g. the certificate
content’s “common name” field does not match the server’s name). In these situations,
when the server certificate is sent to the client, the browsers’ implementations often
ask the user whether to accept the certificate or not.
Taking a university’s webmail service as an example, there are several cases where
self-signed digital certificates are used to setup the SSL Server. Consequently, this
certificate will not be initially included as a trusted certificate in the web browser’s
certificates lists, and subsequently the user will be asked whether to accept the server’s
certificate or not. Most users do not know what the decision presented to them means.
Additionally, most of them do not know what a digital certificate is (and they probably
should not have to know). Thus, the decision given to the user is an example of an
infeasible task. It is necessary to create alternatives when tasks that require higher
levels of knowledge are required. By simply leaving users unassisted, security flaws
might be introduced.
Another example of a task that, depending on the context, may be considered
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unfeasible, is to require the user to generate input data to be used as part of the
protocol workflow (e.g. random passwords). Certain inputs can represent fundamental
elements of the whole system security and should be carefully analysed. For example,
in Bluetooth Legacy Pairing (presented in Section 2.4.1.1), as well as in Kerberos [72]
protocol, a user input (password) represents a fundamental part of the protocol security.
A key that is used to encrypt some of the protocol’s messages is derived from the
user generated password in these examples. If we simply allow the user to create
a password, a weak password might be generated and consequently compromise the
protocol security [18]. On the other hand, defining password policies (e.g. minimum
length, use of special characters, etc.) can also generate other types of problems such
as information disclosure [55].
Humans don’t have strong memorisation capabilities when dealing with random
information, especially when dealing with various different sets of random information
(e.g. a user that has many passwords). To deal with this memorisation issue, humans
tend to disclose this information by using notes, which might allow other users to
discover this data and use it for impersonation attacks. Thus, it is necessary to find
alternatives to produce input data to a protocol which has sufficient quality to be used
as a trustworthy source, as well as make its generation and use feasible to ordinary
humans. Interesting results in password generation are described in [112], where they
performed an experiment with 288 participants and concluded that training users to
produce mnemonic phrases make them as easy to remember as the naively selected
passwords and significantly improve security. Additionally, they showed that although
educating users is important, it does not dramatically improve the compliance rate if
not accompanied by monitoring and enforcement. Therefore, training users on how to
produce random and/or mnemonic phrases and enforcement of (adequate) policies are
equally important.
The recommendations about not giving users an unfeasible task can be summarised
in the following list:
• Identify where the security conditions of the protocol relies on a task performed
by users and identify the level of knowledge of the target audience.
• Check whether the task requires specific types of knowledge or skills. If it does
require, check whether the target audience attend/possesses the pre-requisites.
The more generic the audience, the lower level of understanding and skills should
be required.
• Avoid using user input as a main part of the establishment of security proper-
ties of the protocol. If user input is unavoidable, check if user training and/or
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enforcement policies, to guarantee the quality of the input, are necessary.
• Focus on reducing the chance of mistakes, lapses, and slips. Always minimise the
number of steps necessary to complete the task [35].
Perceiving the knowledge level of the target users is very important to avoid security
flaws due to an overlooked target audience. Also, the more generic the public, the lower
level of understanding should be required. It is a design flaw to assume that the users
are knowledgeable in something they are not. Thus, when designing a human-protocol,
giving tasks to users where they might have insufficient knowledge to perform that task
should always be avoided.
Even educated users may fail when performing a security task if their capabilities
(e.g. physical skills) are not properly considered [35]. For example, despite the im-
portance of creating strong passwords, a policy that requires a password length of 12
random characters may not be feasible even for trained users due to their memory
limitations. The same applies for policies that limit the number of password attempts
before blocking a user’s account. Despite being an important security feature to pre-
vent password-guessing attacks, such a feature is likely to increase administrative costs,
user’s mental load, as well as decrease productivity and reduce compliance with secu-
rity rules, as shown by Brostoff and Sasse [26]. In their work, they demonstrated that
by simply adjusting the policy to a more feasible alternative (i.e. 10 attempts before
blocking the account), all these negative effects are significantly reduced.
3.5.2 Do Not Rely on User Authentication Capabilities
People are very good at recognising people they already know, but they are not good
when authenticating strangers or objects [99, 93, 52]. Thus, except for particular cases,
such as human-human interaction between people that know each other, we cannot rely
on a user’s authentication capabilities and consequently should not include this task in
the human-protocol interaction.
In the same example presented earlier during the SSL/TLS protocol handshake,
when an unknown server certificate is presented to the client’s browser, users are asked
whether they trust that certificate or not. By being asked that question, users are
receiving an authentication task. However, asking users to authenticate an object (a
digital certificate in this case) is not recommended because humans are not capable of
authenticating digital objects properly, and therefore, this authentication process be-
comes insecure. In this specific cause, user’s knowledge is also not properly considered,
since this authentication task requires a high level of knowledge.
57
3.5. Design Recommendations
In the university’s webmail example, an attacker could easily create a spoofed copy
of the webmail’s website, maintaining the same visual attributes. To detect the spoofed
webmail service, users would have to notice the difference in the URL (which might
also be spoofed by a DNS poisoning attack, being the same as the original in this case)
or deny the spoofed server’s certificate when presented by the browser.
As we discussed in Section 3.3, users can be easily fooled by deceptive text, and
more importantly, users are not good at authenticating objects, especially if the au-
thentication task requires technical knowledge. In our example, authenticating a digital
certificate is a task that includes these two problems. It requires an authentication of
digital objects (digital certificates and security indicators), and also, knowledge about
how to differentiate a real from a spoofed certificate. Thus, this task cannot be given
to users, it is necessary to find alternative ways to obtain the required result.
The designer, to avoid security failures due to authentication mistakes, should:
• identify where the security conditions of a protocol relies on an authentication
task performed by humans.
• check whether the authentication task includes authenticating unknown people
or objects.
• verify if the authentication task given to the user is feasible for a ordinary verifier,
not requiring specific technical knowledge [99].
There have been some attempts to provide more feasible authentication methods
for users. Dhamija and Tygar [40, 39] presented an idea of dynamic security skins,
which allows a remote web server to prove its identity to a user in a verifiable manner,
and at the same time is difficult to spoof. The main idea is to provide users with a way
of authenticating a server without requiring additional technical knowledge. They only
need to compare two images, one that they already know and have already associated
to their authentication task, and another which is presented by the server. Since the
image is customised (and previously defined) for each user, it is easy for the user to
detect whether the server is spoofed or not. This is an example of where we can rely on
users authenticating objects, and at the same time, have a good level of security since
humans are good at recognising and remembering images [100, 38]. A similar approach
has been proposed by Gajek et al. [49, 50] focusing on the SSL/TLS protocol, again
using images to provide feasible server authentication for users.
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3.5.3 Integrate Security Into the Main Workflow
The idea that the user’s protection goals must match the security mechanisms imple-
mented, has been discussed for a long time. Saltzer and Schroeder [86], for example,
state that it is essential that the human interaction with a protocol is designed for
ease of use. In this way, users will routinely and automatically apply the protection
mechanisms correctly. If the translation of the security goals to the actual interaction
is not clear, the chance of inaccurate human interactions is likely to increase.
When security is a secondary activity for the user, it tends to be ignored or un-
derrated. Warnings, messages and prompts asking users whether to accept a certain
change in the security context are likely to be ignored by users, compromising the
protocol security [88, 111]. Moreover, most current implementations are plug-ins or
amendments to existing designs which are attempts to overcome inherited design prob-
lems (such as the dozens of browsers toolbars to provide additional security). Security
concerns about human-protocol interaction should be part of the design and included
into the main path of the protocol’s flow.
The following recommendations summarise considerations to be used during the
protocol design:
• If a decision is critical to the security of the protocol, integrate the security
concerns into the critical path of their tasks. By doing it, users will be forced to
interact with it, and will not be able to ignore it. Additionally, asking users to
switch to a safe mode other then just reminding them has been found to be more
effective [111].
• Use active interruption other than passive warnings. This change can produce
more effective results. However, it is necessary to consider the usability impact
of the new design. An excessive use of warnings or employment of unnecessary
prompts and interruptions reduce the usability and consequently reduce the at-
tention given to the them over time [111].
• Incorporating security decisions into the users’ workflow, and, whenever possible,
infer authorisation from acts that are already part of their primary task [113]
(e.g. when a user types the URL in the web browser, we can assume that if there
is an SSL connection, server certificates issued to a different domains should be
rejected).
• Respect user intentions. Warning users that something is wrong and advising
them not to proceed (but still giving them the option to continue) is not the right
approach. They will accept the risks if they believe it is worthwhile. Warnings
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that propose an alternative path allowing users to finish the task safely would
probably be more effective [111].
In the SSL/TLS protocol implementation, we could apply these recommendations
by changing the message presented to the user regarding the untrusted server certificate.
Although the protocol’s specification does not explicitly consider the user-computer
interaction, the SSL/TLS protocol implementation in web browsers has to include the
communication between these nodes. Currently, a message from the browser to the
user is sent via an active warning (a window asking whether the user wants to accept
the certificate). Despite some recent changes in the implementation of these warnings
(which made them more effective [45]) we still believe that once users learn how to
dismiss these warnings, the efficiency of this type of warning is likely to be reduced.
Thus, a third warning type might be needed. We call “interactive warning” a new type
of warning that instead of informing or interrupting users, it makes the user interact
with the protocol.
If we analyse the webmail example, the user will always receive the warning and
then decide whether to proceed afterwards. If an attack occurs, the passive warning
will be ineffective, especially because users are already conditioned to dismiss these
warnings. In this case, a change to an interactive interruption could be a replacement
of the warning message with a question to the user containing an input for the web
address confirmation. The users would be required to type the web address they want
to have access. After typing the URL, the system would check if the “Common Name”
field in the server’s certificate matches the address typed by the user, and, based
on that, decide whether to continue or not. By making this change, attacks that
exploits users’ bounded attention, or even users under influence of external factors,
would be less effective. Additionally, the effects of deceptive URLs and also, the limited
authentication problems would be reduced in this example. This solution needs further
analysis, including user testing. However, the idea behind it, is to remove the security
decision (presented as a passive interruption) from the user’s responsibility and replace
it by a request for a piece of information (using an interactive interruption) that allows
the system to infer the appropriate security decision. By doing that, the security will
be integrated in to the main path of the protocol’s flow. Finally we will be converting
a complex activity into a task that an ordinary user can perform (making the task
feasible).
By doing that, we should be able to reduce the problems related to the lack of
attention to security, as well as the problems with the lack of attention to the absence
security, since users will be more likely to detect the lack of a feature that was part of
their main task (e.g. inserting a card in a ATM and not having to type the PIN).
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3.5.4 Consider that the Expected Behaviour Might Change Under
Different Circumstances
Human behaviour is likely to change under different circumstances (as we have seen
in Section 3.3). The ability to influence the users’ decision making, includes several
factors that might influence users’ behaviour. Factors such as social conditioning,
user’s principles, time constraints, shared risk and fear are efficiently exploited by
attackers. It is necessary to avoid situations where a user interaction might be made
under influenceable conditions. The recommendations for protocol designers are:
• check whether external and internal changes might influence user decisions.
• avoid asking users for decisions when they might be under influence.
• support the users’ goal in making a predictable choice, based on the goal of their
task.
An example of an implementation that does not provide proper mechanisms to
deal with user’s change of behaviour is the web browser implementation of SSL/TLS
protocol. In this implementation, the dialog that asks the users whether they want
to accept an unknown server certificate does not include an effective protection to
user’s change of decision strategies. If the users are under time pressure, for example,
they are more likely to dismiss warnings and informative messages, making them more
vulnerable. In this case, the server’s certificate authentication message, is more likely
to be ignored.
Returning to the webmail example, if a student has just a few minutes to check his
email before going to a class, his decision strategy would potentially change consider-
ably. All the warnings and messages would be dismissed as fast as possible to allow
him to check his email. A spoofed webmail service would be quickly (and carelessly)
accepted as real by the student. The certificate verification, or even the URL would be
ignored due to the time pressure. To avoid this situation, the warnings should require
further checks, such as the domain name confirmation presented in the Section 3.5.3.
By implementing those changes, the student would be forced to ‘authenticate’ the URL,
and by doing that, avoiding some attacks. An attack exploiting time pressure, in this
case, would be less effective.
We should also take into consideration situations where a user generates input that
affects the system’s security. A change of decision strategy, in this case, might also
impact the security properties of the system. Using the Kerberos protocol example, if
the user has to generate a password under time pressure, the quality of input is likely
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to be lower than in a ‘normal’ situation. Additionally, it is likely to increase the chance
of re-using passwords.
It is important to identify potential situations where this component might be
exploited and make the system insensitive to them. Alternatives should be created to
avoid unreasonable decisions by users. These possibilities may include extra checks,
additional verifications, or a reduction in the impact that the user interaction has on
the security properties of the protocol.
3.5.5 Design Should Prevent User From Performing an Inappropriate
Interaction
The system should prevent the user from performing an inappropriate interaction.
Norman [74] introduced the concept of a “forcing function”, which aims to prevent
a user from behaving in any other way than the correct way. Basically, the forcing
function prevents users from progressing with their task until they perform an action
which must be taken to avoid a failure. Additionally, the forcing function will only
enable the safe options when an action is being performed.
Forcing functions prevent errors where a user skips an important step and condition
users to progress with the correct (safe) behaviour. To be effective, efforts (cognitive
and physical) required to follow the forcing function must be less than the effort required
to circumvent it [59]. Thus, protocol designers should:
• attempt to provide only safe options to users, and avoid giving unnecessary (and
unsafe) options when not needed.
• avoid drastic changes in the usability due to use of forcing functions. If the
impacts are too high, users will try to find ways to avoid the ‘safe paths’.
Following the previous examples, in the web browsers’ implementation of SSL/TLS
protocol, the way that the decision of accepting a certificate is implemented does not
protect users from making an inappropriate decision.
In the case of a spoofed website presenting a certificate, the invalid option (accepting
the fake certificate) is still available. On the other hand, predicting users’ intentions is,
for obvious reasons, unfeasible. However, it is possible to ‘ask’ users for their intentions
and then check if the actions match the intentions (Brustolini and Salomon implemented
such mechanism in [28]) before proceeding. The domain name confirmation presented
in the Section 3.5.3 is an example of a forcing function in this case. The user would
only be able to proceed if the certificate presented by the server matches with the server
the user wants to have access.
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Another example of preventing the user from making an inappropriate interaction
can be seen in cash machines (ATMs). When the user is withdrawing cash, for example,
the sequence of operations performed prevents the user from forgetting his card in the
machine. In this case, the cash is not given to the user until he removes the card from
the machine. That is, the only way for the user to achieve its main goal (withdrawing
money) is by clearing a security step, which is removing the card from the machine.
As we can see, forcing functions are very useful. However, we must take care
with the usability impacts and trade-offs, otherwise users will attempt to find ways of
dismissing this feature whenever possible.
3.6 Associations Between Interaction Weaknesses and De-
sign Recommendations
The associations among the weaknesses and the design recommendations show us that,
to minimise the problems of human-protocol interaction, we sometimes have to consider
multiple safeguards to prevent a single weakness from being exploited.
Figure 3.7 represents how the set of weaknesses can be mapped in to the design
recommendations. As we can see, to reduce problems related to users’ knowledge in
a protocol implementation, we have to consider not only that user faculties must be
respected, but also make use of mechanisms to prevent inappropriate interactions from
being performed. The same recommendations should be applied to deal with problems
related to human inherent limitations. Despite being different types of weaknesses,
users’ lack of knowledge and human limitations present similarities when we attempt
to minimise the threats that arise from them.
Decision making influencing factors are linked to three recommendations, which
reinforces our impression that this is a complex weakness to handle. For this weakness,
it is necessary to make use of techniques to prevent inappropriate decisions from being
performed by users, to integrate security into protocols’ implementation main workflow,
and also, to maintain the predictability of the workflow, that is, minimise the impacts
of the users’ changes of behaviour.
To deal with users’ limitations regarding authentication, we first have to consider
that we cannot rely on the accuracy level of an authentication task performed by an
user. However, when this task is unavoidable, it should respect the capabilities of
ordinary users.
Users’ bounded attention deals with users’ scant regard for security tasks. The
main reason for the lack of attention to security is because security activities are usually
secondary concerns in users’ activities. The recommendation connected to this issue
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represents advice to change the focus of security tasks, and bring them to the main
workflow. Consequently, users’ focus will also include security as a component of the
main activity.
User knowledge
Inherent limitations
Decision making
Authentication
capabilities
Bounded Attention
Respect user faculties
Prevent inappropriate inter-
actions from being performed
Consider that the expected
behaviour might change
Do not rely on users’ au-
thentication capabilities
Integrate security into
the main workflow
Figure 3.7: Mapping overlooked components into design recommendations
It is crucial to consider the importance of not relying on user authentication ca-
pabilities for objects and unknown people. Directly or indirectly, most components
presented in our taxonomy are related to this factor. Most attacks exploit the false
acceptance of a spoofed content by users.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown that there are many factors that should be taken into
account when considering human-protocol interaction. At the same time, there is a
wealth of research involving human behaviour analysis and detecting human charac-
teristics that might be exploited by attackers in specific contexts, such as phishing
scams and authentication systems. However, despite the existence of similar findings,
there is a lack of harmonisation regarding the definitions of human characteristics and
weaknesses. We have not found a broad and general taxonomy of human-protocol in-
teraction weaknesses. Therefore, we proposed our own unified set of human weaknesses
that merges different research findings into a well defined set of weaknesses.
From this set of weaknesses, we built a set of recommendations to assist designers in
the complex task of minimising security threats from user interaction. The recommen-
dations are based on our findings, recommendations found in related works, empirical
analysis, and extrapolation from the set of weaknesses presented earlier.
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A better understanding of users’ characteristics and behaviour should lead to more
reliable protocol design and reduce the number of threats found in the human-protocol
field. In this chapter, we highlighted those characteristics and proposed ways to deal
with them. From a ceremony perspective, the taxonomy and design recommendations
we presented are even more relevant. In a ceremony, the human interaction is a more
explicit part of the design. The lessons learnt from analysing human interaction in
existing implementations of security protocols are of great use to provide guidelines for
designing and analysing the interaction that will be performed between users and other
agents in a ceremony. A user interaction in a ceremony should be designed to comply
with the recommendations we presented and take into account the components of the
taxonomy we presented.
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In this chapter we present the foundations of a framework for designing and
analysing security ceremonies. We describe the communication channels and
agent types involved and their respective characteristics. We also present a
threat model tailored for security ceremonies. Part of the content of this chapter
appears in two papers: “A Proposed Framework for Analysing Security Cere-
monies” by the author, Jean Everson Martina, Geraint Price and Ricardo Felipe
Custo´dio published in the Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on
Security and Cryptography [32]; and “An Updated Threat Model for Security
Ceremonies”, by the same authors, published in the Proceedings of the 28th
Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing [31].
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4.1 Introduction
Security ceremonies, as well as security protocols can be seen as sequences of steps that
its peers must take to establish a secure communication amongst themselves. In each
step, a message is transmitted between peers. Each message can be sent in clear (not
encrypted) or encrypted. The contents of these messages may vary according to the type
of channel used. For a traditional protocol channel (network) the contents may include
(but not limited to) names, random numbers, ciphertexts and cryptographic keys. For
other channels, such as those used for expressing human-computer or human-human
communications, message contents can be user input via keyboards, touch screens or
speech. Additionally, a message may be formed by more than one component, for
example, in a single message we may have the concatenation of a random number,
an identity and a key. At its completion, a ceremony as well as a protocol, attempts
to achieve certain goals, usually composed of a set of security properties. A security
ceremony is considered flawed if it fails to provide its claimed goals.
Protocols have been designed and analysed for a long time and several methods
have been developed to prove protocols’ claims. Since Needham and Schroeder [71]
introduced the idea of using encryption to achieve authenticated communication in
computer networks, we have seen a lot of research in the security protocols area. Par-
ticularly in developing formal methods and logics to check and verify protocols’ claims.
We must cite Burrows et al. [29] for giving a formal representation to describe the
beliefs (and its derivations) of the parties involved in the protocol during its execution;
Bellare and Rogaway [17] for the provable security, that allows for probabilistic study
of the confidentiality goals; Lowe [62], Meadows [68], Schneider [89] and Ryan [85] for
works on state enumeration and model checking; Abadi [1, 2] for extending pi-calculus
[70] for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols and thefore creating
the spi-calculus; Paulson and Bella [78, 12] for their inductive method to verifying
protocols, that allows proving the existence of security properties over an inductively
defined set of traces (communication events). We have also seen the creation of a
number of tools to verify and check security protocols automatically such as ProVerif
[19] and Scyther [37]. These techniques and tools have evolved in such a way that
nowadays we can check and analyse complex and extensive protocols.
Meadows [69] and Bella et al. [16] in their area survey gave us a broad coverage of
the maturity in this field of protocol verification. They also point to trends followed
by methods, pinpointing their strong and weak features. They give propositions for
research ranging from open-ended protocols, composability and new threat models;
something that has changed very little since Dolev and Yao’s proposal [43]. These
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problems seem very well covered. Current research is, in general, aimed at optimising
the actual methods in speed and coverage. An important issue regarding these works is
that they do not discuss the extension of protocol verification and description to encom-
pass better assumptions as a valid way of extending research in this area. Therefore,
extending protocol verification and description to include fine-grained assumptions and
derivations is a new and unexplored research path.
Although Ellison [47] proposes the possibility of using formal methods for security
protocol analysis, no major work is found today in the ceremony formal-analysis field.
Most existing research on human-protocol interaction is focused on the human aspects,
based on empirical analysis, which is very important at a design level, but can be
difficult and error-prone during analysis, as the history of protocol analysis shows us.
An advance in the reasoning about ceremonies was introduced by Ruksˇe˙nas et al.
[83, 84]. They developed a human error cognitive model, initially applied to interaction
on interfaces. They show that, normally, security leaks come from mistakes made when
modelling interfaces, not taking into account the cognitive processes and expectations
of human beings behind the computer screen. They successfully verify problems on
an authentication interface and a cash-point interface. They showed that the normal
lack of consideration in the human peers cognitive processes is one of the weakest
factors in these systems. Their proposal comes with a powerful implementation using
a model-checker.
Our approach is different, we do not focus on a specifically difficult to describe
limitation of human beings, but on giving to the protocol and ceremony designers a
better way to define human actions in a ceremony. By making the assumptions more
explicit, and requiring a description of the ceremony’s security, we can enable designers
to experiment with different ceremony techniques. By stating fine-grained assumptions
and analysing their absence, we can get insights in to potential break points for security
ceremonies. The extension we propose aims to be richer in details than what we cur-
rently have, and compatible with established protocol analysis techniques we currently
have.
To try to achieve this complex task of verifying security ceremonies we need to first
understand what we cover with our framework, then we discuss the communication
channels and agents involved and finally the threats such channels are subject to.
4.2 Overview
In traditional protocol specifications we have one communication channel. When mov-
ing to ceremonies we add additional agent types into the specification. Consequently,
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there is a need for new communication channels. By adding human agents, we need
to create channels to represent human-computer interaction (e.g. user interfaces) and
another to symbolise human-human interaction (e.g. speech). Figure 4.1 gives an
overview of the agents and the types of communication channels involved. The area
bounded by the dotted line represents the traditional protocol overview, while the
complete figure represents the point of view from a ceremony perspective.
Figure 4.1: Ceremony communication overview
As we can see, in a protocol design and specification, the human-protocol and
human-human interaction are assumed to happen out-of-band, and therefore become
part of the design assumptions. All the actions outside the dotted area are not included
as messages in a protocol specification. As we will see in Section 4.3, in our framework,
the human agents and the additional communication channels are explicitly included
and the messages exchanged are now part of the ceremony specification.
The idea of having different channel types is not necessarily new. In fact, especially
in ad-hoc networks and ubiquitous computing, we have seen some relevant ideas on
using special channels that are used by devices and humans to solve existing issues (e.g.
authenticating devices that do not pre-share a secret). One of the first references to the
idea of using additional channels was presented by Stajano and Anderson where they
use secret data exchanged over a contact-triggered channel to initiate an authentication
and key exchange protocol [96, 95, 97]. Once the secret data is exchanged, this data
is used for subsequent authentication of the parties on regular network communication
channel. This approach already makes some assumptions on the channels’ properties.
First, it requires that the channel is location-limited, that is, it is physically restricted
to a certain space (e.g. a room). Second, is that the channel is authenticated, meaning
that the attacker cannot transmit data on the channel. Finally, the channel also requires
confidentiality, therefore the attacker cannot eavesdrop this restricted channel.
Balfanz et al. [11] further developed Stajano and Anderson’s idea by removing the
requirement for the additional channel to be secret. They do that by making use of
public key cryptography. The agents use the location-limited channel for exchanging
their public keys. In this case, the attacker can eavesdrop the channel and still will
not be able to do anything with the information obtained. The participants authenti-
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cate each other over the network channel by proving possession of their corresponding
private keys. Since the attacker does not have access to those private keys, he cannot
impersonate any of the participants. Creese et al. [36] also describe the use of different
channels where the attacker has a limited set of capabilities. They describe the use of
a regular network channel with the addition of a low-bandwidth channel, which can
either be uni or bi-directional. An interesting contribution of their work is that they
consider human-interaction with the protocol. Although they do not explicitly define
a human agent in the protocol, they consider that the user might need to input some
information during the protocol run using the low-bandwidth channel.
Hoepman [54] also comes up with the idea of using a low bandwidth communication
channel over which two agents can exchange a limited amount of information. This ex-
tra channel is either authenticated, meaning that (although an attacker can eavesdrop)
the receiver can be sure that a message he received was by the sender he expects; or
private, meaning that only the receiver will be able to read the message (however the
sender is not authenticated). In other words, the attacker is capable of eavesdropping
on the authentic channel (but not insert or modify messages) or insert and modify
messages on the private channel. Vaudenay [106] describes commitment schemes and
makes use of authentication channels with stronger authenticity properties, such as
stall-free transmission, transmission with acknowledgment by the receiver and listener-
ready transmission (in this last one the sender can check if the receiver is currently
listening to the authenticated channel). Such properties are relevant for us because
they are all present in face-to-face (human-human) conversations. In phone conversa-
tions, only the last two properties are achieved. Other less interactive communications,
such as voice mail messages do not provide these properties [106]. Cˆagalj and Cˆapkun
[30] also make use of humans when tackling the problem of key agreement over a radio
link. They use the human’s ability of authenticating each other by visual and verbal
interaction. They base their proposal on three different techniques: on visual compar-
ison of short strings; on distance bounding (where the distance between the devices
is displayed to the user); and on integrity codes. They do not explicitly include the
human nodes in the protocol specification, but they do include some human-performed
tasks into the design assumptions (such as the comparisons of strings).
Wong and Stajano [110] propose protocols which make use of the multichannel ap-
proach and present a practical implementation for such protocols. By making use of
a visual channel, users possessing camera phones would take pictures of short nonces
embedded in QR Codes. With information shared using a radio channel (suscepti-
ble to an attacker who can intercept, stop, modify, and insert messages at will) and
making use of a low-capacity channel that provides data-origin authentication, they
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describe a protocol for mutual authentication that does not assume confidentiality and
resists eavesdropping on the auxiliary channel. They also propose another protocol
that resists a more powerful attacker by assuming a unidirectional visual channel and
a one-bit-per-message data-origin authenticated channel. In fact, this variation of the
protocol makes use of two low-capacity channels. One from the receiver to the sender
(who sends/displays an image) and another one from the sender to the receiver, which
consists of a button that is pressed (in this case, the button would be physically part
of the receiver, but pressed by the sender).
Kainda et al. [58] performed a comparative usability study of the application of
similar methods to those presented above. They argue that most of these proposals
fail to take into account factors that may seriously harm the security and usability
of a protocol. They performed a usability study of pairing methods and outlined
recommendations for designing user interfaces that minimise human mistakes. They
also discuss security failures that such methods might be subject to, such as the users
not performing a string verification properly, or choosing an incorrect option when
checking an authentication string, image or sound. In summary, they show that the
methods of comparing and typing short strings into devices are still preferable despite
claims that new methods (such as using QR codes) are more usable and secure. Finally,
they state that the interface design alone is not sufficient for mitigating human mistakes
on the additional channels.
Our approach focuses on a more generic context than those presented. Most existing
work focuses on a specific problem (e.g. authentication is most cases). We, on the other
hand, focus on building the basis for tackling a wider range of different problems. With
the additional channels we propose, along with the new agent types and a dynamic
threat model, we will be able to approach a larger set of problems from a ceremony
point of view. In Section 4.3, we describe the channels and agents we use. Next, in
Section 4.4, we present a threat model that can be adapted to reflect several different
real world scenarios.
4.3 Communication Channels and Agents
One of the main characteristics that differentiates a ceremony from a protocol is the
additional number of channel and agent types. By extending protocol analysis to cere-
mony analysis, we can potentially find and solve security flaws that were previously not
detectable. However, the design and verification of ceremonies requires the definition
of additional communication channels, nodes, and consequently new threat models.
With the addition of humans to the specification, we also have to consider human
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skills and capabilities. They are different from computers in a number of ways. There-
fore, we need a new agent type which we call human. By adding such an agent, the
communication between this agent and other agents in the ceremony must also be de-
scribed. Thus, new communication channels must also be included to represent the
exchange of messages between the human amongst themselves and with the already
existing device agent (also known as computer). In Figure 4.2, we have two new commu-
nication channels called human-device and human-human channel. The first represents
the communication between the human agents and devices. The second denotes the
communication between humans. The area bounded by the dotted line represents the
classic protocol overview, where we have the device agent type, that represents general
devices (e.g. computers, smartphones, etc.) and a device-device channel which is the
traditional network channel.
Figure 4.2: Ceremony communication channels and agents
In the same way as devices, a human agent is capable of sending and receiving
messages on a channel, but in this case, such a channel must comply to human ca-
pabilities and constraints. This human agent should be capable of storing knowledge
and sending messages on the mediums it is capable of operating. The agent should
also be able to use knowledge conversion functions to be able to operate its devices.
Humans can also be related to devices they operate or own, and some of the physical
constraints existent in the real world can also be present in this relation. For example,
for a one-time-password generator token, the relationship between the human and the
one-time-password generator device is based on the device’s uniqueness.
In addition to the human agent, we create two communication channels, one for the
interaction between humans and devices and another for interaction between humans
themselves. To represent the new human-device interaction, we create a channel called
human-device channel. This channel represents the message exchange between humans
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and devices. Such an interaction is usually performed via a user interface. A device
usually displays (or emits) and receives messages, whereas the human reads (or hears)
and inputs messages.
To represent human-human interaction, we define a channel called human-human.
This channel represents the message exchange between humans. Such an interaction
is usually performed via speech, chats, user interface. This is a very complex channel
which includes a large set of possible actions and virtually impossible to translate into
a finite set of actions. However, we consider a limited set of basic actions and analyse
a ceremony against them. The taxonomy we present in Chapter 3 is important to give
us insights in to what we can, and what we cannot, expect from that interaction. The
recommendations given in the same chapter can provide clues to how to avoid incorrect
and unsafe expectations from the human interaction. Merging this with a simplistic,
but formal definition of the human-human and human-device communication, we can
achieve interesting findings as we will see in Chapter 5.
The addition of humans to the specification brings interesting properties to the
ceremony. Human communication can be performed in different ways, as for example,
in person, via phone or even via some type of recorded material. Each one of them
providing different properties. The four main properties we found (which corroborates
with some ideas proposed by Vaudenay [106]) are:
Authentication – The channel involving humans is usually authenticated, meaning
that the recipient of a message is able to be sure of who sent the message.
Stall-free communication – Human communication can not be stalled, that is, from
the time an authenticated message is released, it is treated by the receiver imme-
diately.
Communication with acknowledgment – In communication in human-related
channels the sender is capable of checking whether the receiver has received the
message or not.
Listener-ready communication – The sender can check whether the receiver is cur-
rently listening to the channel.
It is important to highlight that such properties are not always achievable. We may
find scenarios and communication types that may achieve a subset of these properties,
or even not achieve any. For example, face-to-face conversations usually achieve all
these properties. As a counter-example, as we have seen in Chapter 3, if one of the
parties is unknown (e.g. an unfamiliar person), we may not achieve authentication.
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There will still exist assurance of the sender in this communication (the recipient can
easily spot the sender of the message), but the recipient might not be sure whether the
sender is the person (or authority) he claims to be (e.g. a real police officer). Telephone
conversations usually achieve the last two properties and possibly authentication. If an
agent starts communicating with another one, the first is aware that second is listening,
and subtle human senses assure her that the latter has heard her message [106]. In
addition to that, familiarity with the sender may allow the receiver to authenticate the
sender by their voice. Other communication types, such as voice mail and recordings,
do not provide these properties. There is no immediate reception, no confirmation of
reception and no insurance that the message was recorded in the first place. There
still may be some form of authentication. If there is familiarity with the sender, there
might be authentication of the sender by their voice.
After discussing the human agent and its channels and messages, we have to discuss
knowledge distribution. In a classic protocol framework, knowledge distribution deals
with the contents of the message flow. Whatever goes through the network media, the
sender may learn the messages and also break the messages into their subcomponents
and learn them. The attacker may also learn (depending on the threat model) the con-
tents. With the additional channels and agents, we keep the knowledge distribution the
same. Whatever flows on the human-device and human-human channels is susceptible
to be learned by the attacker, again depending on the threat model.
With the inclusion of new agents and channels, another point that needs to be
covered is the need for a tailored threat model. We need a model that encompasses
active threats, as we have in protocols, as well as passive threats. The classic threat
model for security protocols, as we will show, is not realistic for our human-device
and human-human channels. The presence of an omnipotent and omnipresent being in
human interactions is not always realistic in practice and may imply some unnecessary
and complex solutions to prevent attacks from such a powerful entity. Therefore,
before starting analysing ceremonies, we need to review the possible threats we have
on each channel we propose. The existence of a single worst-case scenario threat model
is justifiable in security protocols. However, the same cannot be said for security
ceremonies. Human agents executing security ceremonies are constrained by the laws
of physics and usual capacities expected from human beings. The existence of such
a powerful agent in a setting involving human-human communication is not plausible
and is likely to demand solutions that are not tailored to reality.
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4.4 A Threat Model for Security Ceremonies
A realistic analysis of security protocols must account for a realistic threat model, and
the protocols’ goals must hold against it [12]. Security protocols are generally secure
against passive attackers who eavesdrop the communication medium. However, since
Needham and Schroeder introduced the notion of an active attacker [71] a lot of research
has been conducted in this area in order to prove protocols’ security against active
attackers. Needham and Schroeder’s attacker model assumed that the attacker could
alter, copy, replay and create messages (or parts of messages) in all communication
paths. Dolev and Yao [43] further developed this attacker model by formalising it and
adding new assumptions. In general, we can say that the Dolev-Yao threat model
defines the most hostile environment for protocols, and that the attacker has complete
control of the network but is not able to perform cryptanalysis [12].
Currently, the Dolev-Yao threat model is the most widely accepted model to analyse
security protocols [12]. Consequently, there are several security protocols considered
secure against Dolev-Yao’s assumptions. In general, we assume that if a protocol is
secure against such a powerful attacker, it is secure against less powerful variations.
When we move to ceremonies, however, a realistic threat model may not be Dolev-
Yao anymore since its focus is only on a networked environment. In ceremonies we
have new communication channels, new nodes, and consequently possible new attacker
variations. For that reason, an appropriate threat model must be designed to fit into
this new architecture. We argue that, even though Dolev-Yao’s threat model can
represent the most powerful attacker in a ceremony, the attacker in this model is not
realistic in certain scenarios.
As we discussed earlier, one of the reasons that certain protocols fail when imple-
mented is because their assumptions are either not well specified or not realistic, forcing
implementations to create mechanisms to circumvent these problems. Consequently,
these workarounds may introduce security problems, making the implementation of the
protocol, in certain contexts, flawed. In this case, despite the fact that the problem was
created during the implementation, the flaw was caused by an inaccurate assumption
at design level. Therefore, we must revisit Dolev-Yao’s threat model so we can have a
tailored threat model for ceremonies, allowing more aligned design and implementation
components for ceremonies.
The definition of a threat model for security ceremonies is not a straightforward
process. In the same way that a ceremony allows a more detailed analysis of a protocol,
the threats, or the capabilities of an attacker under a ceremony scope requires finer
granularity in their description. Even though the assumptions made by Needham
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and Schroeder [71] and extended by Dolev and Yao [43] are the current standard for
protocol analysis, for ceremonies they are not always consistent with real world threats.
For example, an attacker capable of modifying (or replaying) a ‘speech’ packet in a
human-human medium is unrealistic if this communication happens in person.
By specifying and verifying security ceremonies we will be able to encompass a more
human-centric security view. The definition of a realistic threat model for ceremonies
will help us to design ceremonies which will assist the human peers to assess the threat
level they are subject to. By not overstating assumptions we inherently make them
plausible and achievable.
4.4.1 Abstract Threat-Models for Protocols
Security protocols were initially designed to be safe in the presence of a passive attacker.
That is, an attacker able to eavesdrop the communication channels and try to make use
of its contents [43]. The idea of the existence of an active attacker, also called intruder,
saboteur or spy, was first mentioned in the classic Needham-Schroeder paper [71].
They assumed that an attacker can intervene between parties in all communication
channels. Such an attacker is capable of altering, copying, replaying and creating
messages. Needham and Schroeder claim that, although it is a very pessimistic scenario,
the only way an authentication protocol can be considered safe is if it resists against
such a powerful attacker. In the following years, this definition became widely accepted
and applied when discussing whether a protocol is correct or not. In summary, assuming
that the machines involved in the protocol are safe and that cryptography cannot be
broken by brute force or cryptanalysis, Needham and Schroeder assume that an attacker
can:
• obtain any message that goes through the communication channel;
• modify messages and its subcomponents;
• copy messages and its subcomponents;
• replay messages;
• create messages.
In the following years, Dolev and Yao [43] formalised Needham-Schroeder’s attacker
and described the attacker capabilities in more details, in order to allow protocols to
be analysed more precisely, with less assumptions on the attacker’s behaviour. They
added the following assumptions to the attacker capabilities:
76
4.4. A Threat Model for Security Ceremonies
• The attacker is a valid agent of the network, and therefore can initiate commu-
nication with any other agent.
• The attacker can prevent the receiver from receiving a message.
• The attacker, despite the fact that he cannot read the content of an encrypted
message (to which he does not know the key), can forward its contents to another
agent.
• The attacker can perform any operation over a message except cryptanalysis. For
example, he can encrypt and decrypt messages using a key he knows.
The threat model we present above, known as Dolev-Yao, is a de facto standard
for symbolic protocol analysis at present [12]. In summary, in this model, the attacker
controls the communication channel. From the Dolev-Yao threat model, we have seen
the development of two lines of research. The first considers that the Dolev-Yao model
should be extended because such an attacker cannot perform cryptanalysis. They take
a probabilistic-reasoning based approached, which has been described by Bellare and
Rogaway [17]. This research thread has evolved during the years in parallel with the
Dolev-Yao research line [8], although there are a few efforts in reconciling them [3, 10].
The second follows the idea that if a protocol is secure against a Dolev-Yao attacker, it
is secure against a less powerful variation. Furthermore, the latter argues that subtleties
of protocol attacks can still be found even after a protocol is proved correct against
Dolev-Yao. By adjusting the powers of the attacker to adhere to the real world and
using the symbolic approach, such subtleties may be discovered [8].
Our main focus is on the second line of research. A first example of a threat model
that consider variations of Dolev-Yao’s attacker capabilities is BUG [14]. In BUG, the
agents are no longer classified as attacker/non-attacker. In this model, the agents of
the protocol are partitioned in three groups: Bad, Ugly and Good. Bad agents may
(or may not) collude with each other in an attempt to break the protocol for their own
(illegal) benefits. Ugly agents have an intermediate type of behaviour. They may follow
the protocol or may deliberately not, letting the Bad principals exploit them. Good are
principals who follow the protocol and its rules. The BUG threat model is interesting
because of its novelty in having attackers that may not share their knowledge and may
change their behaviour during the protocol run, depending on the risks of retaliation.
A direct derivation from BUG is the Rational Attacker [13]. The rational attackers
model drops the triple distinction of the agents’ types (due to its complexity) and
simplifies BUG by considering that any principal makes cost/benefit decisions at any
time whether to behave according to the protocol. The attacker must decide if the gain
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outweighs the risks of being caught. The Rational Attacker was followed up by the
General Attacker [8]. In this model, the cost/benefit function is removed, but still, any
agent may behave as a Dolev-Yao attacker. In fact each peer is a potential attacker that
can use the information lawfully acquired to subvert the protocol. This threat model
is more realistic than the BUG and the Rational Attacker in an Internet scenario and
has the benefit of not having to deal with the gain/loss function.
Finally, we have a refinement to the General Attacker model, called Multi-Attacker
[9]. In this model, each principal may behave as a Dolev-Yao attacker but will never
reveal his long-term secrets to other agents. The Multi-Attacker adds some rationality
to the General Attacker in a way that it avoids trivial impersonation attacks.
The BUG family of threat models can be seen as a relevant attempt to represent
protocols’ execution environments in a more accurate manner. On the human-centric
security and ubiquitous computing area we see works from Stajano [96], Balfanz [11]
and Creese et al. [36] as interesting starting points where we can see variations of the
Dolev-Yao attacker applied to the analysis of human-interactive security protocols. As
mentioned in Section 4.2, their models include two different communication channels to
encompass different threats and environments. In general, they consider a traditional
network channel which is susceptible to a Dolev-Yao attacker and a restricted channel
where a weakened version of the attacker is used to represent the threat model involving
human agents and devices. These examples are relevant because they introduce the
idea that communication channels involving human peers and human communication
need to be analysed against realistic attacker actions.
In our work, we will discuss how to re-arrange the attacker capabilities to analyse
security ceremonies under a realistic threat model. Although initially simple, such a
threat model hides subtleties that can validate (or invalidate) claims regarding the
achievement of security goals. Attacks can be seen as the marriage between weak goal
achievements and the misunderstanding of the correct threat model and therefore, the
definition of a realistic and accurate threat model is extremely important.
4.4.2 Premises for Ceremony Threat Modelling
It seems obvious that developing a ceremony that is secure against a Dolev-Yao attacker
will imply that the same ceremony will be secure against any weaker real-world attacker.
However, it is often the case that, to guarantee that a certain ceremony is secure
against a such powerful attacker, we have to include very complex mechanisms which
may degrade usability. By doing that, a new threat is introduced, which is the fact
that the user will try to circumvent the security mechanisms in order to accomplish
his/her tasks. If we consider a more realistic threat model, where the attacker might
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not be as powerful as the Dolev-Yao attacker, but such an attacker is powerful enough
to encompass realistic threats, we can prevent the user from being overloaded, and
consequently make the ceremony more usable and secure.
Since the focus of ceremonies is not only on the network channel, we need to define
a set of premises for threat models that involve human agents. One important premise
for a reasonable threat model is that no being is omnipotent in human-human
channels. This premise is easily verifiable by humans. The detection of powers beyond
usual human capability is straightforward in the setting of security ceremonies. The
impact of such a premise is that, depending on the situation, the presence of an active
attacker is not realistic. For example, in a network channel, it is realistic to consider
that the attacker may block and replay messages, as defined by Dolev-Yao. However,
in a human-human channel, an attacker with such power is not reasonable. Replaying
or blocking ‘speech’ in human communication certainly involves the use of powers that
are not feasible for a human peer.
Following a similar aspect, we have a premise that omnipotency in the human-
device channel is not always realistic. Although we have scenarios where we
expect that an attacker has full control over the human-device channel (therefore a
Dolev-Yao attacker), in some situations such a powerful attacker is not consistent with
the real threats. For example, if we assume that the operating system (OS) might
be corrupted, we should then analyse the human-device channel against a Dolev-Yao
attacker. However, if we assume the OS is safe, we may consider that the attacker does
not have all capabilities that the Dolev-Yao attacker has. Another example is when
a ceremony makes use of single-purpose devices (e.g. one-time-password generators).
When these devices are used, the capabilities of the attacker over the human-device
channel is very limited. Thus, the threat model used on such a channel is ceremony
and context-specific.
The next premise we have is that a threat model including human peers
should be constrained by the laws of physics. In several cases, it is unrealistic
to assume an omnipresent attacker in human-human channels. In public locations, we
may need to consider that an attacker (or several attackers working together) is present
during the human-human and human-device communication. However, if we consider
that some ceremonies are executed in a suitable location that takes into account the
verifiable presence of a potential attacker, we have to respect these physical restric-
tions. For instance, there are ceremonies that run in a physical context where human
peers have strict physical access control. A real world example of such a premise is
the execution of security ceremonies for PKIs in safe rooms. These rooms have very
strict physical and electromagnetic controls that prevent attackers from being physi-
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cally present in the environment.
Another important premise for a security ceremony threat model is that humans
are capable of performing basic information recall or mathematical opera-
tions. As we discussed in Chapter 3, some security protocols and their related security
ceremonies are designed to encompass unrealistic human capabilities regarding the re-
call of information or the execution of mathematical operations. In a realistic threat
model, human peers are required to recall just fresh information and to execute basic
mathematical operations. This premise impacts on how the personification of the at-
tacker in the human-human channel behaves. Without support from a device, a human
peer has limited memory and limited mathematical capability. The presence of exter-
nal aids is detectable and can be used to verify an expected behaviour. An example of
such a premise is the verification of possession of a device in an authentication scenario
to generate one-time-passwords.
Finally, we have the premise that one should never use more crypto than
needed. Using more crypto than it is necessary often impacts on usability problems
or may introduce inaccurate assumptions from a human-device interaction perspective.
Although this is not a ceremony specific problem, encryption should be used only
when it is necessary and for clear purposes. Just because a protocol uses encryption,
for example, it does not mean it is secure [7]. Additionally, the inclusion of extra layers
of crypto, that do not address the threat model, may induce the human who is taking
part in the ceremony to misunderstand the threat level he is subject to. An example
of such an extra layer not addressing the threat model is the use of one-time-password
devices by banks. The extra layer of crypto may induce users into believing that an
attacker could not access his account without the device. However, the use of this
device does not address the active man-in-the-middle attacks [90], although establishes
a strong device possession premise.
With the premises above in mind we propose a threat model that encompass the
characteristics of each specific channel. For every channel, we analyse the threat model
looking at Dolev-Yao’s premises, but we dynamically add and remove capabilities in
order to define an attacker model that matches real-world threats.
4.4.3 An Adaptive Threat Model for Ceremonies
A proposition for a new threat model for security ceremonies is justified because no
protocol is executed without context. It is known that even if a protocol is proven
secure against a powerful attacker (e.g. Dolev-Yao), it might still fail due to some
reasons, which may include:
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• Usability problems – despite the fact that user interaction is usually part of a
protocol’s assumptions (and not an explicit part of the specification), in some
cases, when these assumptions are implemented, they may require an unrealistic
set of user capabilities to achieve the expected goals. Therefore, a user may not
be able to perform his tasks correctly and/or not even able to execute them at
all.
• The assumptions are too big/strong or generic – it is often necessary to assume
that previous steps were successfully performed, or that the user is capable of
performing some kind of operation. However, in some scenarios, converting an
assumption into an implementation that achieves the same (expected) security
properties might be extremely challenging.
While those reasons are not directly related to the network channel, and therefore
one could state that the protocol achieves its security goals, we cannot make the same
statements when the protocol is implemented. When put in practice, assumptions that
involve human-device and human-human interaction have to be implemented somehow.
These assumptions must be replaced by dynamic user-interactions. By doing that, we
introduce two new possible communication channels, as we have shown in Figure 4.2.
In this case, we cannot be certain that the expected security properties assumed in the
protocol design will hold in the ceremony.
Another important issue regarding threat models for security ceremonies is that hu-
mans make different decisions, regarding their security, based on a dynamic evaluation
of the environmental threat level that they are subject to [77]. An example of such an
embodied decision making strategy is the evolutionary pressure humans suffered when
deciding the trade-offs between whether to engage in attacks and become hunters or to
keep a way of life as gatherers, and thus being exposed to less risk [5]. This inherent
faculty of human nature is usually not taken into account when we always assume the
worst case scenario as in a Dolev-Yao setting. Some attacks may be thwarted by using
a very pessimistic threat model, but inherently this action may provoke human nature
into acting and finding an easier and plausible solution if the user does not see the
alternative path as risky.
With the above in mind we stress that for a security ceremony, the threat model
must be adaptive. Even the same protocol might need to run under distinct threat
models and achieve its goals in different but still reasonable ways. Considering the
worst case is not always the best option since it can degrade usability. The adaptive
model we propose applies mostly for the human-device and human-human channels.
For network communication (device-device channel), in the majority of cases, we will
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assume a Dolev-Yao attacker since it is the de facto standard. This is important since
it is very well studied and developed.
In addition, having different threat models for different environments can poten-
tially ‘teach’ users to be more aware of threats and to better (more intuitively) un-
derstand the threat model for each circumstance. For example, a user pairing two
Bluetooth devices at home is under a different threat to when in an airport. The same
may happen for an ATM cash withdrawal ceremony in America and Europe, or even
when the ceremony takes place in the same location but at different times of the day.
All of these scenarios are subject to different threats.
Based on that, the most challenging step in designing and analysing ceremonies is to
define the threats and the conditions where the ceremony will be used. A threat model
for ceremonies must be ceremony and context-dependent. However, we can define a
limited set of threats that encompasses the great majority of those cases. The existence
of a standardised threat model scenario is paramount to the establishment of security
goals of ceremonies and for the comparison between the efficacy of different ceremonies.
Therefore, our proposal for a threat model for ceremonies is based on Dolev-Yao’s
attacker set of capabilities. We enlist and describe each capability and we dynamically
add and remove them from the threat model we define. For example, we can have a
threat model where the attacker may have the eavesdrop and initiate capabilities only
to enable the fulfilment of our premises stated in Section 4.4.2. Our final goal is to
measure the security of ceremonies against a realistic attacker, whose capabilities may
be a subset of Dolev-Yao’s attacker capabilities. This approach will also help us to
reuse some of the abstract verification techniques and tools already in use for security
protocols.
To describe our threat model approach, we first enlist a set of attacker’s capabilities
based on the Dolev-Yao attacker. By using this set and defining a threat model, we will
be able to design and verify ceremonies that are secure against a realistic attacker with
different capabilities under different channels (e.g. Dolev-Yao attacker on the network
channel, while an attacker with eavesdrop, initiate and block on the human-device
channel, and finally a passive attacker, who only eavesdrops, on the human-human
channel).
To describe the powers of the attacker on a specific channel, we will use a simple
notation. We start with no threat model, or simply, a model where the attacker has
‘no capabilities’. From that point on we add to the attacker the desired capabilities,
such as E for eavesdrop only, or EB for eavesdrop and block only. Another way of
approaching the notation is by presenting a weakened version of Dolev-Yao’s attacker
model instead of using a composition of capabilities. We would consider that “DY”
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is a Dolev-Yao attacker, and everything followed by a “–” symbol will represent the
capabilities removed from this attacker. For example, a “DY-BR” means a Dolev-Yao
attacker without the blocking and replaying capabilities. We would like to stress that
this is more a denotational problem and using both strategies we will always achieve
an equivalence. However, before making use of the secondary notation, we would need
a formal and precise definition of Dolev-Yao’s set of capabilities, which we will not
include here. We will therefore use only the first type of notation in this thesis.
Using the same initial assumptions of Dolev and Yao about the attacker, that is, that
the attacker is a valid agent of the network and that he cannot perform cryptanalysis,
we list below the attacker’s set of capabilities which we include in our adaptive threat
model. All the capabilities we list are based on Dolev-Yao’s attacker and their informal
definitions are shown below:
Eavesdrop (E) – Represents the capability of the attacker to passively listen to the
communication media. That means that the attacker will learn the contents of
any message M that is sent through the communication channel. Even if the
message is not intended for the attacker, he is able to capture and learn M .
Initiate (I) – Another important capability of an attacker is the capacity to initiate
a communication with another peer using the knowledge the attacker possesses.
The definition of initiate is that the attacker can use any information he knows
(from his initial knowledge or learnt during the ceremony run) to initiate a com-
munication with an agent A by sending message M , the contents of which are
part of, or derived from, the attacker’s knowledge.
Block (B) – Is the attacker’s capability to block messages, that is, preventing the
receiver from learning the contents of a message sent to them. Its definition is
that when A sends a message M to an agent B, the content of the message will
not be learnt by B.
Atomic Break Down (A) – Defines the capability that allows the attacker to break
down messages in to its subcomponents. This capability is relevant so that the
attacker can use atomic components of previously learned messages to produce
new ones. The definition for Break Down is that for all pairs composed by some
X and Y elements in the knowledge of the attacker I, the element X and Y are
also in the knowledge of the attacker I individually.
Derive (D) – An important capability for the attacker is the usage of publicly known
functions to produce new messages. Examples of such functions can be crypto-
graphic hashes, encryption and decryption, or any other function publicly avail-
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able to the execution of the ceremony. Derive may be an n-ary function. The
capability of deriving messages can be described as for all messages X that are
part of the set of knowledge of the attacker I, the result of the application of
a publicly available function F is also part of the set of messages known by the
attacker I.
Some of the well known attacker’s capabilities (based on Dolev-Yao threat model)
are not directly shown here, since they can be achieved by the combination of our
definitions. For example, the capability of Modifying (M) messages on the commu-
nication channels could be defined as the use of Block + Initiate, while Replaying
(R) messages can be represented as Eavesdrop + Initiate. It is important to remem-
ber that the list we presented is necessarily incomplete, simply because new attacks
and/or attacking tactics can be discovered or exist under different scenarios that we
initially do not cover. Nevertheless, our dynamic and adaptive threat model inherently
allows additions to the set of attacker’s capabilities.
The adaptive threat model we propose here can be applied on all the communication
channels in a ceremony. Although we recommend that the device-device channel should
be verified in the majority of cases against a Dolev-Yao attacker, it is important to
always consider whether the Dolev-Yao attacker is realistic for every channel, even for
device-device communication. In Chapter 5 we will present and discuss some real-world
examples and the threat model for each channel in more details.
4.4.4 Case Study: Bluetooth Pairing Protocol
To demonstrate how the threat model for security ceremonies we proposed may be
used in the ceremony analysis, we will use the Bluetooth pairing protocol as a case
study. Considering the Bluetooth Legacy Pairing (described in Section 2.4.1.1) and
Bluetooth Simple Secure Pairing (SSP) (described in Section 2.4.1.2) as examples,
when we thoroughly analyse the protocol specifications, we find that the association
modes are designed under assumptions that imply a weaker threat model for the pairing
protocol. In this Section, we focus on showing the impacts of changing the threat model
of the communication channels. We demonstrate that an unrealistic threat model may
lead us to find impractical attacks. In Chapter 5, we provide a more thorough analysis
of the Bluetooth ceremony, using additional tools, results from our taxonomy and set
of recommendations, and additional granularity of the threat model.
In the legacy pairing, the device-device channel (DD) is designed considering a
DY attacker, while the human-device (HD) and human-human channels (HH) are
assumed to have no attackers. Although there are other flaws in this protocol [57, 51],
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a relevant, simple and effective passive attack can be found if we add the capability of
eavesdropping to the attacker on either HD or HH channels. In this case, the attacker
would learn the PIN by just eavesdropping those channels (hearing the PIN value) and
with that, he could decode all messages. This works similarly to the attack described
in [92], but without the need of deploying a brute force attack on the PIN . This attack
would easily be captured when verifying this protocol as a ceremony.
In the case of the SSP protocol, which is the main focus of our case study, each
association mode needs to be analysed under a different threat model, and more impor-
tantly, each implementation should respect the specified threat model. In our examples,
we will use the numeric comparison against a Dolev-Yao attacker and also under
other variations of the attacker capabilities. The following specification describes phase
two of the SSP protocol using the numeric comparison mode specified as a ceremony.
A and B represent the devices used and UA and UB represent the users of each device
respectively. The notation follows the format discussed in Chapter 2, and the functions
f1 and V a are the same as presented in Section 2.4.1.
1. B −−→
DD
A : Cb = f1(pkB, pkA, Nb, 0)
2. A −−→
DD
B : Na
3. B −−→
DD
A : Nb
4. A −−→
HD
UA : Va = g(pkA, pkB, Na, Nb)
5. B −−→
HD
UB : Vb = g(pkA, pkB, Na, Nb)
6. UA −−→
HH
UB : Va
7. UB −−→
HH
UA : Vb
Figure 4.3: Protocol description for Bluetooth SSP phase two under the Numeric Com-
parison mode
In our analysis, we considered the ceremony using the numeric comparison (NC)
mode under different variations of the threat model. Table 4.1 presents a summary of
threat models and association modes we use.
Channel NC + DY NC + ATM V1 NC + ATM V2
DD DY DY DY
HD DY E E
HH DY DY E
Table 4.1: Threat models and SSP modes
As we can see, we created three different scenarios. In the first, we consider a Dolev-
Yao (DY ) attacker for all three channels. In the second, we use an Adaptive Threat
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Model (ATM V1) that changes the threat model for the human-device (HD) channel
by having an attacker capable of eavesdrop only. Finally, in the third (ATM V2), we
have a DY attacker only for the device-device (DD) channel. For the HD channel and
for the human-human (HH) channel, we have an attacker capable of eavesdrop only.
Given the notation presented in Section 2.3.2, knows(Y ) representing the set of
knowledge of Y , Mn symbolising the message n of the ceremony, DY as the Dolev-Yao
attacker, E a threat model where the attacker possesses only the eavesdrop capability,
and ∅ representing that no attacks have been found, we present the theorems below
that describe the results of our analysis.
Theorem 1 (Numeric Comparison + Dolev-Yao). If the ceremony messages M1 to
M7 are run against a DY attacker, the attacker can prevent UA from learning Va or Vb
and UB from learning Vb or Va, forcing them to learn Vi instead.
M1...7 ∪DY
Va ∧ Vb ∧ Vi ∈ knows(I)∧
Va /∈ knows(UA) ∧ Vb /∈ knows(UA)∧
Vb /∈ knows(UB) ∧ Va /∈ knows(UB)∧
Vi ∈ knows(UA) ∧ Vi ∈ knows(UB)
Proof. Assuming that the attacker I, acting as a man-in-the-middle, initiated two
parallel pairing sessions with A and B during Messages M1 to M3. The authentication
from A to B starts on M4 where the value Va is sent to UA. The equivalent message
from B to UB occurs in M5. A DY attacker I, by using his block (B) and initiate (I)
capabilities, can prevent the message M4 and M5 from being delivered to UA and UB
respectively, and instead, send them any chosen value Vi. In M6 and M7, A and B
would complete the protocol by sending Vi to each other, successfully concluding the
pairing and allowing the man-in-the-middle attack to be deployed.
Using an alternative threat model, which we term the Adaptive Threat Model V1,
we assume the attacker can only eavesdrop the HD channel. In the specific case of
Bluetooth pairing, the assumption is that the device is free from malware and the
display is presenting the correct information.
Theorem 2 (Numeric Comparison + Adaptive Threat Model V1). If the protocol
messages M1 to M3 are run against a DY attacker; the messages M4 to M5 are run
against an E attacker; and messages M6 to M7 are run against a DY attacker, the
attacker can prevent UA from learning Vb and UB from learning Va, forcing them to
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learn the repetition (replay) of Va and Vb (respectively) instead.
(M1...3 ∪DY ) ∧ (M4...5 ∪ E)∧)(M6...7 ∪DY )
Va ∧ Vb ∈ knows(I) ∧ Va /∈ knows(UB) ∧ Vb /∈ knows(UA)
Proof. Again, assuming that the attacker I, acting as a man-in-the-middle initiated two
parallel pairing sessions with A and B during Messages M1 to M3. The authentication
from A to B starts on M4 where the value Va is sent to UA. The equivalent message
from B to UB occurs in M5. In this case, the E attacker can only learn the values Va and
Vb. In M6 and M7, A and B complete the protocol by sending Va and Vb respectively,
to each other. A DY attacker in messages M6 and M7 can perform a similar attack
to the one described in Theorem 1. By preventing Va from being delivered from UA
to UB in M6 and Vb from UB to UA in M7, and then replaying the values Vb and Va
(respectively) instead, the protocol run would be successfully finished and would allow
a man-in-the-middle attack to be deployed.
Finally, when using another variation of the threat model, which we call the Adap-
tive Threat Model V2, the attacker can eavesdrop both the HD and the HH channels,
that is, the attacker can eavesdrop on any communications in the pairing process that
involve the humans.
Theorem 3 (Numeric Comparison + Adaptive Threat Model V2). If the protocol
messages M1 to M3 are run against a DY attacker and the messages M4 to M7 are
run against an E attacker, the attacker cannot produce any relevant attack.
(M1...3 ∪DY ) ∧ (M4...7 ∪N + E)
∅
Proof. Once again, assuming that the attacker I, acting as a man-in-the-middle, ini-
tiated two parallel pairing sessions with A and B during Messages M1 to M3. The
authentication from A to B starts on M4 where the value Va is sent to UA. The equiv-
alent message from B to UB occurs in M5. In this case, the E attacker can only learn
the values Va and Vb. In M6 and M7, A and B complete the protocol by sending Va
and Vb respectively, to each other. In messages M6 and M7, the E attacker can only
learn the values Va and Vb. Therefore, Va received by UB in M6 and Vb received by UA
in M7 would not match the Vb and Va in knows(B) and knows(A) respectively, not
allowing the attack to succeed.
Although the attack described in Theorem 1 is plausible in real world scenarios, it
is very difficult to deploy. An attacker would have to corrupt both devices as well as
start parallel sessions with both users during a short period of time. This is a good
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example of a technically feasible attack but highly unlikely to happen in practice. By
removing capabilities B and I of the attacker, we can analyse the protocol further, and
possibly find other (more) relevant attacks. In Section 5.4, we implement variations
of this scenario using an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier tool (ProVerif) and
discuss each variation in more detail.
The second attack, demonstrated in Theorem 2 is utterly unrealistic. To be de-
ployed in practice, the attacker would have to block a communication between two
humans and then replay some data over a channel where the user would easily notice
if some other party wanted to spoof the identity of the sender. In this case, the attack
does not exist in practice.
In theorem 3, which we found to be free of attacks, will be further discussed in
Section 5.4. We will demonstrate that even when a protocol is proven to be free of
attacks, inaccurate assumptions on the human components may introduce security
problems.
The idea is similar for the other association modes. Each one of them must consider
the real-world scenario and define the threat model. In addition to that, it should not be
possible to use an association mode under a different threat model to the one specified.
4.5 Summary
Protocols are, by design, implemented to attend to human demands. The method we
propose approaches real world concerns on the design level. It is impossible to represent
all possible human characteristics in a limited set of operations, but by including the
human node in the specification and adjusting the threat model to represent realistic
threats to every communication channel we use, we can thoroughly study interactions
and factors which were previously included in the set of assumptions for each protocol.
As we can see, a ceremony adds some complexity to the analysis due to the addi-
tional agents and channels. On the other hand we do not want to change the way we
analyse protocols today, since the formal methods available are mature and powerful
for their intended purposes. Our framework approaches the problem from an extended
point of view. The extensions we propose allow adding support to ceremony analysis in
existing methods and tools (as we will see in Chapter 5). Our objective with this model
is to extend the coverage from the verification of security protocols to ceremonies. Hu-
man behaviour is indeed unpredictable, but by including humans in the formal models
we can, at least, predict what happens if some action is performed by the user in an
incorrect manner.
Our approach for describing a threat model for security ceremonies is based on a
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well established model for security protocols. In our approach we weaken the attacker
to conform to the premises governing human-device interaction and human-human
interaction. This strategy seems plausible because it will help security protocols and
ceremony designers to develop ceremonies with reasonable assumptions and tailored to
the real capacities of the attacker.
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In this chapter we present examples of the design and analysis of security cer-
emonies. We make use of existing real world protocols that require user inter-
action and model their ceremony versions. Furthermore, we analyse each cer-
emony presented and prove its properties by using an automatic cryptographic
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protocol verifier (ProVerif). We then discuss our findings and highlight the
achievements obtained by analysing these ceremonies. Part of the content of
this chapter appears in the paper “An Updated Threat Model for Security Cere-
monies”, published in the Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on
Applied Computing [31].
5.1 Introduction
The next step to confirm the benefits of designing and analysing security ceremonies
and evaluate the results, is to analyse real world situations where protocols that involve
human interaction are used. In this chapter we start by describing the ceremony design
process we consider ideal. Next, we present three examples of such protocols and we
demonstrate how we could analyse them as ceremonies. We develop different scenarios
and use different threat models in order to dissect possible outcomes.
First, we design and analyse the Bluetooth Legacy Pairing ceremony. Although
legacy pairing is deprecated and has been replaced by Simple Secure Pairing (SSP), the
analysis of the Bluetooth Legacy Pairing ceremony is relevant due to the authentication
mechanism used, which is based on user input. Such a mechanism and its analysis could
then be extended to other ceremonies and therefore it is worth analysing. We describe
the threat model for the ceremony and provide both informal and formal analysis of
the ceremony.
Our second ceremony is SSP, which replaces Legacy Pairing in recent versions of
Bluetooth. In our analysis we focus on the Numeric Comparison (NC) pairing mode,
which represents an interesting case study for ceremonies due to the user interaction
involved. We again describe the threat model for the ceremony and provide both
informal and formal analysis of the ceremony. Furthermore, we propose a variation of
the ceremony, which relies on the same protocol with an additional comparison that
should be performed on the device after the user interaction. This new ceremony
improves the authentication process of SSP under the NC mode by changing a task
that the user might not perform adequately to another that makes use of a forcing
function, preventing the user from performing the incorrect interaction.
Finally, we analyse a ceremony that involves the registration process of a very
popular messaging application called WhatsApp. We present different registration
ceremonies and use different registration methods. The threat model for each ceremony
is discussed and we provide both informal and formal analysis of the ceremonies.
The formal analysis we perform uses a cryptographic protocol verifier tool called
ProVerif [19]. This tool is used for automatically analysing security protocols. ProVerif
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handles different languages as input types. The most commonly used, and considered
to be state-of-the-art is the language known as typed pi calculus [20], which is the
language we use for our implementations. Cryptographic primitives, such as symmet-
ric and asymmetric encryption, digital signatures and hash functions are supported
and ProVerif is capable of proving reachability properties, correspondence assertions,
and observational equivalence. Such capabilities allow the analysis of confidentiality
and authentication properties, which are our goals in the examples we provide in this
chapter.
By default, ProVerif’s communication channels are assumed to be controlled by a
Dolev-Yao attacker. It also provides support for private channels, where the attacker
has no capabilities. A passive attacker, who is only able to eavesdrop the communica-
tion channel is also supported. However, once the attacker is set as passive, the whole
threat model is switched to such a threat model. At the moment, there is no direct
support for modelling both Dolev-Yao and passive attackers on different channels in
the same protocol. In our ceremony framework, we need such a feature, and we can
simulate such attacker behaviour by using some implementation tricks. We describe in
this chapter how we implemented this feature.
5.2 The Ceremony Design Process
The ceremony design process is more complex than the protocol design process. It
involves more agents, more channels, different threats, more variables and more steps.
A more thorough ceremony analysis can be achieved by evaluating ceremonies in a
loop, as presented in Figure 5.1.
Taxonomy
AnalysisExperiments
Figure 5.1: The ceremony design process
The analysis component involves the process of formal and/or informal analysis,
similar to the work we presented in Chapter 5. Every human interaction must be
modelled to respect the taxonomy components we presented in Chapter 3 and follow the
design recommendations. User experiments may also be relevant to evaluate whether
the expected interaction happens in practice and whether the assumptions regarding the
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human agent capabilities are accurate. In this thesis, the experiment phase was based
on related work that performed experiments similar to those required for the ceremonies
we analysed. It is important to highlight that every step in this cycle generates new
information that might help to refine the other steps performed. Whenever a failure or
a security flaw is found in a phase, the ceremony designer must go back to the design
phase, correct it, and perform the analysis in the loop again.
This design process loop provides a systematic approach to identifying different
possible failures in different aspects of a ceremony. More importantly, it assists the
identification of root causes of different failures. After completing a loop, designers
may need to revisit the whole loop to try to further improve the ceremony and reduce
the risk of failures. The number of rounds in the loop can be as many as needed to
reach a point where no relevant issue can be found.
5.3 Bluetooth Legacy Pairing Ceremony
Although it is well known that this protocol presents security flaws, the Bluetooth
Legacy Pairing ceremony is worthy of the analysis because we can develop several
insights into what ceremony analysis gives us. By systematically presenting variations
of the ceremony model, and the threat model involved, we can reach different results
and discover clues as to what are the benefits of this approach.
The first change we note when we move from a protocol description (as seen in
Section 2.4.1.1) to Bluetooth’s legacy pairing ceremony, is that the definition of the
PIN code cannot be ignored, and therefore it is not part of the design assumptions
any more. In fact, for each type of method for setting the PIN value, a different
ceremony must be specified. For a fixed PIN , we could still assume that the PIN is
pre-defined and therefore the ceremony would be similar to the protocol. However, in
the variable PIN setting, which is the recommended use according to the specification
[22], the PIN is now a relevant part of the specification. The PIN request is now
an explicit message sent from the device to the user after the ACCEPT message, as
shown in the protocol description presented in Figure 5.2. Also, the request of the
PIN and its value being shared between the UA and UB are also explicit messages in
the specification. Finally, the user entering the PIN in to the device is also presented
in the ceremony description.
The remainder of the protocol stays the same. In this ceremony we consider two
different users pairing their respective devices. The moment where the PIN is gener-
ated by the user does not affect the ceremony. However, the way they share the PIN
with the other user is relevant, since an attacker could eavesdrop the PIN value. Note
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1. A −−→
DD
B : IN RAND
2. B −−→
DD
A : ACCEPTED
3. A −−→
HD
UA : PIN Request
4. B −−→
HD
UB : PIN Request
5. UA −−→
HH
UB : PIN
6. UA −−→
HD
A : PIN
7. UB −−→
HD
B : PIN
8. A −−→
DD
B : AU RANDA
9. B −−→
DD
A : SRES1 = e1(Kinit, BD ADDRB, AU RANDA)
10. B −−→
DD
A : AU RANDB
11. A −−→
DD
B : SRES2 = e1(Kinit, BD ADDRA, AU RANDB)
12. A −−→
DD
B : E LK RANDA = LK RANDA ⊕Kinit
13. B −−→
DD
A : E LK RANDB = LK RANDB ⊕Kinit
Figure 5.2: Ceremony description for the legacy mode pairing
that there is also a ceremony setting where a single user could be pairing two devices
they own.
The ceremony we will focus on in this section is a legacy pairing ceremony using
a variable PIN that involves two users pairing their devices. As mentioned earlier,
the changes from the protocol description to ceremony description are clear in the
initialisation steps in legacy pairing. Figure 5.3 shows a sequence diagram of the
initialisation phase of the ceremony. In the other parts, authentication and link key
calculation are similar for the protocol and ceremony (see Figure 2.5 and 2.6 for more
details).
5.3.1 Threat Model
Now that we have defined the ceremony, it is important to define a realistic threat
model for its channels. It is reasonable to assume that for the DD channel, we will
have a DY attacker since it represents a very powerful (and realistic) attacker for a
network channel. The communication channel between the humans and the devices
(HD) in this ceremony could possibly be under three different threat models. First,
we could use DY and therefore assume that we do not trust what the devices A and B
display and receive via input (possibly due to a corrupted application and/or operating
system). Second, we could assume an attacker capable of only eavesdropping (E)
on the messages, meaning that we have a passive attacker. Third, we could assume
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Device A Device B
Human A Human B
Generate IN RAND
IN RAND
ACCEPTED
PIN Request
Generate PIN
PIN
PIN
PIN Request
PIN
Calculate: Kinit =
e22(BD ADDRB , P IN,
IN RAND)
Calculate: Kinit =
e22(BD ADDRB , P IN,
IN RAND)
Figure 5.3: Sequence diagram for the legacy mode pairing ceremony (Initialisation)
that there is no attacker on the HD channel. Finally, for the HH channel, a DY
attacker is unrealistic since an attacker cannot perform any other operation rather than
eavesdropping the channel without being detected in this Bluetooth pairing setting.
As we can see, defining the threat model for the DD and HH channel for this
ceremony is straightforward. However, the attacker capabilities on the HD channel
requires further analysis. Although possible, a DY attacker on the HD channel in this
ceremony is extremely unlikely to exist in real world scenarios. An attacker would have
to corrupt both devices in order to manipulate the messages exchanged between the
users and their devices to deploy an attack. A threat model that does not consider any
attacker capability for the HD channel is also questionable. Despite that, the protocol
description for the legacy pairing protocol assumes that there is no attacker on the HD
channel. Such a threat model does not seem to be accurate in the case of the ceremony.
Since Bluetooth is designed to be used in short range communications between (mobile)
devices, the pairing ceremony could be run anywhere, from private places (e.g. home)
to public ones (e.g. airport lounges). It is too optimistic to assume that no one else
apart from the users involved in the ceremony could see (eavesdrop) the user entering
PIN in to the device. Finally, considering that the attacker is capable of eavesdropping
on the HD channel seems realistic for the reasons we presented. Over-the-shoulder is a
very well known threat and fits well in this scenario. Thus, an eavesdropping attacker
is appropriate and realistic for the HD channel.
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5.3.2 Informal Analysis
As described in Section 2.4.1.1, it is clear that if an attacker is capable of obtaining the
PIN value, the protocol properties of confidentiality and authentication are violated.
The same situation applies for the legacy pairing ceremony. Although the specification
allows for PINs up to 16-digit long, in practice only 4-digit long PINs are used. This
represents a very low entropy input. That is, an attacker is likely to be able to guess
the PIN value and verify it oﬄine, as already discussed in [57, 92, 34]. In fact, for
4-digit long PINs, Shaked and Wool demonstrated that brute-forcing the PIN could
be done in near real time [92].
To analyse the legacy pairing ceremony in more detail, we will divide the threat
model in to four possible settings:
i) the ceremony is similar to the most common version of protocol, that is, the PIN
is short (e.g. 4-digit long) and we assume that the attacker has no control over the
HH and HD channel. In this scenario, the attacker is DY on the DD channel,
and has no capabilities on the HD and HH channels.
ii) we consider the PIN as the longest possible (16 digits). Therefore, we assume that
it is long enough not to be broken by the attacker in a reasonable time. Again, the
attacker is DY in the DD channel, and has no capabilities on the HD and HH
channels.
iii) we still have a long PIN (16 digits), but the attacker now has eavesdrop (E)
capability on the HD and HH channels.
iv) we reduce the PIN back to 4 digits, and keep E for the attacker on the HD and
HH channels.
The ceremony is considered broken if an attacker is able to break the confidentiality
of the protocol by either obtaining PIN or deriving Kinit, or if the attacker is able to
violate mutual authentication between the parties involved. For scenario i, we can see
that by eavesdropping the DD channel, the attacker cannot learn the PIN , making
the oﬄine attack the only viable option due to the low-entropy of the PIN . This
attack is similar to the attacks presented in [57, 92, 34] and violates confidentiality for
the current session and authentication for future sessions. Confidentiality is violated
because the attacker will have all the information needed to calculate Kinit, then derive
the link (KAB) and encryption keys. Authentication is violated, possibly only in future
sessions, since pairing happens only for the first time when two devices connect. After
that, they use KAB as the base for calculating encryption keys between them. Thus, by
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knowing KAB, an attacker can impersonate the devices in future sessions. Note that,
depending on the length of PIN , it could be broken by the attacker in a very short
time (in milliseconds, as demonstrated in [92]) and therefore authentication could be
violated even in the first session (during pairing) when short PINs are used (e.g. less
than 6 digits).
If we increase the length of PIN , as proposed in scenario ii, breaking or brute-
forcing its value would be unreasonable for the attacker. Since the attacker has only
access to the DD channel, there is nothing much he could do to break the ceremony.
Indeed, this scenario is considerably more secure than the previous one and no relevant
attacks can initially be found. However, another problem is evident in this ceremony:
usability. Asking users to generate and share 16-digit long random numbers is very
unusable and unfeasible as we discussed in Chapter 3, and as some experiments have
demonstrated [103, 104, 58]. The result of this setting is two-fold. First, if users decide
to proceed and enter the 16-digit long number, there is a high probability that the
numbers will not have enough randomness and be predictable, significantly reducing
the entropy. In this case, the attacks we discussed for scenario i, are now possible in
this scenario. Second, as Uzun et al. [103] and Valkonen et al. [104] demonstrated,
entering 4-digit long PINs already require a significant effort from users (taking around
20-25 seconds to be performed). By increasing this number to 16 digits, there is a high
probably that the ceremony would be unusable and users would give up on using the
mechanism. In this case, the setting would be relatively safe (if users could choose
random PINs), but useless, since no one would use it in practice.
In scenario iii, we still assume a high-entropy PIN , making it relatively unbreakable
by the attacker. However, in this setting, there are at least two additional points where
an attacker could learn the PIN value in the ceremony without even having to brute-
force it. By eavesdropping the HH or HD channels in messages 5, 6 or 7, he could
learn the PIN and therefore calculate Kinit, KAB and finally the encryption key. This
violates both confidentiality and authentication for the current session in a very simple
and straightforward way, making the attack even more powerful than the oﬄine attacks
presented in scenario i. Note that the attacker would only need to eavesdrop either
the HH or HD channel to be able to lean the PIN , which is, in practice, completely
feasible since Bluetooth is designed to run on mobile devices, and therefore be used in
public places such as airport lounges, restaurants, etc.
Finally, in scenario iv we have the most realistic setting for this ceremony. We
merge the case where we have the low-entropy 4-digit PIN , which is the most used
setting, with the E capabilities of the attacker. In this scenario, the attacks we found
in i and iii are possible.
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In the analysis we present we consider the case of two users pairing two devices
they own. Another situation that could happen is a setting where one user is pairing
two devices they own (e.g. a smart phone and a laptop). In this case, there would be
no HH channel in the ceremony. However, the only change in our analysis would be
that the attacker would have the eavesdrop capability only on the HD channel. The
attacks would still be the same on the scenarios presented.
5.3.3 Formal Analysis
In our formal analysis, we modelled the same scenarios presented in the informal anal-
ysis we performed earlier (Section 5.3.2). In ProVerif however, there are some details
that are relevant to the scope of our analysis. First, we need to model the secrecy of
PIN , in order to represent its variations in low and/or high entropy settings. Second,
we need to model the additional channels used in the ceremony. Third, we have to de-
fine different threat models for the channels, which proved to be quite tricky. Finally,
it is necessary to model the confidentiality property of the protocol.
Modelling the secrecy of the PIN value is subtle. As discussed earlier in the in-
formal analysis and in Section 2.4.1.1, the PIN used in legacy mode is usually a low
entropy input and therefore is guessable. ProVerif provides a mechanism for modelling
low entropy values, such as human-memorable passwords. It has already been demon-
strated and proved that legacy pairing is subject to oﬄine attacks in its protocol version
[57, 92, 34]. To model such a characteristic of the PIN in ProVerif, and therefore verify
the absence (or otherwise) of oﬄine guessing attacks against the PIN , we make use of
the query: weaksecret PIN . When this query is used, ProVerif tries to prove that the
adversary cannot distinguish a correct guess of the PIN from an incorrect guess [20].
In the scenario where we consider longer PINs and therefore wish to analyse when a
PIN provides higher entropy, we can simply remove the weaksecret query from the
model.
Modelling the additional channels is quite straightforward. It is as simple as mod-
elling a network channel. However, in our implementation, one important difference
is that it is semantically important to differentiate between the channels used for the
communication between user UA and device A and user UB and device B. By using
different channels for them, despite being of the same type (HD) we can clearly differ-
entiate the messages between the users and the devices they possess rather than mixing
them all on the same channel (which does not happen in practice).
Defining the threat model for each channel is a tricky part of our modelling. By
default, ProVerif provides either a Dolev-Yao or a passive attacker for all channels.
The only additional differentiation we could have for a channel is between defining it
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as public or private. In a private channel the attacker has capability on the channel.
In a public channel we can have either Dolev-Yao or passive only. Thus, we kept the
threat model for all channels (except for private channels) as Dolev-Yao, and declared
the channels that we will add eavesdrop capability as private. Then, to allow the
attacker to eavesdrop these private channels, we broadcast any communication on these
channels over a public channel. With this trick, we are able to simulate the passive-only
channels needed along with the Dolev Yao threat model for the other channels. Then,
the definition of the channels in ProVerif is the following:
free DD : channel. (* device-device channel *)
free HDA : channel [private]. (* human-device channel A (no attackers) *)
free HDAE : channel. (* human-device channel A (eavesdrop) *)
free HDB : channel [private]. (* human-device channel (no attackers) *)
free HDBE : channel. (* human-device channel B (eavesdrop) *)
free HH : channel [private]. (* human-human channel B (no attackers) *)
free HHE : channel. (* human-human channel (eavesdrop) *)
As we can see, we defined a public channel for device-device communication (DD),
private channels between the users and their respective devices (HDA and HDB) and
a human-human private channel (HH). In addition to these channels, we defined
the three additional public channels (HDAE , HDBE and HHE). To broadcast the
messages sent on the private channels HDA, HDB and HH, to the public channels
HDAE , HDBE and HHE respectively, and therefore simulate the attacker’s eavesdrop
capability, we add the following to the process model:
(!in(HDA, x :bitstring); out(HDAE, x ))
| (!in(HDB, x :bitstring); out(HDBE, x ))
| (!in(HH, x :bitstring); out(HHE, x ))
The modelling above duplicates everything on the private channel to the respective
public channel enabling a passive attacker on the channel.
To model the secrecy property of the protocol, we then simulated a scenario where
A sends a secret to B using the initialisation key Kinit they established during the
pairing process. To do that, we defined secret s, which is sent from A to B at the
end of the protocol run, and added the query “query attacker(s)” to the model, in
order to test the secrecy of s. Internally, ProVerif attempts to prove that a state where
the secret s is known by the attacker is unreachable. If a state where s is known by
the attacker is found, it means that the protocol specified fails to provide the desired
secrecy property.
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We modelled in ProVerif each scenario presented in Section 5.3.2 using the mech-
anisms discussed above when needed. The results were similar to those presented in
our informal analysis. For scenario i, we tested the secrecy of PIN using the query
weaksecret PIN . As expected, ProVerif found an attack which is fundamentally the
same as the attacks found and described in [57, 92, 34]. In the attack, the attacker eaves-
drops a successful pairing session between A and B and uses the values BD ADDRB,
IN RAND, AU RANDA and SRES1. Figure 5.4 shows how the attacker proceeds af-
ter collecting the information needed. The attacker tries an initial value for PIN ′, then
he calculates K ′init and SRES
′
1. He then compares whether SRES
′
1 matches SRES1.
If it does, the value he guessed for PIN ′ matches PIN , otherwise he tries a new value
for PIN , until he finds a matching value.
Attacker tries:
PIN ′ = 0000
Calculate K′init =
e22(BD ADDRB ,PIN
′, IN RAND)
Calculate SRES′1 =
e1(K′init, BD ADDRB , AU RANDA)
is
SRES1 =
SRES′1?
Try next PIN ′
PIN = PIN ′
Attacker knows:
BD ADDRB
IN RAND
AU RANDA
SRES1
no
yes
Figure 5.4: Brute-forcing PIN in the legacy pairing
For scenario ii, we removed the weaksecret query from the model and added a
query for the secret s, as described earlier. In this case, no attack was found, since
PIN was assumed to have high entropy. Note that the analysis we presented in Section
5.3.2 already pointed to the same results. However, it highlights the low probability of
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a such setting being feasible in practice.
Next, we modelled scenario iii, where the entropy of PIN is still assumed to be high,
but the attacker now has the eavesdrop capability on both HD and HH channels. As
expected, ProVerif found an attack where the attacker could eavesdrop the PIN value
from the HH channel, and then violates the confidentiality of s by being able to obtain
Kinit from the values eavesdropped from the DD channel and the PIN from HH.
Although this attack seems very simplistic, the assumption that the attacker will never
learn the PIN value by eavesdropping the communication channels between humans
and between human and devices is too optimistic. As mentioned earlier, Bluetooth
pairing is expected to be used in public places and therefore should take into account
such a realistic setting in its design.
Finally, in scenario iv, we analyse the scenario that covers the most (realistic)
threat among the variations we presented. As expected, the results demonstrated the
existence of attacks on the entropy of PIN as we found by analysing scenario ii, and
on the confidentiality of s, as found in scenario iii.
5.4 Bluetooth Simple Secure Pairing Ceremony
As discussed earlier, the Bluetooth Simple Secure Pairing (SSP) ceremony is designed
to mitigate the problems found in the legacy pairing protocol. The most relevant
phase for the ceremony analysis is the second phase. It is in this phase where mutual
authentication is achieved, which is the main goal of this ceremony. Therefore, our
focus on the ceremony analysis will be on phase two using the numeric comparison
(NC) mode.
The second phase of SSP, described as a ceremony, includes two more agents UA
and UB and two additional communication channels HD and HH to represent the
human-device channel and human-human channel respectively. Figure 5.5 presents the
ceremony of phase two using the NC mode.
When compared to the protocol description (presented in Figure 2.10), we have 6
additional steps. These steps start at 4, which represents device A sending the value
Va to user UA; then 5, which represents device B sending the value Vb to user UB; 6
which represents user UA sending the value Va to user UB; 7 which represents user UB
sending the value Vb to user UA; finally 8 and 9 where the users confirm whether the
values received and generated match. It is important to note that in our ceremony
we assume two users pairing two devices. The main reason for using this assumption
is that it allows us to introduce the idea of the HH channel in a realistic scenario.
However, there is also the possibility of a single user pairing two devices, which would
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1. B −−→
DD
A : Cb = f1(PKB, PKA, Nb, 0)
2. A −−→
DD
B : Na
3. B −−→
DD
A : Nb
4. A −−→
HD
UA : Va = g(PKA, PKB, Na, Nb)
5. B −−→
HD
UB : Vb = g(PKA, PKB, Na, Nb)
6. UA −−→
HH
UB : Va
7. UB −−→
HH
UA : Vb
8. UA −−→
HD
A : Ok
9. UB −−→
HD
B : Ok
Figure 5.5: Ceremony description for the SSP ceremony phase two
remove the need of the HH channel. In this case, we would just assume that messages
sent by both devices via the HD channel would be sent directly to the same human
who would then compare their values. Figure 5.6 shows the sequence diagram for phase
two of the pairing ceremony under the NC mode.
By adding these six additional steps, the pairing ceremony encompasses the whole
pairing process and covers all the messages sent and received among the peers in order
to achieve mutual authentication. Furthermore, when analysing the specifications, we
find that both legacy mode and SSP are designed under assumptions that the attacker
possesses a restricted set of capabilities during the pairing process.
5.4.1 Threat Model
A SSP ceremony is considered flawed if an attacker is able to violate the mutual au-
thentication between the devices A and B. Although no explicit mention is made of
these additional channels or variations of threat models in the specification, it is clear
that the SSP protocol and its association modes are designed under assumptions that
imply a weaker threat model. If they assumed a Dolev-Yao attacker, several attacks
would be possible (as we briefly presented in Section 4.4.4). However, since there is
no HD and HH channels specified, it is not clear which threat models were assumed
instead.
When analysing the SSP ceremony we need to define a realistic threat model. A
DY attacker is reasonable for the DD channel, however it is not appropriate for the
HD and HH channels. If we assume a Dolev-Yao attacker for the entire ceremony,
unrealistic attacks will be found. These unrealistic attacks may incur countermeasures
that are extremely likely to make the protocol more complex and less usable in practice.
In a similar manner to the threat model we discussed for legacy pairing, the threats
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Device A Device B
Human A Human B
Generate: Na Generate: Nb
Calculate :
Cb = f1(PKB , PKA, Nb, 0)
Cb
Na
Nb
Verify if:
Cb = f1(PKB , PKA, Nb, 0)
Calculate:
Va = g(PKA, PKB , Na, Nb)
Calculate:
Vb = g(PKA, PKB , Na, Nb)
Va Vb
Va
Vb
Verify if Va = Vb Verify if Va = Vb
Ok Ok
Figure 5.6: Sequence diagram for phase two of the ceremony of SSP under the NC
mode
that the HD channel is subject to could vary. We could assume DY and therefore not
trust what A and B display and receive. Another option would be that the attacker is
capable of eavesdropping (E) the messages, or even no attackers on the HD channel.
For the HH channel, an attacker capable of eavesdropping is very realistic. The pres-
ence of no attackers on the HH channel for this ceremony could only be assumed in
very strict scenarios.
In our analysis, the threat model we consider consists in DY for the DD channel
and E for both HD and HH channels. Since Bluetooth is designed to be used in
both private and public locations for short range communications between (mobile)
devices, assuming that no one else, apart from the users involved in the ceremony, could
eavesdrop the messages between the users and the users and devices is too optimistic,
and would ignore some realistic threats. On the other hand, active attackers on the
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HH channel for the SSP ceremony is not realistic either, since both users agree to
pair their devices in the first place. Finally, assuming an E only attacker for the HD
channel rather than DY is reasonable since the attacker would need to corrupt both
devices in order to succeed. Still, it would be interesting to analyse what happens in
the case of one device being corrupted, that is, having a DY attacker for only one of
the HD channels we have in the ceremony.
5.4.2 Informal Analysis
Although no major attacks currently exist against the protocol, analysing the SSP
ceremony is relevant since it brings different scenarios into perspective and new possible
threats. We divided our analysis in six different settings, where we systematically
change the threat model and user behaviour so that we can simulate several possible
scenarios, as follows:
i) In a similar manner to the most common version of the protocol specification, we
assume that the attacker has no control over the HH and HD channel. Thus, in
this scenario the attacker is DY on the DD channel, and has no capabilities on
the HD and HH channels.
ii) In this setting, we add eavesdrop capabilities to the attacker on both HD and HH
channels. On the DD channel the attacker is kept as DY .
iii) For this variation, we still consider DY for the HD channel and E for both HD
and HH channels. The difference now is that we will make an assumption about
the behaviour of human UA. Rather than behaving as expected and comparing the
number on his screen to the one he received from the human UB, he will proceed
even if the numbers do not match.
iv) In this case, we assume the opposite of we assumed in iii. Now, UA behaves as
expected, but UB will proceed in any case.
v) Complementing the previous two settings, we now assume that both UA and UB
proceed without checking if Va and Vb match.
vi) Finally, we again change the threat model on the HD channel. In this case we will
analyse what happens in the case where one of the devices is corrupted. That is,
the HD channel of one user is under a DY attacker. In this case, we will assume
that the HD channel between UA and his device A is under a DY attacker and
that both UA and UB behave correctly.
104
5.4. Bluetooth Simple Secure Pairing Ceremony
Figure 5.7 shows an attacker attempting to deploy a man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack between devices A and B. In the figure, we present the expected execution of
the ceremony when this situation occurs. As we can see, what prevents the attacker
from succeeding is the human verification of whether Va and Vb match and if it does
not, the human ends the ceremony and aborts the pairing.
Device A Device B
Human A Human BAttacker
Establishes 2 parallel sessions with
A and B, calculating Vi−A =
123412 and Vi−B = 567890
Calculated
Va = 123412
Calculated
Vb = 567890
Va Vb
Va = 123412
Vb = 567890
Verify if
Va = Vb → fail
Verify if
Va = Vb → fail
Abort Abort
Figure 5.7: Sequence diagram for an MITM attempt in the SSP in NC mode
For scenarios i and ii, no attacks happen if the user verification is performed cor-
rectly. Even in ii, where the attacker has E, he will not be able to prevent the users
from detecting the difference between Va and Vb. This generates a scenario similar to
the one presented in Figure 5.7. Although being simple and easy to use when using
4-digit long numbers, the authentication method used, based on users comparing values
and confirming whether they match is susceptible of a high error rate, going up to 20%
error rate in some scenarios [103, 104, 58]. Therefore, attacks such as the one presented
in Figure 5.7 could succeed in many cases. If the users make a mistake when checking
the values, or do not check the values at all, and therefore just proceed confirming the
pairing, the MITM attack would be successful, even though the ceremony is designed to
prevent such an attack. Furthermore, if consider the taxonomy we presented in Chap-
ter 3, this user-ceremony interaction is likely to be susceptible to user-conditioning, as
presented in the bounded attention taxonomy item (Section 3.3.4); lack of knowledge of
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security threats and inaccurate mental models (Section 3.3.1) from the user knowledge
item; and the decision making influencing factors (Section 3.3.3).
Users can easily be conditioned to just click on “confirm” for the pairing process,
especially if the pairing is repeated several times by the user. In this case users can pre-
dict the outcome, and it may result in them anticipating the matching hash values task
and simply pressing “confirm” without properly checking the values [58]. Another fac-
tor that may impact on the failure rate of this ceremony is the users’ lack of knowledge
of security threats and inaccurate mental models, since by not appreciating the possi-
ble threats to the pairing process and not evaluating the importance of authentication
processes correctly, the importance of comparing the values displayed are likely to be
underrated and consequently poorly performed. Finally, factors that influence decision
making are more difficult to simulate in lab experiments such as those in [103, 104, 58].
Factors such as time constraints are likely to negatively influence the user performance
when comparing strings, making the error-rate even higher, as mentioned by Kainda
et al. [58].
For iii and iv, we consider that just one of the humans involved behaves as expected
by the ceremony. In iii, for example, A would be vulnerable to the attacker since A
would have concluded the pairing, even though B has not accepted or finished the
pairing. This problem could be solved by UB warning UA that the numbers did not
match, but it could be too late and A would have to abort by closing the application
they were using to create the pairing. The same applies for the opposite scenario, iii.
In the case where the two devices perform the pairing process prior to any other action
(e.g. sharing a file), there would be little or no harm if UB notifies UA about the not
matching values. However, if the pairing was started in order to immediately share
a file between A and B, the file transfer is likely to happen before UB can warn UA,
causing a more serious security problem. Another issue with this scenario is that at the
end, the attacker will have created a link key with the device that mistakenly accepted
the pairing, and future connections with this device would not require a new pairing
procedure. Thus, to prevent that from happening, A would have to manually delete
the link key stablished with the attacker, which is not simple or easily understood by
some users.
In scenario v, both UA and UB behave inadequately, and therefore a MITM attack
is trivial. In this case, an attack would be even harder to detect because the pairing
session, and the subsequent actions (e.g. file sharing), would work normally. The
attacker would then have link keys established with both devices, making future attacks
against the devices trivial.
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Finally, in vi, we assume a DY attacker on one of the HD channels. In our example,
we assume that we have DY on the HD channel between A and UA. The attacker, in
this case, could simply replace the number sent from A to UA by the number generated
between the attacker and B. In this case, the numbers would match, and even if both
UA and UB perform the authentication task correctly, the attack would still succeed,
since the numbers displayed to the users would match. Figure 5.8 shows the attack.
Another variation of an attack on the HD channel would be in case the attacker
changes the confirmation message. In this case, even if UA sends an Abort message to
A, the attacker would replace Abort by Ok and therefore A would confirm the pairing.
However, this second case, would only affect A’s side, since UB would abort after
verifying that the number sent by UA does not match the one he sees on his display
(similar to scenario iii).
Device A Device B
Human A Human BAttackerAttacker
Establishes 2 parallel ses-
sions with A and B, cal-
culating Vi−A = 123412
and Vi−B = 567890
Calculated
Va = 123412
Calculated
Vb = 567890
VaVi−B
Vb
Vi−B = 567890
Vb = 567890
Verify if
Vi−B = Vb → Ok
Verify if
Vi−B = Vb → Ok
Ok Ok
Figure 5.8: Sequence diagram for an MITM attack in the SSP in NC mode
In the analysis we presented, we assumed the case where two users pair two devices
they each posses. The pairing process may be also run in a setting where one user
pairs two devices (e.g. a smart phone and a laptop). In this case, there is no HH
channel in the ceremony. In this case, scenarios iii and iv are not likely to exist, being
replaced just by v. The other scenarios would still be similar. Note that, in this
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case, user-conditioning could have more influence and be more likely to happen. The
repetitive task of verifying numbers would be performed twice by the same user per
pairing session, accelerating the user-conditioning process. Another factor that may
happen, but would be difficult to measure, is the possible increased level of confidence
when the user pairs two devices they own. In this setting, the user could feel more
‘secure’ and be less careful when checking the numbers on both displays.
5.4.3 Formal Analysis
Our formal model of the Simple Pairing ceremony focuses on phases one and two of
the ceremony and implements similar scenarios to those we have seen in the informal
analysis we performed. The basic ceremony is the same as we have shown in figure
5.6 with the addition of a public key exchange (phase one) that happens prior to the
sequence presented in the figure. We modelled the channels HD and HH using the
same approach we discussed in Section 5.3.3, where we have separate channels for the
HD for A to UA and B to UB. The threat model for these channels in our analysis
varies from no attacker (N), to eavesdrop (E) and finally Dolev-Yao DY . The approach
for modelling these variations is similar to the one we discussed in Section 5.3.3. Our
focus is on modelling authentication, which is the most important and interesting part
of this ceremony.
We modelled authentication using correspondence assertions which are used to rep-
resent a sequence of events in the form “if an event x has been executed, then event
x′ has been previously executed” [20]. In ProVerif we use special begin and end events
that are parameterised by protocol terms. To model the authentication of A to B, we
modified A’s process to include a begin event using B’s parameters as soon as A starts
a pairing session with B (after the initial public key exchange). We also modify B’s
process to include an end event using B’s parameters once B successfully completes a
pairing session. Similarly, we model authentication from B to A by making the same
modifications, but using A’s parameters and including the begin event in B’s pro-
cess and end event in A’s process. Thus, in ProVerif, we modelled the authentication
properties in the form: if the event end(X’s parameters) is executed, then the event
begin(X’s parameters) should have been previously executed. If a state where the event
end(X’s parameters) is executed without a previous begin(X’s parameters) event, the
authentication property is violated. This condition, means that an attacker could have
started a communication with an agent X and the execution reached an state where
the event end(X’s parameters) was executed without the event begin (X’s parame-
ters) being executed before. Such an implementation is similar to the implementation
described in [34].
108
5.4. Bluetooth Simple Secure Pairing Ceremony
ProVerif supports two types of correspondence assertion types: correspondence
(non-injective) and injective correspondence. The difference between them is that the
injective correspondence captures a one-to-one relationship between the number of
protocol runs performed, while the first does not. For example, injective correspondence
is useful to capture a setting where a server should only complete a single transaction
per transaction started by the client (e.g. financial transactions). In other words,
injective correspondence implies that for every end(params) event, there should be a
matching begin(params) event, while for the (non-injective) correspondence, implies
that if end(params) is output, then at least one begin(params) event was previously
outputted.
In our analysis, we followed a similar authentication implementation that was made
by Chang and Shmatikov [34] for the protocol version of SSP. Therefore, we model both
injective and non-injective versions of two types of authentication properties. The first
type is modelled by using the agents’ identities (public keys) as parameters of begin and
end events. In this first type, if the authentication property holds, then we can assume
that each agent is certain about the identity of the other agent in the ceremony run.
However, other parameters, such as nonces and the other agents’ identities involved do
not necessarily match. Therefore, we model a second authentication type, where the
events are parameterised by the nonces generated by A and B, and their respective
identities, which are the parameters used in the challenge-response performed in the
ceremony. Finally, we modelled the authentication properties from both sides, that is
from A to B and B to A authentication.
We modelled each one of the scenarios presented in Section 5.4.2 in ProVerif. Sim-
ilarly to our findings from the informal analysis, in scenarios i and ii, no attack traces
were found.
However, as described in our informal analysis, it is often the case where one or both
users may not check the values adequately (due to several factors) and just proceed
with the pairing. Scenarios iii, iv and v reflect these cases, varying from one human
agent to both agents not behaving as expected. The results of formal analysis are very
similar in the three cases. When only one human agent does not behave as expected
and always confirms the pairing, the authentication property does not hold for only the
side that misbehaves. For the the other side, the authentication holds. As mentioned
in Section 5.4.2, the harm caused by this attack may vary, since the side that behaved
properly can inform the other side about the failure. However, in cases such as a pairing
directly followed by file sharing, for example, it may be too late and the file could have
been already received by the attacker. When both sides misbehave (scenario v), the
attacker successfully deploys a MITM attack. The sequence of steps found in the attack
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trace generated by ProVerif in this scenario is presented in Figure 5.9. Note that in the
case where both sides misbehave, the messages exchanged between the users are not
likely to happen in reality, since knowing the other side’s value is not relevant in such
settings. Finally, by analysing Figure 5.9, we can easily see how the attack works on
the other cases (iii and iv). The only difference would be in the last message, where the
side behaving as expected would send an Abort message (since Va and Vb are different)
rather than Ok.
Device A Device B
Human A Human BAttacker
PKA PKI
PKI PKB
Generate: Na Generate: Nb
Generate:
Ni and N
′
i
Calculate :
C ′b = f1(PKI ,
PKA, Ni, 0)
Calculate :
Cb = f1(PKB ,
PKI , Nb, 0)
C ′b Cb
Na Ni
N ′i Nb
Verify if:
C ′b = f1(PKI ,
PKA, N
′
i , 0)
Verify if:
Cb = f1(PKB ,
PKI , Ni, 0)
Calculate: Va =
g(PKA, PKI , Na, N
′
i)
Calculate: Vb =
g(PKI , PKB , Ni, Nb)
Va Vb
Va
Vb
Ok Ok
Figure 5.9: Sequence diagram for an MITM attack in the SSP in NC mode when A
and B always confirm the pairing
For the last scenario, vi, where we assume a DY attacker on the HD channel
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between A and UA, two different attacks were found. The first, where the authentication
from B to A is violated, is very straightforward. Since the attacker controls the channel
between A and UA, the trace of the attack indicates that A communicates with the
attacker I as a normal pairing session until A sends the verification value Va to UA. At
this point, the attacker simply replies to A on the HD channel with an Ok message,
concluding the pairing session. In practice, this attack can be interpreted in different
ways. We could just assume that it happens exactly as the trace shows. That is, even
though the number displayed to UA differs to the one presented to UB, the attacker (in
this case, probably malware installed on device A) sends Ok directly back to A, without
prompting UA for confirmation. Another possibility would be that the behaviour of the
buttons “Ok” and “Abort” on the display are modified by the attacker. In this case,
even if UA chooses to abort the connection, the attacker would replace the message by
Ok when sending it to A. In both cases, a user that knows how the ceremony works
would possibly detect the different behaviour of the ceremony or be notified by UB
that the values do not match. However, the user would have to actively interrupt the
pairing (e.g. closing the application), rather than being protected by the ceremony run
itself.
A more interesting attack is shown in the attack trace where A’s authentication to
B is violated. In fact, this attack violates authentication of both sides and it would
be undetectable by the users since the ceremony runs as normal. Figure 5.10 presents
the attack trace found in ProVerif. The attacker again starts two parallel sessions with
A and B, acting as a man-in-the-middle. The ceremony runs normally for both sides
until right before the moment where the verification values Va and Vb are about to be
displayed. At this point, the attacker intercepts Va that is sent on the HD channel
between A and UA and replaces its value by Vi, which is the same Vi generated in
the session he runs with B. By doing that, the values displays for both UA and UB
will be the same. After that, the ceremony runs as normal, UA and UB exchange the
values shown on their displays (which will match) and confirm the pairing, allowing
the attacker to successfully deploy a MITM attack.
5.4.4 Fixing the Simple Secure Pairing Ceremony
Although the authentication mechanism used in SSP in NC mode, where the users are
asked to compare two short values, is relatively easy and simple to be used by humans
[103, 104, 58], it presents security problems. As discussed in Section 5.4.2, this method
is susceptible to a high error rate, going up to a 20% error rate in some scenarios,
possibly even more. These errors happen when users fail to compare the values, or
even in the case where they do not compare the numbers at all. Additionally, this
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Device A Device B
Human A Human BAttackerAttacker
PKA PKI
PKI PKB
Generate: Na Generate: NbGenerate: Ni
Calculate :
C ′b = f1(PKI ,
PKA, Ni, 0)
Calculate :
Cb = f1(PKB ,
PKI , Nb, 0)
C ′b Cb
Na Ni
Ni Nb
Verify if:
C ′b = f1(PKI ,
PKA, Ni, 0)
Verify if:
Cb = f1(PKB ,
PKI , Ni, 0)
Calculate:
Va = g(PKA,
PKI , Na, N
′
i)
Calculate:
Vb = g(PKI ,
PKB , Ni, Nb)
Calculate:
Vi = g(PKI ,
PKB , Ni, Nb)
VaVi
Vb
Vi
Vb
Verify if Vi = Vb Verify if Vi = Vb
Ok Ok
Figure 5.10: Sequence diagram for an MITM attack in the SSP in NC mode when
HDA is under a DY attacker
user interaction is likely to be susceptible to user-conditioning, lack of knowledge of
security threats, inaccurate mental models and the decision making influencing factors.
Therefore, we propose a different approach to solve the problems we found.
Our amended version for the SSP under the NC mode changes the authentication
task given to the user. Instead of asking the users to compare numbers, we make use
of a forcing function that prevents the user from proceeding with the pairing without
completing the security task (authentication) and that brings the focus on the secu-
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rity activity to the main workflow. Additionally, we focus on making the minimum
changes possible to the specification, making the impact of such a change very small
and therefore more likely to be implemented in practice.
The new version of the ceremony, shown in Figure 5.11 runs normally until the
moment that Va and Vb are calculated. At this point, we split the values calculated
into two parts, producing Va1 and Va2 for Va, and Vb1 and Vb2 for Vb. Next, rather than
sending the complete value to the human via HD channel, each device sends just one
of the halves calculated. The initiating device (A) sends the first half of its Va and the
non-initiating device (B) sends the second half of its Vb.
Device A Device B
Human A Human B
Calculated
Va = 12345678
Calculated
Vb = 12345678
Split Va in Va1 = 1234
and Va2 = 5678
Split Vb in Vb1 = 1234
and Vb2 = 5678
Va1 Vb2
Va1
Vb2
Vb2 Va1
Calculate
V ′a = (Va1||Vb2)
Calculate
V ′b = (Va1||Vb2)
Verify if Va = V
′
a Verify if Vb = V
′
b
Figure 5.11: Sequence diagram for our fix to the SSP in NC mode
After receiving the values from their respective devices, humans UA and UB then
exchange the values they received via the HH channel. The following step is where our
forcing function takes place. Now, rather than just choosing between Ok and Abort, the
user is required to type the value received from the other human peer into their device.
This prevents the user from not checking the value and shifts the comparison task
from the human to the device. Therefore, the human peers now send the values they
receive from the other human to their devices via the HD channel. Each device, when
receiving the values, merge the half displayed with the half received and compare with
the full value calculated earlier. If the values match, the pairing succeeds, otherwise it
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fails.
Device A Device B
Human A Human BAttacker
Establishes 2 parallel ses-
sions with A and B, calcu-
lating Vi−A = 12123434
and Vi−B = 56567878
Calculated
Va = 12123434
Calculated
Vb = 56567878
Split Va in Va1 = 1212
and Va2 = 3434
Split Vb in Vb1 = 5656
and Vb2 = 7878
Va1 Vb2
Va1 = 1212
Vb2 = 7878
Vb2 Va1
Calculate
V ′a = 12127878
Calculate
V ′b = 12127878
Verify if
Va = V
′
a → fail
Verify if
Vb = V
′
b → fail
Figure 5.12: Sequence diagram of a MITM attempt against our fix to the SSP in NC
mode
Figure 5.12 shows a MITM attempt against our variant of SSP. The main difference
now is that the authentication property of the ceremony does not depend on correct
user behaviour. Now, the user cannot make a mistake that impacts on the security
properties of the ceremony. If the user inputs an invalid half of V into his device, the
pairing will fail. In the case of an attempted MITM attack, as shown in Figure 5.12,
the values exchanged via the HH channel will be sent on the HD channel afterwards.
Since the attacker does not control this channel (he can only eavesdrop), he cannot
stop this authentication step and prevent the MITM attempt from failing. The only
possibility is in the case of the attacker having DY on one of both HD channels, in
this case, he could modify the value displayed to the users and inserted by the users,
and therefore perform an attack similar to the one presented earlier, in Figure 5.10.
Although possible, this attack is more complex than the one presented for SSP ‘as-is’.
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The attacker would have to display one value to the user, so the correct value needed
by the attacker would be sent via the HH channel. In addition, the attacker would
have to modify the value entered by the user, replacing it by a value that matches
the expected one. Thus, our variation has inherent resistance against user security
mistakes, as long as the devices are not compromised.
We updated the formal implementation in ProVerif for scenarios i and ii and sim-
ilarly to the previous implementation, no attack traces were found. For the scenarios
that involved user mistake (iii, iv and v), there is no possible formal implementation
since the user cannot perform the authentication task incorrectly, otherwise the pairing
ceremony will fail. For vi, where there is a DY attacker on the HD channel between A
and UA, the authentication of B to A fails. This failure happens because the attacker
knows the complete value of Va and therefore sends the second half of Va through the
HD channel between A and UA. This action can be interpreted as, in practice, the
attacker could block what UA sends to A and replace it by Va2. Similarly, the authen-
tication of A to B fails because the attacker may display the value Vb1 on A’s display.
That is, the attacker replaces Va1 by Vb1 on the HD channel between A and UA. Then,
UA sends Vb1 to UB via HH channel, who will then send the value modified by the
attacker to B and complete the MITM attack successfully.
The method we proposed here is inherently secure against incorrect user interaction.
However, it requires more effort from the users involved. Both users would have to read
and type values in to their devices. In usability tests performed in [103, 104, 58] users
found, as expected, the default method used in SSP’s NC mode easier and faster to
use when compared to another method that presents similar interaction to the method
we propose here. However, as described by Kainda et al. [58], although the actions of
reading and typing values in to devices are more difficult to perform in terms of usability,
the mechanism we proposed cannot be incorrectly operated by users. Additionally, the
popularity of Short Message Service (SMS) and similar services for mobile devices
means that more and more users tend to become familiar with the task of typing text
in to devices. Furthermore, in the study performed by Uzun et al. [103] and another
by Valkonen et al. [104], a similar method to the one we presented here was perceived
as more difficult to use than the default SSP, but also more professional. Among users
in the experiment performed by Uzun et al., most users mentioned that this method
was the most preferred personal choice and they would like to have it available on their
devices.
Looking back to the taxonomy we presented in Chapter 3, we find that the activ-
ities involved in the task we added to our ceremony follows the recommendations we
proposed. It respects user faculties, since it only asks users to read short strings and
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input them into a device. More importantly, it removes an authentication task from
the user and gives it back to the device, following the recommendation of not relying on
user authentication capabilities. It also integrates the security into the main workflow
by including the security-related user interaction as an active part of the ceremony.
Finally, the use of the forcing function we proposed prevents the user from performing
an inappropriate interaction.
5.5 WhatsApp Registration Ceremony
The WhatsApp registration ceremony is simple and relies on the properties that an
SSL/TLS connection with the registration server provides. The registration process is
straightforward. It uses the user’s mobile phone number as the basis for identification,
which is sent to the registration server. In response, the server returns an acknowl-
edgement message. The server then sends a PIN1 code via SMS to the phone number
that requested the registration. As we can see, the message that contains the PIN
code is sent via an alternative channel. Finally, the registration is confirmed when
the PIN code is sent back to the server, now using a regular network channel. This
message binds the phone number to the device, and allows the server to complete the
registration. As a response, the server sends a confirmation message to the device.
Note that all the messages exchanged between the device and the registration server
are sent using an HTTPS connection, meaning that there is server authentication and
the communication is encrypted.
The whole registration ceremony using protocol notation is presented in Figure 5.13.
As we can see, we have four agents and four communication channels in place. First,
we have agent S which is the registration server. Second, there is UA which represents
the user operating the device A. In A, we have two subdivisions in our ceremony.
Rather than specifying just a device A, we consider two different agents. The agent
AW represents the WhatsApp application installed on the device, while AM is an SMS
application. In most cases, both applications will be installed on the same device, but
in fact, it could also be the case where they are on two different devices. The main
reason for this separation is because of the nature of the protocol. Although the SMS
is sent to device A, in most cases (except for Android OS devices), AW cannot directly
read the contents. Therefore, the user will have to read the contents of the SMS and
then type it into the application. This causes the need for additional messages 5 and
6 that deal with the actions of receiving the PIN and sending it to the WhatsApp
1Although we disagree with the name “PIN” to represent the value sent by the server, all the
references to the WhatsApp protocol call this value by “PIN”. In reality, this value acts as a one-time-
password rather than a PIN.
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application. Once again, this works in the same way, whether the applications are
installed on the same device or not.
The four channels we use are composed of:
• the network channel DD between AW and S (assuming a HTTPS connection);
• a secondary and restricted device-device channel, DDSMS which is specifically
used to the deliver the SMS message;
• a HDAW channel between the user UA and the agent AW ;
• and finally, another HDAM channel between the user UA and the agent AM .
1. UA −−−−→
HDAW
AW : PhoneNumber
2. AW −−−−→
DD
S : PhoneNumber
3. S −−−−→
DD
AW : NumberReceived
4. S −−−−→
DDSMS
AM : PIN
5. AM −−−−→
HDAM
UA : PIN
6. UA −−−−→
HDAW
AW : PIN
7. AW −−−−→
DD
S : PIN
8. S −−−−→
DD
AW : RegistrationConfirmation
Figure 5.13: Ceremony description for WhatsApp registration
A more detailed sequence of actions and messages is presented in Figure 5.14.
We identified the SMS channel using a larger arrow and presented the application as
different agents. The sequence diagram presents the registration ceremony using the
sms method.
In the self method, presented in Figure 5.15, the larger arrow does not exist. In-
stead, there is a change in the NumberReceived message contents, which now includes
the PIN code. The SMS message containing the PIN code would be sent from the
WhatsApp App to the SMS App. The SMS App then sends an SMS to the device’s
own number (using the short message service center - SMSC), ‘validating’ the number.
Note that the DDSMS channel used in the sms method does not exist in the self
method. There is a new DD channel, called DDSMSC , that is responsible for the mes-
sage exchange between SMS App and SMS Center. There is also a HDWM channel,
which is an additional device-device channel that exists between the two applications
involved in the ceremony: WhatsApp and SMS app.
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WhatsApp
App
SMS
App Server S
Human A
PhoneNumber
PhoneNumber
Generate PIN
NumberReceived
PIN
PIN
PIN
PIN
Verify if PIN
values match
RegistrationConfirmation
Figure 5.14: Sequence diagram of the WhatsApp registration ceremony using the sms
method
As presented in Section 2.4.2, in older versions of the registration ceremony, the
PIN used to be generated in the device and then sent to the server which caused
several security problems. In our analysis we consider only the most recent version,
where the PIN is generated on the server side and the methods self and sms are
available.
Finally, for analytical purposes, we will also discuss a naive version of the registra-
tion protocol, where an SMS message is not used to authenticate the ownership of the
number. The ceremony starts in two possible ways. In the first, the user would insert
the desired phone number in to the device (using the WhatsApp application), while in
the second the application detects the phone number automatically. After obtaining
the device’s phone number, the application then sends it to the registration server,
which will confirm the registration back to the application, as shown in Figure 5.16.
5.5.1 Threat Model
The threat model for the WhatsApp ceremony is difficult to define. Where a HTTPS
connection is used, there are several assumptions on the DD channel that are very
difficult to model and analyse. There are also different threat models for the DDsms
channel, HDWM channel and HDAM channel. For all registration methods, we would
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Figure 5.15: Sequence diagram of the WhatsApp registration ceremony using the self
method
WhatsApp
App Server S
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PhoneNumber
PhoneNumber
RegistrationConfirmation
Figure 5.16: Sequence diagram of the WhatsApp registration ceremony without an
alternative channel verification
typically assume a DY attacker on the DD channel, however, the current protocol uses
the TLS/SSL protocol, which provides server authentication and confidentiality. On
the other hand, assuming no attacker on the DD channel may hide some subtleties of
the protocol and potential attacks. Therefore, we will approach this scenario would by
analysing the ceremony against different variants of the threat model and verifying the
outcomes. Thus, for the DD channel, we will consider different variants of the threat
model in our analysis. We will discuss a setting where there is no attacker (N), which
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is likely to be the threat model assumed by the registration protocol designers; another
setting that gives DY capabilities to the attacker; and finally, an I attacker, which
is capable of initiating a new communication with the server using the knowledge he
possesses.
For the restricted DDsms channel, we assume no attackers (N). Finally, for the two
channels that involve human interaction (HD), we need to consider variations going
from N to E, since the registration may be run in a public location. A DY attacker
for the HD channels in this ceremony are very unlikely to exist in practice as long as
the device is not corrupted (although we can still analyse the outcome this a scenario
in our ceremony).
Note that for the self method, there is an additional device-device channel which
exists between the two running applications in the ceremony: WhatsApp and SMS
app. For this channel, we assume an N attacker in our analysis. We assume the same
attacker capabilities (N) for the DDSMSC as well. All of these different registration
methods and channels give us different scenarios where we can analyse the ceremony
outcomes and the relevance of the SMS mechanism used.
5.5.2 Informal Analysis
In our informal analysis of the WhatsApp registration ceremony, we consider the three
registration methods discussed earlier. This gives us four different scenarios given some
variations on the threat model:
i) In this setting, we assume a naive implementation of the registration of the pro-
tocol, where no SMS verification is used. That is, the WhatsApp software sends
the phone number (received from the user or automatically detected) to the server
which confirms the registration. Therefore, there is a maximum of two channels
in use in this ceremony. In the case of the user entering the phone number, we
have a HD channel where the attacker may be capable of eavesdropping (E). If
the phone number is automatically detected, the HD channel does not exist. For
the DD channel we assume a DY and an I attacker.
ii) This scenario assumes the use of the self method. In the first setting, we assume
a DY attacker for the DD channel, and no attackers (N) for all the remaining
communication channels.
iii) In this scenario we change the method to sms. In this setting, we assume a DY
attacker for the DD channel, N attacker for the DDSMS channel, and N for both
HD channels.
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iv) Next, we assume a similar setting to the one we have in iii, but we change the
attacker on both HD channels to E.
The ceremony for the scenario i, is obviously flawed. Anyone who knows the victim’s
phone number can perform the registration impersonating the victim. If the user is
asked to insert the phone number, the impersonation attack is very straightforward.
There is no need to modify any channel or agent’s behaviour. The attacker would simply
initiate communication with the server by using his I capability and send the victim’s
phone number. In practice, an attacker would simply enter the victim’s phone number
in to the device he possesses and would successfully register an account. However,
if the number is detected automatically by the operating system, which is possible
in Android but not in iOS, the security would be reduced to operating system (OS)
security. This second variation is more reliable than the first, but it is still flawed. To
succeed, the attacker would need to corrupt the OS or the application to give himself
the I capability and send the phone number he desires instead of the correct one. The
attacker does not need to attack the victim’s device, he only needs to corrupt any
device he possesses.
The next scenario, ii, consists of a more realistic setting. In this case, SMS messages
are used to validate the ownership of the phone number using the self method, as
shown in Figure 5.15. This method is relatively similar to the sms method presented
earlier. The main change is that now the PIN is sent back to the device along with
the NumberReceived message. Additionally, the SMS containing the PIN is no longer
sent by the server. Instead, the device sends an SMS to its own number in order to
validate the ownership of the phone number. The method is inherently flawed since the
PIN is sent back to the client without any validation of the ownership of the number.
The authentication method via PIN using the SMS message is of no use since the
client already knows the PIN value.
The attack we found in the scenario ii is very straightforward. The attacker simply
initiates a communication with the server using the DD channel sending the victim’s
phone number. The server replies with the confirmation message and the PIN . At this
point, the attacker has all the information necessary to perform the attack. Despite the
fact that SSL/TLS is used, the attacker initiates the SSL/TLS session with the server,
meaning that all the messages are exchanged between the attacker and the server. In
this case, the use of SSL/TLS would only be of benefit if the attacker had only E or
N capabilities on the channel, which is not realistic. In this case, the attacker would
not be able to read the PIN value, since it would be encrypted due to the SSL/TLS
session between the client and the server. However, the attack we presented does not
require the user to be engaged in a registration session. The attacker could perform
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the whole registration ceremony by himself (similarly to the attack discussed in Section
2.4.2.1). Note that this attack would work even considering weaker variations of the
attacker model. An I attacker on the DD channel would already be powerful enough
to be able to deploy the same attack. Thus, it is clear that the self method should be
avoided by all means (although it is still available in the latest version) since it leaks
the PIN prior to the verification of the ownership of the number.
In the Figure 5.15, we presented the case where the user has to type the PIN in
to the WhatsApp application. However, there is another possible sequence of actions.
The application could monitor the SMS application for incoming messages and auto-
matically read the contents of the SMS when it is received. It is not possible in iOS,
but it is possible in Android. However, the attack discussed above would still work,
since the WhatsApp application would be installed on the attacker’s device and the
sequence of sending/receiving the SMS is not relevant because the attacker already
knows the PIN at this point.
For the sms method, the WhatsApp developers/designers probably assumed that
the use of SSL/TLS would imply an N threat model for the DD channels. The phone
number is considered public, hence the need for an SMS to verify the ownership of
the number. As opposed to the self method, this method would require the attacker
to obtain the PIN code that would be sent to the victim’s device. As long as the
attacker does not control the DDSMS channel, there is no other way to obtain the
PIN code apart from obtaining it from the victim’s device. Thus, when changing
the authentication method to sms, an important change in the ceremony happens.
Now, assuming a SSL/TLS connection between the victim’s device and the server, the
only point where the attacker can learn the PIN value is by eavesdropping one of the
HD channels between the user and the SMS application or between the user and the
WhatsApp application.
In scenario iii, the attacker, despite having full control of the DD channel, does not
have any capability on the other channels and therefore cannot learn the PIN at any
point, being unable to confirm his registration. Note that even though the attacker
has full control over the DD channel, he will not be able to read the PIN sent by the
WhatsApp application to the server on this channel because it is encrypted using an
SSL/TLS connection. Additionally, the attacker cannot impersonate the server to the
WhatsApp application and act as a man-in-the-middle, since SSL/TLS provides server
authentication.
However, in scenario iv, the attacker has eavesdropping capabilities on the HD
channels. In practice, this could happen in the case where the attacker is near the
victim’s device, being able to see its screen. A realistic example could be the case
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where the victim’s device is left on a desk during a meeting or a class without its owner
paying much attention to it. The attacker could then launch the attack by engaging in
a registration process using the victim’s phone number. When the SMS is sent to the
user’s device, the attacker would just need to read the PIN code that would appear
on the victim’s display. By using this code, the attacker would be able to register an
account impersonating the victim. In this attack, the legitimate user could notice an
unexpected SMS being received, but cannot be sure whether this is used as part of an
attack or not. In this case, the use of an SSL/TLS connection on the DD channel does
not stop the attack from happening. The SSL/TLS connection would be established
using the attacker’s device. The WhatsApp application on the victim’s device is not
used during this attack since the attacker initiates the registration process.
5.5.3 Formal Analysis
In our formal model of the WhatsApp registration ceremonies we implemented similar
scenarios to those we have seen in the informal analysis. Our implementation of these
scenarios used similar mechanisms to those we discussed in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4.3,
with the main focus on modelling authentication, which is the most relevant part of
this ceremony.
We modelled in ProVerif each one of the scenarios presented in Section 5.5.2. There
is a limitation however. ProVerif does not support multiple variations of the attacker
model, which does not allow us to model an I-only attacker. In fact, as we presented
in Section 5.3.3, we had to use an implementation trick to be able to use DY , E and
N in the same ceremony implementation. The results, however, were not affected by
this limitation, as we will see in this section.
In the sms method implementation, we had to change an additional configuration
setting. We changed the directive ignoreTypes to false, to force the ceremony to
respect the type system. The reason for this change is that the verification had problems
because the types defined for PIN and for phone numbers were not being respected,
although they were different. When that happened, termination problems occurred
because an attacker could send a phone number as a PIN and vice-versa, which does
not happen in practice. The side-effect of this change, is that the analysis can possibly
find fewer attacks. To prevent this from happening, we carefully analysed the trace
before making the change. The previous trace only pointed to the problem we described,
so the impact of this change in this scenario is not likely to be a problem.
For scenario i, the attack trace presents an attacker sending a phone number to the
server, and receiving the confirmation back. This is similar to the attack we informally
discussed in Section 5.5.2 for the same scenario.
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In scenario ii, the same attack presented in Section 5.5.2 was found. The attack
trace presented in ProVerif in this case is very simple. It describes the attacker sending a
phone number to the server using the DD channel and receiving the message containing
NumberReceived and PIN back. By having the PIN , the attacker then sends it to
the server using the DD channel and the attack is completed. As the attack trace
shows, only the attacker, the server S and the DD channel are used for this attack
to succeed. The SMS and the other agents in the protocol are not even used in the
attack. Therefore, all the other agents and channels in the self method just add more
complexity to the ceremony without bringing any additional features or gains.
Moving to the sms method implementation, similar results to those discussed in
Section 5.5.2 were found. First, for scenario iii, no attacks were found, since the attacker
controls the DD channel but cannot obtain the PIN to perform the impersonation at-
tack because the PIN value is protected by the SSL/TLS connection. For the scenario
iv, we added eavesdropping capabilities on the HD channels for the attacker to simu-
late the case where the attacker is near the victim’s device, being able to see its display.
The attack trace is presented in Figure 5.17. In the attack found by ProVerif, similarly
to the attack we described in Section 5.5.2, the attacker starts a registration process
by sending a phone number on the DD channel to the server S. The server sends
the PIN to the victim’s device using the DDSMS channel. The SMSApp then sends
(displays) the PIN to the human using the HDAM channel. Since the attacker is able
to eavesdrop the HDAM channel, which is represented in the trace by the replication
of the message sent on the eavesdrop channel we implemented, the attacker learns the
PIN . With the possession of the PIN value, the attacker completes the registration,
and therefore the impersonation attack, by sending the PIN he eavesdropped, in to
the server S.
Implementing a ceremony that models the properties provided by the SSL/TLS
protocol was tricky. If we do not assume an SSL/TLS connection, a MITM attack
is possible. The attacker would simply intercept all the messages between the victim
and the server, and forward the same messages to the server. In the end, the attacker
would complete the registration with the server using the victim’s details, and therefore
perform an impersonation attack. Since an SSL/TLS connection prevents this type of
attack from happening, and provides confidentiality of the messages exchanged, we
modelled authentication in a form that we can verify if a PIN received by the server
(S) (modelled as an event in Proverif) was preceded by a PIN sent by the WhatsApp
application AW . By doing this, we can still detect attacks where the attacker initiates
a registration process with the server (as the attack found in scenario iv), but we do
not ‘allow’ the attacker to perform a MITM attack or read the PIN sent by the victim
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Figure 5.17: Sequence diagram of the attack on the WhatsApp registration ceremony
using the sms method
through the DD channel.
5.6 Gains by Analysing Security Ceremonies
As we could see in the analysis we performed in this Chapter, as well as in the contents
discussed throughout this thesis, the most important gains we obtain by extending
protocol design and analysis to ceremonies are:
Realistic analysis – Ceremony analysis implies considering the security problem from
practical point of view and in its context of use. Although every change in context
implies different ceremonies and additional analysis, the level of accuracy of the
results is very high, as the description of the actions are significantly closer to
the practical use when compared to traditional protocol descriptions.
Better usability – By having more details of practical aspects, such as user inter-
action, messages sent and displayed to users and/or exchanged among users, it
is easier to perceive how a ceremony would work in practice and consequently
how usable it is. By not overstating the attacker’s capabilities by assuming an
excessively-pessimistic threat model, we prevent the protocol/ceremony designer
from adding (unnecessary) features that could imply non-plausible assumptions
and/or degraded usability.
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Earlier problem detection – Ceremonies are likely to improve the detection of se-
curity problems during design phases. Since the level of detail is higher, and
the assumptions are more accurate and less numerous, it is likely to be easier to
detect security problems during the design process. A good example is the PIN
issues we discussed in Bluetooth’s legacy pairing and with the self method in
the WhatsApp registration.
Better assumptions – Assumptions, which previously provided relatively static in-
put to protocol design, are now a more explicit part of the model. This allows a
more detailed analysis of their influence on the ceremony’s security goals. As an
example, in the Bluetooth SSP we moved user interaction from an assumption to
a more explicit exchange of messages with smaller assumptions. Therefore, we
were able analyse different scenarios that covered variations of the user behaviour
and examine the outcomes. Such differences allow for a better understanding of
the impacts in case an assumption does not hold, and may also (although it is
very subjective) help the designer to further rationalise about the assumptions
made regarding the human peer.
Prediction of the impacts of user misbehaviour – Due to the explicit inclusion
of user agents, we can now verify what happens in a ceremony if a user misbehaves,
as we did in the Bluetooth SSP analysis. We were able to analyse the impacts
of one peer misbehaving in a ceremony as well as the case where two or more
peers do not perform their tasks as expected. The changes to the threat model
we propose allows a systematic variation of the agent’s behaviour and a proper
measurement of its impact.
Prediction of the impacts of any agent’s misbehaviour – In addition to the pos-
sibility of analysing user’s misbehaviour, we can verify the impacts, in a ceremony,
of any agent’s misbehaviour. In the SSP ceremony, we demonstrated this feature
by modifying the threat model of the HD channels during the pairing process.
Training users to recognise threats – In some scenarios, adaptive threat models
may lead users to be able to detect different threat models for those situations. By
executing similar ceremonies which are adapted to run under different (realistic)
threat models, users may start to notice the different surrounding threats they
are subject to. For example, in Bluetooth SSP pairing, an automatic transition
between pairing modes according to the surrounding environment could be used
as part of the ceremony. The ceremony could enforce the pairing mode to be used
by taking into account, for example, whether there are more Bluetooth enabled
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devices around before allowing pairing under the just works mode. If there is
more than one, the just works mode should not be available since the weakened
threat model requires that. If only one device is found, the just works mode could
be used securely, since it respects the threat model specified for its use.
Reducing the gap between protocol and HCI communities - By including user
interaction in the specification, and analysing such an interaction considering in-
herent human characteristics and capabilities, we essentially make use of existing
knowledge, methods and techniques of two different research areas to achieve a
common goal. The findings of such an approach can potentially provide cues for
taking research in these areas even further.
5.7 Summary
The findings we obtained from analysing Bluetooth’s legacy pairing ceremony are rel-
evant for several reasons. They demonstrate an inaccurate assumption that was made
at the design phase of the protocol. Assuming that threats were only existent on the
device-device channel is not consistent with the scenarios where the protocol would
take place in practice. This may have happened due to the inherent idea of threat
modelling in protocols where the threats are only assumed to exist on the network
channel. However, protocols such as legacy pairing involve more than just networked
communication. Attacks found on the protocol corroborates this. In fact, if the pos-
sibility of an attacker eavesdropping the human-device or human-human channel was
considered at the design phase, it would be straightforward to notice that the whole
security of the protocol relies on the PIN in the first place. As a result, attacks similar
to those we discussed could have been found and solved at the design or analysis phase.
Similarly, in the analysis of Bluetooth’s SSP ceremony, we found that although the
protocol can be considered secure, in practice it is likely to be susceptible to attacks.
The assumptions made regarding the human agent and its behaviour are not realistic
and do not consider several of the human characteristics we discussed in Chapter 3. We
have shown that if the user behaves according to what was assumed, the ceremony is
safe. However, there is a high probability that the users do not behave in the expected
way, and eventually make errors. Such a probability is even likely to increase over time.
To fix this problem we proposed a change in the pairing mechanism which uses a forcing
function and maintains the safety of the ceremony even in the case of a user making
an inappropriate interaction. Our amended version respects the taxonomy presented
in Chapter 3 and follows the proposed recommendations.
For the WhatsApp registration ceremony, we analysed several variants of the au-
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thentication mechanisms and threat models. Similarly to the Bluetooth SSP ceremony,
where an authentication message is exchanged via an alternative channel, the What-
sApp registration ceremony also makes use of alternative channels for authentication.
One relevant difference is that the SSP ceremony achieves the claimed properties even
in the case of an attacker being able to eavesdrop the HD channels, while the What-
sApp ceremony does not. In order to achieve the claimed properties, the WhatsApp
ceremony limits the attacker capabilities on the DD channel by using an SSL/TLS con-
nection and assumes that the attacker is not capable of performing any action on all
remaining communication channels. However, this change in the DD channel demon-
strates how difficult composability of security protocols may be. By assuming that
the channel was authenticated and confidential (properties provided by SSL/TLS), the
designers made several mistakes, such as sending the PIN on this channel right after
receiving a phone number, without verifying the ownership of the number first. This
allows strong impersonation attacks even in the case where the victim is not actively
engaged in registering for the service. For the HD channels, the assumption that the
attacker cannot eavesdrop this channel has also proven to be inaccurate in practice, as
we demonstrated in our analysis.
Another interesting point raised by the ceremony analysis we performed through-
out this chapter was the systematic variation and analysis of scenarios. This gave us
interesting insights about the attacks we knew and/or found. Such an approach is
interesting for ceremonies, since they allow us to fine-tune the threat model according
to the results of the analysis and confirm whether the attack found is realistic or not.
Finally, it was interesting to note the importance of the taxonomy and design
recommendations we presented in Chapter 3. We found that even when no attacks
were initially found in our analysis, the assumptions regarding the user behaviour need
to be carefully analysed. As we demonstrated in the analysis, inaccurate assumptions
may lead to security flaws in the ceremony.
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Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis we investigated and studied the benefits of designing and analysing se-
curity protocols from an extended point of view. We discussed the topic of security
ceremonies and their components from different perspectives and presented examples of
how a multidisciplinary approach could be beneficial to minimising security problems
we frequently experience when protocols are used in real-world scenarios.
Security protocols have been actively researched over the last few decades. Methods
and techniques to verify whether the claimed security properties are achieved have also
been the focus of intensive research. Similarly, but for a slightly shorter period, human-
computer interaction has also been the focus of active research. Despite their different
nature, they are both very relevant to real word scenarios where secure communication
is required. The design and analysis of security ceremonies can benefit from the existing
knowledge, methods and tools from both fields. The existing gap between these two
relevant research areas is narrowed when we use security ceremonies.
As we discussed throughout this thesis, knowing human capabilities and limita-
tions, as we presented in Chapter 3, is important in order to not overestimate the
expectations around the human peer in a ceremony. This also helps us to understand
why some protocols fail in practice and teaches us how to avoid such problems in the
future. Simply stating that the human is the weakest link does not improve security
or make existing security problems less relevant. Understanding the reasons why such
user interactions may have caused a security flaw and developing mechanisms that are
usable, feasible and respect inherent human characteristics is challenging, but must
always be done. The design of a human interaction should be revised if it violates the
recommendations we proposed, or does not consider the components we presented.
Ceremonies, as well as protocols, are developed to support human demands for secu-
rity solutions. An important difference, however, is that security ceremonies explicitly
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include the human components at the design and analysis phases. The framework we
presented in Chapter 4 allows such a description and discusses how the definition of
a realistic threat model is important to produce a ceremony that achieves its security
goals and is, at the same time, usable. The framework presented makes use of the
existing models for security protocols and extends them to encompass ceremony needs.
The examples we analysed in Chapter 5 are very interesting for several reasons.
They clearly show the difference between ceremony and protocol analysis. From the
granularity of the assumptions involved to the additional number of agents, channels
and messages exchanged, we were able to discuss in detail the gains of analysing cer-
emonies. We presented scenarios where practical security problems could have been
found at the design phase. We also demonstrated how reasoning about a realistic threat
model can be performed and how the analysis of the possible outcomes is relevant. Not
all of the attacks found were plausible in practice, but just the fact that we could iden-
tify a possible breach is enough to provide clues to how a ceremony could be improved
if necessary.
We demonstrated that existing protocol verification tools and methods can be
adapted to mechanically analyse security ceremonies. Another interesting contribu-
tion was the systematic variation of the threat model and its impact on the analysis
of the ceremonies presented. Such an approach can be used for any ceremony and
allows a ceremony designer to fine-tune the threat model. By checking the analysis re-
sults and verifying whether the attack found is realistic or not, a more accurate threat
model can be defined for a ceremony while the threat model stays realistic. Finally, it
was interesting to note how the application of the ceremony design and analysis cycle
presented in Section 5.2 is important. Some ceremonies that were initially considered
secure can have security flaws in practice because they would not accurately consider
the capabilities of the human node.
6.1 Future Work
There are several avenues of research that we believe would be interesting to investigate
further. The first, is to increase the number of analysed ceremonies. New scenarios, new
interaction types, and analysis of ceremonies that achieve different security goals will
surely enrich the coverage we currently have. This would allow further evaluation and
refinements of the proposed framework and the human-protocol interaction taxonomy
and recommendations.
An interesting type of ceremony to be analysed is a ceremony that includes humans
making use of constrained devices, such as one-time-password generators. These devices
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are widely used in several real-world scenarios, ranging from ATM systems to web
authentication. They cannot be modelled as computers or human agents. They are
different types of agents in a protocol and therefore are likely to be exposed to a
different threat model as well. Another characteristic that is likely to be interesting
from a ceremony perspective is modelling the possession of such a device.
Other ceremonies include SSL/TLS implementation in web browsers. One ceremony
that still lacks good usability and user interaction is the SSL/TLS handshake ceremony
in web browsers. The dynamic acceptance of new and/or unknown digital certificates
presented by the server in the handshake is clearly a burden for the users. Assuming
that users can handle this task is certainly a flaw and deserves more attention.
A good starting point to approach the problem from a ceremony-based perspective
is presented by Gajek [49, 50] et al. and further investigated by Radke et al. [81]. It
would be interesting to further analyse the suggestions made by Radke et al. as well
as trying different human-server authentication mechanisms, possibly using alternative
(authenticated) channels.
All of these different scenarios, along with some user-based experiments are likely
to provide interesting outcomes and would help us to further evaluate and refine our
framework, as well as verify and improve the human-protocol interaction taxonomy
and the set of design recommendations.
It is also worth investigating and elaborating a set of human strengths that can
be exploited by the ceremony designers. We briefly mentioned that users are good at
authenticating people they know. Other human strengths may include unstructured
problem-solving (i.e. solving for problems in which there are no existing rules to solve),
acquiring and processing new information (e.g. deciding what is relevant in a new
discover), among others. Such a list of strengths could be of great use when design a
user interaction.
Another point that can be investigated further is the specification and implementa-
tion of the adaptive threat model we proposed in Chapter 4 in the existing verification
methods and tools for security protocols. This would allow these existing methods and
tools, such as ProVerif, to provide better and extended support for security ceremonies.
In Chapter 5, we demonstrated and implemented mechanisms that allowed us to tailor
the set of attacker capabilities for each ceremony and adjust them to be more real-
istic. However, in our analysis, we were limited to a small set of capabilities (as we
discussed in Section 5.5.3) that we were able to implement using the tools as they cur-
rently are. Additional attacker variations to support a wider range of capabilities are
worth studying and implementing. These implementations would definitely allow for
better automated testing and provide support for designing a wider range of security
131
ceremonies.
The contextual coverage that ceremonies bring to security protocols is worth inves-
tigating further. This can give us better insights into the problem of protocol com-
posability. The composability problem normally happens because of clashes among
assumptions that are embedded in protocols. By being able to model more details of
the environment, we may now have more tools to predict what happens when two pro-
tocols, which are designed focusing on their own respective environments, are put to
work together. As we could see in the WhatsApp ceremonies we analysed in Chapter
5.5, just putting two protocols together does not necessarily mean that the proper-
ties that each protocol individually provides will be provided when the protocols are
used together. The assumption that an attacker could not eavesdrop the PIN code
sent by the server to the user’s device in the WhatsApp ceremony demonstrates that.
Although the SSL/TLS protocol provides confidentiality, when the protocol was put
together with another, the confidentiality property of the information sent through the
SSL/TLS channel was no longer achieved.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate how ceremony analysis copes with
social engineering attacks. By being able to model human nodes and the exchange
of messages between humans, and between humans and devices, we may be able to
analyse the impacts of an attacker manipulating a human peer and investigate possible
solutions.
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Appendix A
Proverif Source Code of the
Bluetooth Legacy Pairing
Ceremonies
A.1 Bluetooth Legacy Pairing - scenario i
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
(* Types *)
type key.
type nonce. (* for nonces *)
type ui_input. (* for user input messages via UI *)
type ui_message. (* for messages displayed via UI *)
(* Symetric Encryption *)
fun senc(bitstring , key): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring , k : key; sdec(senc(m,k), k) = m.
(* Ceremony/Protocol Specific Functions *)
fun e22(bitstring ,bitstring ,nonce) : key.
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fun e1(key ,bitstring ,bitstring) : bitstring.
(* Public information *)
free BD_ADDR_A : bitstring. (* A’s Bluetooth address *)
free BD_ADDR_B : bitstring. (* B’s Bluetooth address *)
(* Private information *)
free pin:bitstring[private ].
(* Queries / Tests *)
weaksecret pin.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in (hdA , pin_reqX : ui_message); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ
*)
out (hh , pin); (* 5. UA -hh -> UB : PIN *)
out (hdA , pin). (* 6. UA -hh -> A : PIN *)
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in (hdB , pin_reqX : ui_message); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ
*)
in (hh , pinX : bitstring); (* 5. UA -hh -> UB : PIN REQ *)
out (hdB , pinX). (* 7. UB -hh -> B : PIN *)
(* Device A *)
let processA =
new in_rand : nonce;
out(dd , in_rand); (* 1. A -> B : IN_RAND *)
in(dd , accept: ui_input); (* 2. B -> A : ACCEPT *)
new pin_reqa : ui_message;
out(hdA , pin_reqa); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ *)
in (hdA , pinX : bitstring); (* 6. UA -hd -> A : PIN *)
let kinit_a = e22(BD_ADDR_B , pinX , in_rand) in (* A
generates Kinit *)
new au_rand_a : bitstring;
out(dd , au_rand_a); (* 3. A -> B : AU_RANDa *)
in(dd, sres1X:bitstring); (* 4. B -> A : SRES1 *)
if sres1X = e1(kinit_a , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_a) then
in(dd, au_rand_bX:bitstring); (* 5. B -> A : AU_RANDb *)
let sres2 = e1(kinit_a , BD_ADDR_A , au_rand_bX) in
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out(dd , sres2). (* 6. A -> B : SRES2 *)
(* Device B *)
let processB =
in(dd , in_randX : nonce); (* 1. A -> B : IN_RAND *)
new accept:ui_input;
out(dd , accept); (* 2. B -> A : ACCEPT *)
new pin_reqb : ui_message;
out(hdB , pin_reqb); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ *)
in (hdB , pinX : bitstring); (* 7. UB -hd -> B : PIN *)
let kinit_b = e22(BD_ADDR_B , pinX , in_randX) in (* B
generates Kinit *)
in(dd , au_rand_aX:bitstring); (* 3. A -> B : AU_RANDa *)
let sres1 = e1(kinit_b , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_aX) in (* calculate
SRES1 *)
out(dd , sres1); (* 4. B -> A : SRES1 *)
new au_rand_b : bitstring;
out(dd , au_rand_b); (* 5. B -> A : AU_RANDb *)
in(dd , sres2X:bitstring); (* 6. A -> B : SRES2 4 *)
if sres2X = e1(kinit_b , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_b) then
0.
process
(
(! processA) | (! processB) | (! processUA) | (! processUB)
)
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A.2 Bluetooth Legacy Pairing - scenario ii
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
(* Types *)
type key.
type nonce.
type ui_input.
type ui_message.
(* Symetric Encryption *)
fun senc(bitstring , key): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring , k : key; sdec(senc(m,k), k) = m.
(* Ceremony/Protocol Specific Functions *)
fun e22(bitstring ,bitstring ,nonce) : key.
fun e1(key ,bitstring ,bitstring) : bitstring.
(* Public information *)
free BD_ADDR_A : bitstring. (* A’s Bluetooth address *)
free BD_ADDR_B : bitstring. (* B’s Bluetooth address *)
(* Private information *)
free pin:bitstring[private ].
(* Queries / Tests *)
free s:bitstring[private ]. (* secret that the attacker should not
be able to obtain *)
query attacker(s).
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(* User A *)
let processUA =
in (hdA , pin_reqX : ui_message); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ
*)
out (hh , pin); (* 5. UA -hh -> UB : PIN *)
out (hdA , pin). (* 6. UA -hh -> A : PIN *)
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in (hdB , pin_reqX : ui_message); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ
*)
in (hh , pinX : bitstring); (* 5. UA -hh -> UB : PIN REQ *)
out (hdB , pinX). (* 7. UB -hh -> B : PIN *)
(* Device A *)
let processA =
new in_rand : nonce;
out(dd , in_rand); (* 1. A -> B : IN_RAND *)
in(dd , accept: ui_input); (* 2. B -> A : ACCEPT *)
new pin_reqa : ui_message;
out(hdA , pin_reqa); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ *)
in (hdA , pinX : bitstring); (* 6. UA -hd -> A : PIN *)
let kinit_a = e22(BD_ADDR_B , pinX , in_rand) in (* A
generates Kinit *)
new au_rand_a : bitstring;
out(dd , au_rand_a); (* 3. A -> B : AU_RANDa *)
in(dd, sres1X:bitstring); (* 4. B -> A : SRES1 *)
if sres1X = e1(kinit_a , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_a) then
in(dd, au_rand_bX:bitstring); (* 5. B -> A : AU_RANDb *)
let sres2 = e1(kinit_a , BD_ADDR_A , au_rand_bX) in
out(dd , sres2); (* 6. A -> B : SRES2 *)
out(dd , senc(s,kinit_a)).
(* Device B *)
let processB =
in(dd, in_randX : nonce); (* 1. A -> B : IN_RAND *)
new accept:ui_input;
out(dd , accept); (* 2. B -> A : ACCEPT *)
new pin_reqb : ui_message;
out(hdB , pin_reqb); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ *)
in (hdB , pinX : bitstring); (* 7. UB -hd -> B : PIN *)
let kinit_b = e22(BD_ADDR_B , pinX , in_randX) in (* B
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generates Kinit *)
in(dd , au_rand_aX:bitstring); (* 3. A -> B : AU_RANDa *)
let sres1 = e1(kinit_b , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_aX) in (* calculate
SRES1 *)
out(dd , sres1); (* 4. B -> A : SRES1 *)
new au_rand_b : bitstring;
out(dd , au_rand_b); (* 5. B -> A : AU_RANDb *)
in(dd , sres2X:bitstring); (* 6. A -> B : SRES2 4 *)
if sres2X = e1(kinit_b , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_b) then
in(dd ,x:bitstring);
let z = sdec(x,kinit_b) in
if z = s then
0.
process
(
(! processA) | (! processB) | (! processUA) | (! processUB)
)
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A.3 Bluetooth Legacy Pairing - scenario iii
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdAe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Types *)
type key.
type nonce.
type ui_input.
type ui_message.
(* Symetric Encryption *)
fun senc(bitstring , key): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring , k : key; sdec(senc(m,k), k) = m.
(* Ceremony/Protocol Specific Functions *)
fun e22(bitstring ,bitstring ,nonce) : key.
fun e1(key ,bitstring ,bitstring) : bitstring.
(* Public information *)
free BD_ADDR_A : bitstring. (* A’s Bluetooth address *)
free BD_ADDR_B : bitstring. (* B’s Bluetooth address *)
(* Private information *)
free pin:bitstring[private ].
(* Queries / Tests *)
free s:bitstring[private ]. (* secret that the attacker should not
be able to obtain *)
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query attacker(s).
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in (hdA , pin_reqX : ui_message); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ
*)
out (hh , pin); (* 5. UA -hh -> UB : PIN *)
out (hdA , pin). (* 6. UA -hh -> A : PIN *)
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in (hdB , pin_reqX : ui_message); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ
*)
in (hh , pinX : bitstring); (* 5. UA -hh -> UB : PIN REQ *)
out (hdB , pinX). (* 7. UB -hh -> B : PIN *)
(* Device A *)
let processA =
new in_rand : nonce;
out(dd , in_rand); (* 1. A -> B : IN_RAND *)
in(dd , accept: ui_input); (* 2. B -> A : ACCEPT *)
new pin_reqa : ui_message;
out(hdA , pin_reqa); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ *)
in (hdA , pinX : bitstring); (* 6. UA -hd -> A : PIN *)
let kinit_a = e22(BD_ADDR_B , pinX , in_rand) in (* A
generates Kinit *)
new au_rand_a : bitstring;
out(dd , au_rand_a); (* 3. A -> B : AU_RANDa *)
in(dd, sres1X:bitstring); (* 4. B -> A : SRES1 *)
if sres1X = e1(kinit_a , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_a) then
in(dd, au_rand_bX:bitstring); (* 5. B -> A : AU_RANDb *)
let sres2 = e1(kinit_a , BD_ADDR_A , au_rand_bX) in
out(dd , sres2); (* 6. A -> B : SRES2 *)
out(dd , senc(s,kinit_a)).
(* Device B *)
let processB =
in(dd, in_randX : nonce); (* 1. A -> B : IN_RAND *)
new accept:ui_input;
out(dd , accept); (* 2. B -> A : ACCEPT *)
new pin_reqb : ui_message;
151
out(hdB , pin_reqb); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ *)
in (hdB , pinX : bitstring); (* 7. UB -hd -> B : PIN *)
let kinit_b = e22(BD_ADDR_B , pinX , in_randX) in (* B
generates Kinit *)
in(dd , au_rand_aX:bitstring); (* 3. A -> B : AU_RANDa *)
let sres1 = e1(kinit_b , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_aX) in (* calculate
SRES1 *)
out(dd , sres1); (* 4. B -> A : SRES1 *)
new au_rand_b : bitstring;
out(dd , au_rand_b); (* 5. B -> A : AU_RANDb *)
in(dd , sres2X:bitstring); (* 6. A -> B : SRES2 4 *)
if sres2X = e1(kinit_b , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_b) then
in(dd ,x:bitstring);
let z = sdec(x,kinit_b) in
if z = s then
0.
process
(
(! processA) | (! processB) | (! processUA) | (! processUB)
| (!in(hdA ,x:bitstring); out(hdAe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive attacker
(simulates eavesdrop on hdA) *)
| (!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
(simulates eavesdrop on hdB) *)
| (!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker (
simulates eavesdrop on hh) *)
)
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A.4 Bluetooth Legacy Pairing - scenario iv
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdAe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Types *)
type key.
type nonce.
type ui_input.
type ui_message.
(* Symetric Encryption *)
fun senc(bitstring , key): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring , k : key; sdec(senc(m,k), k) = m.
(* Ceremony/Protocol Specific Functions *)
fun e22(bitstring ,bitstring ,nonce) : key.
fun e1(key ,bitstring ,bitstring) : bitstring.
(* Public information *)
free BD_ADDR_A : bitstring. (* A’s Bluetooth address *)
free BD_ADDR_B : bitstring. (* B’s Bluetooth address *)
(* Private information *)
free pin:bitstring[private ].
weaksecret pin.
(* Queries / Tests *)
free s:bitstring[private ]. (* secret that the attacker should not
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be able to obtain *)
query attacker(s).
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in (hdA , pin_reqX : ui_message); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ
*)
out (hh , pin); (* 5. UA -hh -> UB : PIN *)
out (hdA , pin). (* 6. UA -hh -> A : PIN *)
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in (hdB , pin_reqX : ui_message); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ
*)
in (hh , pinX : bitstring); (* 5. UA -hh -> UB : PIN REQ *)
out (hdB , pinX). (* 7. UB -hh -> B : PIN *)
(* Device A *)
let processA =
new in_rand : nonce;
out(dd , in_rand); (* 1. A -> B : IN_RAND *)
in(dd , accept: ui_input); (* 2. B -> A : ACCEPT *)
new pin_reqa : ui_message;
out(hdA , pin_reqa); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ *)
in (hdA , pinX : bitstring); (* 6. UA -hd -> A : PIN *)
let kinit_a = e22(BD_ADDR_B , pinX , in_rand) in (* A
generates Kinit *)
new au_rand_a : bitstring;
out(dd , au_rand_a); (* 3. A -> B : AU_RANDa *)
in(dd , sres1X:bitstring); (* 4. B -> A : SRES1 *)
if sres1X = e1(kinit_a , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_a) then
in(dd , au_rand_bX:bitstring); (* 5. B -> A : AU_RANDb *)
let sres2 = e1(kinit_a , BD_ADDR_A , au_rand_bX) in
out(dd , sres2); (* 6. A -> B : SRES2 *)
out(dd , senc(s,kinit_a)).
(* Device B *)
let processB =
in(dd, in_randX : nonce); (* 1. A -> B : IN_RAND *)
new accept:ui_input;
out(dd , accept); (* 2. B -> A : ACCEPT *)
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new pin_reqb : ui_message;
out(hdB , pin_reqb); (* 3. A -hd -> UA : PIN REQ *)
in (hdB , pinX : bitstring); (* 7. UB -hd -> B : PIN *)
let kinit_b = e22(BD_ADDR_B , pinX , in_randX) in (* B
generates Kinit *)
in(dd , au_rand_aX:bitstring); (* 3. A -> B : AU_RANDa *)
let sres1 = e1(kinit_b , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_aX) in (* calculate
SRES1 *)
out(dd , sres1); (* 4. B -> A : SRES1 *)
new au_rand_b : bitstring;
out(dd , au_rand_b); (* 5. B -> A : AU_RANDb *)
in(dd , sres2X:bitstring); (* 6. A -> B : SRES2 4 *)
if sres2X = e1(kinit_b , BD_ADDR_B ,au_rand_b) then
in(dd ,x:bitstring);
let z = sdec(x,kinit_b) in
if z = s then
0.
process
(
(! processA) | (! processB) | (! processUA) | (! processUB)
| (!in(hdA ,x:bitstring); out(hdAe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive attacker
(simulates eavesdrop on hdA) *)
| (!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
(simulates eavesdrop on hdB) *)
| (!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker (
simulates eavesdrop on hh) *)
)
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Appendix B
Proverif Source Code of
Bluetooth SSP Ceremonies
B.1 Bluetooth SSP - scenario i
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
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(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd, pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
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new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
new okA : nonce;
out(hdA , (Va ,okA)); (* msg 6 ... A -HD -> UA : Va *)
in(hdA ,=okA); (* msg 10 ... UA -HD -> A : ok *)
event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
new okB : nonce;
out(hdB , (Vb ,okB)); (* msg 7 ... B -HD -> UB : Vb *)
in(hdB ,=okB); (* msg 11 ... UB -HD -> B : ok *)
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (VaX : bitstring , okAX : nonce));
out(hh , (VaX ,okAX));
in(hh , (VbX: bitstring ,=okAX ,okBX:nonce));
out(hh ,okBX);
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if VbX = VaX then
out(hdA , okAX);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in(hdB , (VbX : bitstring , okBX : nonce));
in(hh , (VaX :bitstring , okAX :nonce));
out(hh , (VbX ,okAX ,okBX));
in(hh ,=okBX);
if VaX = VbX then
out(hdB , okBX);
0.
process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
( (! processA(pk(skA),skA)) | (! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) | (! processUB) )
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B.2 Bluetooth SSP - scenario ii
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdAe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
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event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd , pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
new okA : nonce;
out(hdA , (Va ,okA)); (* msg 6 ... A -HD -> UA : Va *)
in(hdA ,=okA); (* msg 10 ... UA -HD -> A : ok *)
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event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
new okB : nonce;
out(hdB , (Vb ,okB)); (* msg 7 ... B -HD -> UB : Vb *)
in(hdB ,=okB); (* msg 11 ... UB -HD -> B : ok *)
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (VaX : bitstring , okAX : nonce));
out(hh , (VaX ,okAX));
in(hh , (VbX: bitstring ,=okAX ,okBX:nonce));
out(hh ,okBX);
if VbX = VaX then
out(hdA , okAX);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in(hdB , (VbX : bitstring , okBX : nonce));
in(hh , (VaX :bitstring , okAX :nonce));
out(hh , (VbX ,okAX ,okBX));
in(hh ,=okBX);
if VaX = VbX then
out(hdB , okBX);
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0.
process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
(
(! processA(pk(skA),skA)) |
(! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) |
(! processUB) |
(!in(hdA ,x:bitstring); out(hdAe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker *)
)
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B.3 Bluetooth SSP - scenario iii
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdAe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
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event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd , pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
new okA : nonce;
out(hdA , (Va ,okA)); (* msg 6 ... A -HD -> UA : Va *)
in(hdA ,=okA); (* msg 10 ... UA -HD -> A : ok *)
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event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
new okB : nonce;
out(hdB , (Vb ,okB)); (* msg 7 ... B -HD -> UB : Vb *)
in(hdB ,=okB); (* msg 11 ... UB -HD -> B : ok *)
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (VaX : bitstring , okAX : nonce));
out(hh , (VaX ,okAX));
in(hh , (VbX: bitstring ,=okAX ,okBX:nonce));
out(hh ,okBX);
(* if VbX = VaX then *) (* User now doesn ’t compare the numbers
and send Ok anyway *)
out(hdA , okAX);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in(hdB , (VbX : bitstring , okBX : nonce));
in(hh , (VaX :bitstring , okAX :nonce));
out(hh , (VbX ,okAX ,okBX));
in(hh ,=okBX);
if VaX = VbX then
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out(hdB , okBX);
0.
process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
(
(! processA(pk(skA),skA)) |
(! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) |
(! processUB) |
(!in(hdA ,x:bitstring); out(hdAe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker *)
)
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B.4 Bluetooth SSP - scenario iv
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdAe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
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event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd , pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
new okA : nonce;
out(hdA , (Va ,okA)); (* msg 6 ... A -HD -> UA : Va *)
in(hdA ,=okA); (* msg 10 ... UA -HD -> A : ok *)
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event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
new okB : nonce;
out(hdB , (Vb ,okB)); (* msg 7 ... B -HD -> UB : Vb *)
in(hdB ,=okB); (* msg 11 ... UB -HD -> B : ok *)
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (VaX : bitstring , okAX : nonce));
out(hh , (VaX ,okAX));
in(hh , (VbX: bitstring ,=okAX ,okBX:nonce));
out(hh ,okBX);
if VbX = VaX then
out(hdA , okAX);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in(hdB , (VbX : bitstring , okBX : nonce));
in(hh , (VaX :bitstring , okAX :nonce));
out(hh , (VbX ,okAX ,okBX));
in(hh ,=okBX);
(* if VaX = VbX then *) (* User now doesn ’t compare the numbers
and send Ok anyway *)
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out(hdB , okBX);
0.
process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
(
(! processA(pk(skA),skA)) |
(! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) |
(! processUB) |
(!in(hdA ,x:bitstring); out(hdAe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker *)
)
171
B.5 Bluetooth SSP - scenario iv
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdAe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
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event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd , pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
new okA : nonce;
out(hdA , (Va ,okA)); (* msg 6 ... A -HD -> UA : Va *)
in(hdA ,=okA); (* msg 10 ... UA -HD -> A : ok *)
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event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
new okB : nonce;
out(hdB , (Vb ,okB)); (* msg 7 ... B -HD -> UB : Vb *)
in(hdB ,=okB); (* msg 11 ... UB -HD -> B : ok *)
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (VaX : bitstring , okAX : nonce));
out(hh , (VaX ,okAX));
in(hh , (VbX: bitstring ,=okAX ,okBX:nonce));
out(hh ,okBX);
(* if VbX = VaX then *) (* User now doesn ’t compare the numbers
and send Ok anyway *)
out(hdA , okAX);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in(hdB , (VbX : bitstring , okBX : nonce));
in(hh , (VaX :bitstring , okAX :nonce));
out(hh , (VbX ,okAX ,okBX));
in(hh ,=okBX);
(* if VaX = VbX then *) (* User now doesn ’t compare the numbers
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and send Ok anyway *)
out(hdB , okBX);
0.
process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
(
(! processA(pk(skA),skA)) |
(! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) |
(! processUB) |
(!in(hdA ,x:bitstring); out(hdAe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker *)
)
175
B.6 Bluetooth SSP - scenario vi
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel. (* human -device channel (no attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
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event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd , pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
new okA : nonce;
out(hdA , (Va ,okA)); (* msg 6 ... A -HD -> UA : Va *)
in(hdA ,=okA); (* msg 10 ... UA -HD -> A : ok *)
event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
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0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
new okB : nonce;
out(hdB , (Vb ,okB)); (* msg 7 ... B -HD -> UB : Vb *)
in(hdB ,=okB); (* msg 11 ... UB -HD -> B : ok *)
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (VaX : bitstring , okAX : nonce));
out(hh , (VaX ,okAX));
in(hh , (VbX: bitstring ,=okAX ,okBX:nonce));
out(hh ,okBX);
if VbX = VaX then
out(hdA , okAX);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in(hdB , (VbX : bitstring , okBX : nonce));
in(hh , (VaX :bitstring , okAX :nonce));
out(hh , (VbX ,okAX ,okBX));
in(hh ,=okBX);
if VaX = VbX then
out(hdB , okBX);
0.
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process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
(
(! processA(pk(skA),skA)) |
(! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) |
(! processUB) |
(!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker *)
)
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Appendix C
Proverif Source Code of
Bluetooth SSP Ceremonies -
Amended Version
C.1 Bluetooth SSP amended version - scenario i
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
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(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* Functions for truncating Vs *)
fun splitVsP1(bitstring) : bitstring.
fun splitVsP2(bitstring) : bitstring.
reduc forall x: bitstring; mergeVs(splitVsP1(x),splitVsP2(x)) = x
.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
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query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd , pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
let part1Va = splitVsP1(Va) in
out(hdA , part1Va);
in(hdA , part2VbX :bitstring);
if Va = mergeVs(part1Va ,part2VbX) then
event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
let part2Vb = splitVsP2(Vb) in
out(hdB , part2Vb);
in(hdB , part1VaX :bitstring);
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if Vb = mergeVs(part1VaX ,part2Vb) then
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (trVa1 : bitstring));
out(hh , trVa1);
in(hh , trVb2 :bitstring);
out(hdA , trVb2);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in(hdB , (trVb2 : bitstring));
out(hh , trVb2);
in(hh , trVa1 : bitstring);
out(hdB , trVa1);
0.
process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
(
(! processA(pk(skA),skA)) |
(! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) |
(! processUB)
)
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C.2 Bluetooth SSP amended version - scenario ii
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdAe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* Functions for truncating Vs *)
fun splitVsP1(bitstring) : bitstring.
fun splitVsP2(bitstring) : bitstring.
reduc forall x: bitstring; mergeVs(splitVsP1(x),splitVsP2(x)) = x
.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
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(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd , pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
185
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
let part1Va = splitVsP1(Va) in
out(hdA , part1Va);
in(hdA , part2VbX :bitstring);
if Va = mergeVs(part1Va ,part2VbX) then
event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
let part2Vb = splitVsP2(Vb) in
out(hdB , part2Vb);
in(hdB , part1VaX :bitstring);
if Vb = mergeVs(part1VaX ,part2Vb) then
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (trVa1 : bitstring));
out(hh , trVa1);
in(hh , trVb2 :bitstring);
out(hdA , trVb2);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
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in(hdB , (trVb2 : bitstring));
out(hh , trVb2);
in(hh , trVa1 : bitstring);
out(hdB , trVa1);
0.
process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
(
(! processA(pk(skA),skA)) |
(! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) |
(! processUB) |
(!in(hdA ,x:bitstring); out(hdAe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker *)
)
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C.3 Bluetooth SSP amended version - scenario vi
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel. (* human -device channel (no attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (eavesdrop) *)
free hh : channel [private ]. (* human -human channel (no attackers
) *)
free hhe : channel. (* human -human channel (eavesdrop) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Types and functions for public key cryptography *)
type skey.
type pkey.
fun pk(skey):pkey.
(* Commitment function *)
fun f1(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,bitstring):bitstring.
(* Confirmation value *)
fun g(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce):bitstring.
(* Functions for truncating Vs *)
fun splitVsP1(bitstring) : bitstring.
fun splitVsP2(bitstring) : bitstring.
reduc forall x: bitstring; mergeVs(splitVsP1(x),splitVsP2(x)) = x
.
(* zero *)
const zero:bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginAparam(pkey).
event beginBparam(pkey).
188
event endAparam(pkey).
event endBparam(pkey).
event beginAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event beginBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endAConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
event endBConfirm(pkey ,pkey ,nonce ,nonce).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginAparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> event (beginBparam
(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endAparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginAparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyX:pkey; inj -event (endBparam(pkeyX)) ==> inj -event (
beginBparam(pkeyX)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event (
endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event (endAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginAConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; event(
endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
query pkeyW:pkey , pkeyX:pkey , nonceY:nonce , nonceZ:nonce; inj -
event(endBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)) ==> inj -event(
beginBConfirm(pkeyW ,pkeyX ,nonceY ,nonceZ)).
(* Device A *)
let processA(pkA:pkey , skA:skey) =
out(dd , pkA); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
in(dd , pkBX :pkey); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
event beginBparam(pkBX);
new Na :nonce;
in(dd , CbX :bitstring); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,
PKa ’,Nb ,0) *)
out(dd , Na); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
in(dd , NbX :nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
event beginBConfirm(pkA , pkBX , Na, NbX);
if CbX = f1(pkBX , pkA , NbX , zero) then (* checking commitment
value *)
let Va = g(pkA , pkBX , Na , NbX) in
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let part1Va = splitVsP1(Va) in
out(hdA , part1Va);
in(hdA , part2VbX :bitstring);
if Va = mergeVs(part1Va ,part2VbX) then
event endAparam(pkA);
event endAConfirm(pkA ,pkBX ,Na,NbX);
0.
(* Device B *)
let processB(pkB:pkey , skB:skey) =
in(dd , pkAX :pkey); (* msg 1 ... A -DD -> B : PKa *)
event beginAparam(pkAX);
out(dd , pkB); (* msg 2 ... B -DD -> A : PKb *)
new Nb : nonce;
let Cb=f1(pkB , pkAX , Nb , zero) in
out(dd , Cb); (* msg 3 ... B -DD -> A : Cb = f1(PKb ,PKa ’,Nb ,0)
*)
in(dd , NaX :nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD -> B : Na *)
event beginAConfirm(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb);
out(dd ,Nb); (* msg 5 ... B -DD -> A : Nb *)
let Vb = g(pkAX , pkB , NaX , Nb) in
let part2Vb = splitVsP2(Vb) in
out(hdB , part2Vb);
in(hdB , part1VaX :bitstring);
if Vb = mergeVs(part1VaX ,part2Vb) then
event endBparam(pkB);
event endBConfirm(pkAX ,pkB ,NaX ,Nb);
0.
(* User A *)
let processUA =
in(hdA , (trVa1 : bitstring));
out(hh , trVa1);
in(hh , trVb2 :bitstring);
out(hdA , trVb2);
0.
(* User B *)
let processUB =
in(hdB , (trVb2 : bitstring));
out(hh , trVb2);
in(hh , trVa1 : bitstring);
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out(hdB , trVa1);
0.
process
new skA:skey;
new skB:skey;
(
(! processA(pk(skA),skA)) |
(! processB(pk(skB),skB)) |
(! processUA) |
(! processUB) |
(!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
(!in(hh ,x:bitstring); out(hhe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hh to hh to reproduce a passive attacker *)
)
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Appendix D
Proverif Source Code of
WhatsApp Ceremonies
D.1 WhatsApp Registration Ceremony - scenario i
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free hd : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hde : channel. (* human -device channel (no attackers) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Public Phone Number *)
free Num : bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginSparam(bitstring).
event endSparam(bitstring).
query NumX : bitstring; event (endSparam(NumX)) ==> event (
beginSparam(NumX)).
(* User A *)
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let processUA =
out(hd , Num); (* msg 1 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
0.
(* Agent A - WhatsApp *)
let processA =
in(hd, NumX:bitstring); (* msg 1 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
out(dd , NumX); (* msg 2 ... A -DD -> S : Num *)
event beginSparam(NumX);
in(dd, RegConf:bitstring); (* msg 3 ... S -DD -> A : RegConf
*)
0.
(* Server S *)
let processS =
in(dd, NumX:bitstring); (* msg 2 ... A -DD -> S : Num *)
event endSparam(NumX);
new RegConf:bitstring;
out(dd ,RegConf); (* msg 3 ... S -DD -> A : RegConf *)
0.
process
(
(! processUA) |
(! processA) |
(! processS) |
(!in(hd,x:bitstring); out(hde ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive
attacker *)
)
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D.2 WhatsApp Registration Ceremony - scenario ii
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free dd2 : channel [private ]. (* device -device authenticated
channel *)
free dd3 : channel [private ]. (* device -device channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Public Phone Number *)
free Num : bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginSparam(nonce).
event endSparam(nonce).
query PINx : nonce; event (endSparam(PINx)) ==> event (
beginSparam(PINx)).
(* User A *)
let processUA =
out(hdA , Num); (* msg 1 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
in(hdB , PINx:nonce); (* msg 7 ... B -HD -> UA : PIN *)
out(hdA , PINx); (* msg 8 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
0.
(* Agent A - WhatsApp *)
let processA =
in(hdA , NumX:bitstring); (* msg 1 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
out(dd , NumX); (* msg 2 ... A -DD -> S : Num *)
in(dd, (NumRec:bitstring ,PINx:nonce)); (* msg 3 ... S -DD -> A
: NumRec , PIN *)
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event beginSparam(PINx);
out(dd3 , PINx); (* msg 4 ... A -DD3 -> B : PIN *)
in(hdA , PINb:nonce); (* msg 8 ... Ua -HD -> A : PIN *)
out(dd , PINb); (* msg 9 ... A -DD -> S : PIN *)
in(dd , RegConf:bitstring); (* msg 10 ... S -DD -> A : RegConf
*)
0.
(* Agent B - SMS App *)
let processB =
in(dd3 , PINx:nonce); (* msg 4 ... A -DD3 -> B : PIN *)
out(dd2 , PINx); (* msg 5 ... B -DD2 -> SC : PIN *)
in(dd2 , PINsc:nonce); (* msg 6 ... SC -DD2 -> B : PIN *)
out(hdB , PINsc); (* msg 7 ... B -HD -> UA : PIN *)
0.
(* Server SMSC *)
let processSMSC =
in(dd2 , PINx:nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -DD2 -> SC : PIN *)
out(dd2 , PINx); (* msg 6 ... SC -DD2 -> B : PIN *)
0.
(* Server S *)
let processS =
in(dd, NumX:bitstring); (* msg 2 ... A -DD -> S : Num *)
new NumRec:bitstring;
new PIN:nonce;
out(dd , (NumRec ,PIN)); (* msg 3 ... S -DD -> A : NumRec *)
in(dd, PINx:nonce); (* msg 9 ... A -DD -> S : PINx *)
if PINx = PIN then
event endSparam(PIN);
new RegConf:bitstring;
out(dd ,RegConf); (* msg 10 ... S -DD -> A : RegConf *)
0.
process
(
(! processUA) |
(! processA) |
(! processB) |
(! processS)
)
195
D.3 WhatsApp Registration Ceremony - scenario iv
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free dd2 : channel [private ]. (* device -device authenticated
channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Public Phone Number *)
free Num : bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginSparam(nonce).
event endSparam(nonce).
query PINx : nonce; event (endSparam(PINx)) ==> event (
beginSparam(PINx)).
query PINx : nonce; inj -event (endSparam(PINx)) ==> inj -event (
beginSparam(PINx)).
(*
With the setting (set ignoreTypes = false), the protocol respects
the type system.
However , it finds fewer attacks.
In this specific case , respecting types is relevant since the
human -interaction
here cannot ignore types , but it should be carefully used for
other interactions.
I recommend test without it first on every scenario and check
whether the termination
problem is really related to it.
*)
set ignoreTypes = false.
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(* User A *)
let processUA =
out(hdA , Num); (* msg 1 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
in(hdB , PINx:nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -HD -> UA : PIN *)
out(hdA , PINx); (* msg 6 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
0.
(* Agent A - WhatsApp *)
let processA =
in(hdA , NumX:bitstring); (* msg 1 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
out(dd , NumX); (* msg 2 ... A -DD -> S : Num *)
in(dd, NumRec:bitstring); (* msg 3 ... S -DD -> A : NumRec *)
in(hdA , PINx:nonce); (* msg 6 ... Ua -HD -> A : PIN *)
(* colocando event beginSparam(PINx) aqui antes , eu forco o
caso de que A sempre envia o PINx antes - free from MITM
attacks due to SSL *)
event beginSparam(PINx);
out(dd , PINx); (* msg 7 ... A -DD -> S : PIN *)
(* colocando aqui depois , eu mostro o caso onde onde pode
existir MITM *)
in(dd, RegConf:bitstring); (* msg 8 ... S -DD -> A : RegConf
*)
0.
(* Agent B - SMS App *)
let processB =
in(dd2 , PINx:nonce); (* msg 4 ... S -DDs -> B : PIN *)
out(hdB , PINx); (* msg 5 ... B -HD -> UA : PIN *)
0.
(* Server S *)
let processS =
in(dd, NumX:bitstring); (* msg 2 ... A -DD -> S : Num *)
new NumRec:bitstring;
out(dd , NumRec); (* msg 3 ... S -DD -> A : NumRec *)
new PIN:nonce;
out(dd2 , PIN); (* msg 4 ... S -DDs -> B : PIN *)
in(dd, PINx:nonce); (* msg 7 ... A -DD -> S : PINx *)
if PINx = PIN then
new RegConf:bitstring;
out(dd ,RegConf); (* msg 8 ... S -DD -> A : RegConf *)
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event endSparam(PIN);
0.
process
(
(! processUA) |
(! processA) |
(! processB) |
(! processS)
)
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D.4 WhatsApp Registration Ceremony - scenario i
(*-----------------------------------------------
Protocol specification
-----------------------------------------------*)
(* Channels *)
free dd : channel. (* device -device channel *)
free dd2 : channel [private ]. (* device -device authenticated
channel *)
free hdA : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdAe : channel. (* human -device channel (no attackers) *)
free hdB : channel [private ]. (* human -device channel (no
attackers) *)
free hdBe : channel. (* human -device channel (no attackers) *)
(* Defining type nonce *)
type nonce.
(* Public Phone Number *)
free Num : bitstring.
(* Queries and events *)
event beginSparam(nonce).
event endSparam(nonce).
query PINx : nonce; event (endSparam(PINx)) ==> event (
beginSparam(PINx)).
query PINx : nonce; inj -event (endSparam(PINx)) ==> inj -event (
beginSparam(PINx)).
(* User A *)
let processUA =
out(hdA , Num); (* msg 1 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
in(hdB , PINx:nonce); (* msg 5 ... B -HD -> UA : PIN *)
out(hdA , PINx); (* msg 6 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
0.
(* Agent A - WhatsApp *)
let processA =
in(hdA , NumX:bitstring); (* msg 1 ... Ua -HD -> A : Num *)
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out(dd , NumX); (* msg 2 ... A -DD -> S : Num *)
in(dd , NumRec:bitstring); (* msg 3 ... S -DD -> A : NumRec *)
in(hdA , PINx:nonce); (* msg 6 ... Ua -HD -> A : PIN *)
event beginSparam(PINx);
out(dd , PINx); (* msg 7 ... A -DD -> S : PIN *)
in(dd , RegConf:bitstring); (* msg 8 ... S -DD -> A : RegConf
*)
0.
(* Agent B - SMS App *)
let processB =
in(dd2 , PINx:nonce); (* msg 4 ... S -DDs -> B : PIN *)
out(hdB , PINx); (* msg 5 ... B -HD -> UA : PIN *)
0.
(* Server S *)
let processS =
in(dd, NumX:bitstring); (* msg 2 ... A -DD -> S : Num *)
new NumRec:bitstring;
out(dd , NumRec); (* msg 3 ... S -DD -> A : NumRec *)
new PIN:nonce;
out(dd2 , PIN); (* msg 4 ... S -DDs -> B : PIN *)
in(dd, PINx:nonce); (* msg 7 ... A -DD -> S : PINx *)
if PINx = PIN then
new RegConf:bitstring;
out(dd ,RegConf); (* msg 8 ... S -DD -> A : RegConf *)
event endSparam(PIN);
0.
process
(
(! processUA) |
(! processA) |
(! processB) |
(! processS) |
(!in(hdA ,x:bitstring); out(hdAe ,x)) | (* this replicates
everything in hdA to hdAe to reproduce a passive
attacker *)
(!in(hdB ,x:bitstring); out(hdBe ,x)) (* this replicates
everything in hdB to hdBe to reproduce a passive attacker
*)
)
200
